

you are not trusted, and the Germans are dangerous... Yes, I could not meet a worthy opponent. But knowing the multiple superiority of the Soviet troops, I wanted to fight them, guided by your Suvorov commandment: defeat the larger enemy with the smallest number. Unfortunately, in Crimea, I did not manage to do this ...

It seems that von Manstein was a little cunning, because what he managed to do under the walls of Sevastopol and on the Kerch bridgehead is the pinnacle of his unique military talent. The quality that manifests itself in units; Talented generals are, after all, not such a frequent occurrence in the history of world wars.

[chapter 23

VIOLENCE AS A COMPONENT PATRIOTISM

Having looked at how the battle for the Crimea took place, let's return to some of the briefly described events. The foregoing was necessary for the very reason that to avoid the imposed pattern: when it was about the enemy, Soviet writers and historians most often got off with frightening characteristics like "superior to the formidable forces of the damned fascists." Showing the absurdity and lies aimed at fooling my own fellow citizens, I in no way

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I belittle the exploits and heroic struggle of ordinary defenders of the Crimea. I'm just trying to answer the question: why, why, in the name of what do people die?!

So what and how was done at the headquarters of the Crimean Front and the Black Sea Fleet from 1941 to 1942?

On September 9, 1941, the fleet headquarters received a telegram for the deputy chief of the Main Naval Staff approving the land defense plan for Sevastopol presented in August.

In early September, according to the order of the fleet headquarters, as Soviet sources indicate, replenishment of about 4,000 people arrived in the Coastal Defense, of which two more battalions were formed and artillery units were understaffed.

In mid-September 1941, the Military Council of the Fleet appointed a commission to select the forward line of defense of the Main Base. The commission included: P. A. Morgunov (chairman), V. G. Paramonov, E. I. Zhidilov, N. A. Egorov, M. G. Fokin, N. A. Baranov, B. K. Sokolov, P.I. Bukharov, and so-

same sector commanders and the most qualified specialists in engineering.

Soviet historians write that on September 20, 1941, Wehrmacht broke through the Ishun positions without much effort and broke into the open spaces of the Crimea. And at the same time, they do not indicate at all that these positions were supposed to be held by the troops of the 9th Special Rifle Corps, which in their power exceeded the forces of almost any Wehrmacht army (as a military association).

Soviet historians point out that the enemy attacked Sevastopol with four infantry and one motorized divisions. And five infantry, one motorized division and two cavalry brigades - in the direction of Kerch. Other information was given above, by what forces the corps of General Batov was destroyed and what forces after the September battles were left with General von Manstein after von Rundstedt took the 49th Corps of General Kübler from him. So von Manstein has 6 infantry di

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visions and the 3rd Romanian army, which suffered losses, which included 3 mountain divisions.

After the defeat of the 9th Special Rifle Corps, the unification of General von Manstein cut off the retreat of the remnants of the corps of General Batov, and forced the Separate Maritime Army to withdraw through the mountain range to Alushta and Yalta. By November 9, 1941, the troops of the Primorsky Army, half-destroyed and having lost their heavy weapons, hardly reached Sevastopol. The 51st Army, which, due to the lack of organization of Commander General Lvov and his headquarters, was unable to gain a foothold on the Turkish Wall, retreated in the direction of Kerch with heavy losses.

The formations of the army and the 9th OSK surrendered as quickly as their generals, commissars, commanders and special officers fled east (to Kerch and the Caucasus). The process of synchronous flight in different directions! The troops threw not only military equipment and weapons, but also the wounded. So great was the fear of the Soviet generals before the offensive impulse of the Wehrmacht unit, insignificant in comparison with the number of Soviet troops.

Many years later, on December 18, 1958 and May 19, 1961, military-historical conferences were held, which Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who had repeatedly officially applied to the highest authorities of the Soviet government, tried so hard to get (!) for obvious reasons, received numerous refusals from the Soviet leadership.

From the transcript of a speech at the first conference by Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky: "In the first ten days of November 1941, when we fought off the first assault on

Ords, once the Commander of the Primorsky Army, Major General Petrov, came to my command post with his adjutant. Of course, we usually do not write about such events and do not speak to the broad masses, but I want to tell you for orientation. The chief of staff of the fleet, a member of the Military Council, was with me at my coastal flagship command post. General Petrov, coming in to me, put his hands on his head, burst into tears (naturally), declared: "Comrade Commander

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blowing, I have nothing, where you order me to go. It was clear that the general was without an army, he had lost his army, he came to me shabby, dirty, demoralized. What do you say to such a general?

- And where is your Primorsky army?

The general could not say anything intelligible. Somewhere in the mountains, someone is making their way to Yalta, but there is no army as such, it has collapsed.

So, did anyone really want to fight for SUCH generals, NOT sparing their lives?!

And is it not for this "heroic" loss of the army and future losses, or for the tears on the shoulder of the former commander, General of the Army I.E. Petrov became a Hero of the Soviet Union (1945), was awarded five Orders of Lenin, two military orders ?!

As is known, by October 23, 1941, the Stavka appointed Vice-Admiral Gordey Ivanovich Levchenko, Deputy Commissar of the Navy, Commander of the Crimean Front.

It has already been pointed out that Levchenko never commanded ground units and formations, had neither theory nor experience in commanding army troops. And the 51st Army, which suffered significant losses in equipment and personnel, was demoralized. The Special Seaside Army, having experience in defensive battles in Odessa, somehow came to its senses and took up positions for the defense of the city.

Historians consider it a major miscalculation that by the beginning of the defense of the Crimea, defensive lines had not been created either in the Perekop area or in the Ishun positions. However, the geographical conditions of these places are already difficult to overcome barriers, such is the terrain. Which the red generals could not use wisely ...

Having entered the Crimea, the 11th Army skillfully carried out the plan of its commander, cut off the escape routes of the Primorsky Army, blockaded the troops on the Kerch bridgehead, and with its aircraft systematically destroyed naval bases and ports, and destroyed transports with ammunition. So, during one of the raids on Kerch, 50 wagons were blown up on transport

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new ammunition, a minesweeper, 3 barges, a tugboat and a bo-linder were sunk. After that, the commander of the fleet, Vice-Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, ordered all large ships to be urgently withdrawn from Sevastopol to the ports of the Caucasus, and the fleet headquarters to be relocated to Tuapse.

On the night of November 1, 1941, the main base - Sevastopol - left the battleship "Paris Commune", the cruiser "Molotov", the leader "Tashkent", the destroyer "Savvy" and two submarines.

And in the afternoon the Luftwaffe raid began.

Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov in the book "On the Course to Victory" writes: "As early as October 31, while fulfilling the order of the Headquarters, in Arkhangelsk I received a telegram from the head of the Main Military School I. S. Isakov. He reported that the command of the Black Sea Fleet was proposing to transfer the ships to the ports of the Caucasian coast. The head of the Main Staff believed that the artillery ships should be left in Sevastopol, most of the submarines and part of the auxiliary vessels that were not needed to provide for the warships remaining in Sevastopol, it was advisable to transfer to the east, to the ports of the Caucasian coast for basing the ship fleet. And S. Isakov asked to approve these proposals for giving instructions to the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet.

After agreeing with Moscow, the people's commissar (internally disagreeing with this cowardly flight and withdrawal of warships) agreed to the transfer.

Further, he writes: "... on November 4, the commander of the fleet sent a telegram addressed to I.V. Stalin and the people's commissar of the Navy, in which he reported that there had been a sharp deterioration in the situation, and proposed to withdraw the combat strength of the fleet from Sevastopol and disperse it over bases of the Caucasian coast.

However, the author, knowing many of the nuances, does not indicate them in his book, speaking in vague allusions, however, as was customary during the prosperity of the Soviet regime. He does not say, for example, that this telegram, which speaks of the deterioration of the situation, in no way justifies the actions of the commander, but only aggravates them by the fact that he, as a commander

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the commander of the fleet and the head of the SOG, many times superior to the forces of the fleet and the army, did not organize the destruction of the 54th German corps, which blocked the Belbek valley and covered the artillery and parts of the Separate Primorskaya with heavy artillery shells of siege guns

army on the positions of the Mekenziev mountains.

Nor does he want to mention that the relief of the terrain—the Mekenzievy Mountains, Inkerman, Bartenevka, where the bloody battles took place, is naturally a rather impregnable bastion of Sevastopol. And the heights of Sapun-gory? This is an exceptional defensive line ...

Speaking about the events in the Crimea, the admiral did not write that he, together with Levchenko and the command of the Southern Direction, discussed a possible decision to appoint General P. I. Batov as commander of the 51st Separate Army. But is it possible to trust the army to a general who has previously destroyed the most powerful corps in the Red Army? So the “contribution” of this man to the loss of Sevastopol was doubly, for which, for sure, Pavel Ivanovich was subsequently awarded two Gold Stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union: one for each catastrophe in which hundreds of thousands of souls of Russian people and other peoples were killed countries...

The telegram to Stalin said that the presence of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol was unnecessary. Kuznetsov considered this incorrect, as well as the change of commanders of the 51st Army, which was carried out by the command of the SOR and the Crimean Front. After the meetings of Nikolai Gerasimovich with Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, the decision on Sevastopol was formalized in a different document - signed by I. V. Stalin and B. M. Shaposhnikov, and below N. G. Kuznetsov. The meaning of the decision was to pin down the enemy forces in the Crimea and prevent him from entering the Caucasus through the Taman Peninsula. The headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered: the main task of the Black Sea Fleet is the active defense of Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula. Sevastopol categorically do not take!

Then the Military Council of the Fleet decided:

1. Withdraw the main forces of the fleet to the Caucasus, leaving in the city 2 old cruisers, 4 obsolete destroyers, which

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they will have to destroy enemy forces, several more minesweepers and boats with artillery fire; transfer part of the seamen to the marines.

2. Evacuate to the Caucasus all the ships under construction, the Marine Plant and the workshops of the rear of the fleet.

3. Relocate all aviation to the airfields of the Caucasus, leaving only a small number of aircraft in the Sevastopol area.

4. Evacuate the logistics departments to Poti and Samtredi.

5. Organize a flagship command post in Tuapse, where to transfer the headquarters and establishments of the fleet.

The leadership of the defense of Sevastopol was entrusted to Oktyabrsky with his subordination to Vice-Admiral Levchenko. Levchenko was supposed to be in Kerch. Chief of Staff Eliseev - in Tuapse. And General Batov was appointed the immediate head of the defense of the Kerch Peninsula.

Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Fleet, ordered Oktyabrsky not to leave the city under any circumstances, but he ... did not comply with the order and, leaving the main base for the umpteenth time, departed for Tuapse. Under the cover of his patron - the head of the Main Staff, admiral Isakov.

On the eve of the most important communist holiday, November 6, 1941, F. S. Oktyabrsky gives a new telegram, but to Stalin personally, that the situation is critical... What a disaster! Well, Philip Sergeyevich would take it and write to the Supreme Commander: "I have a battleship, cruisers, leaders, destroyers, submarines, the Primorsky Army and the 51st Separate Army, battery artillery, the terrain in favor of the fleet and my position is not critical! - because the enemy is attacking me with the forces of one corps, consisting of two infantry divisions battered in battles, which support weak Romanian formations and a special division of siege weapons located in the area of the Kacha River. I have my own aviation, only the raids of the Luftwaffe of the 8th Air Corps are significant, but we are not afraid of them ... "But the admiral wrote an outright lie:" The enemy has a numerical superiority in tanks, in aviation, in infantry and continuously attacks main base.

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Dönitz's submariners and Raeder's warships are raging in the sea, the Italian fleet is about to enter the sea with its battleships and heavy cruisers "...

Truly fear has big eyes!

Once again I remind the reader that there were no tanks in the 54th Corps, which blockaded Sevastopol. Just as there was no siege artillery (it was subordinate to the commander of the 11th Army). There were only tankettes, which Soviet political workers mistook for "terrible heavy tanks", and, speaking of them, they did not subsequently explain to gullible readers and listeners why these so-called "tanks", since they were "heavy tanks", were advancing. not along the convenient road Simferopol - Sevastopol, which runs along the Belbek valley, but climbed up ... the mountain - walked over the village of Duvanka at an altitude of 105 m off-road. And then, allegedly, on their way, on the orders of the commander of the marine battalion, five people were thrown out there, led by a political instructor, who, at the cost of their lives, blew up as many as 26 (according to some reports - 18) enemy tanks ... and even in "ve Liky" holiday - November 7, 1941. Ek has a lot of imagination among the members of the Military Council I. I. Azarov and N. M. Kulakov; so frightened of the "overpowering power", and in order to hide

their clumsy actions and not make it clear: why did they still run away, and why could not overcome the smaller enemy forces? - came up with heroic tales; nevertheless achieved the awarding of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to all five participants in this non-existent raid: political instructor Nikolay Dmitrievich Filchenkov, "a teacher and ... a miner by education", sailors Odintsov, Krasnoselsky, Parshin and Tsibulko. The fact that these four sailors fought in the ranks of the marines of the Black Sea Fleet and died in battle is their honor and unforgettable glory; but was there a political instructor ... so here it's more like a familiar communist agitation ...

I cannot resist the temptation to cite this feat in the words of Lieutenant General Morgunov, as described by him in the book "The Heroic Sevastopol" (however, such a story is almost word for word contained in almost every

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source I mentioned above): "During the daytime fighting on November 4th, the local rifle regiment and the 8th Marine Brigade repelled all enemy attacks and held their positions. Particularly stubborn battles took place in the area of the Duvankoi defense center. Building up forces, the enemy forced some units of the 3rd Marine Regiment to retreat to a new line by evening, passing through the villages of Orta Kesek, Biyuk-Otarkoy and high. 65.8. The enemy captured heights 134.3 and 142.8 and, having pressed the Air Force and No. 19 battalions, occupied height. 103.4 and the Kizil-Bair tract north of vil. Duvanka. There was a threat of an enemy breakthrough into the valley of the river. Belbek.

The 17th Marine Battalion (about 600 men) was ordered to move to the Duvankoy area at the disposal of the commander of the 3rd Marine Regiment for a counterattack... ..To prevent the enemy from breaking through, to the area of st. Belbek was urgently transferred from the reserve to the 18th marine battalion, which arrived in the Belbek valley, the railway and the highway to the Mekenzievy mountains and Sevastopol. He was subordinate to the commander of the right subsector of the III sector, Colonel Datsishin...

... The day of the Great October holiday has come. On this day in the area of vil. Duvanka, a group of our fighters, led by political instructor Nikolai Dmitrievich Filchenkov, accomplished an immortal feat. (Agitprop link to the main Bolshevik holiday. - Auth.)

Before the war, N. D. Filchenkov served in the coastal defense as a company political instructor and enjoyed great prestige. Fighters willingly went to him with various questions and always received an exhaustive answer. He was rightfully considered one of the best political instructors in the regiment. (Everyone around was extremely stupid (?) and went to look for answers to all questions, as it should be, to the political instructor - the most literate person in the regiment; comments are superfluous. - Avi.)

After the capture of Duvankoy by the enemy, the 18th battalion of the naval

infantry, in which Filchenkov served, occupied the defense to the west of vil. Duvankoy, saddle Belbek valley and slopes of hills to the south and north of it in the area of Belbek station. And thus covering the approaches to the Mekenziev mountains along the highway and railway ...

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... The command of the battalion, having determined a particularly dangerous direction for tanks on the left flank, decided to send a group of Red Navy men there in order to cover the flank of the battalion from a breakthrough of tanks in the rear of our defense. (And the most "tank-dangerous" direction turned out to be not on the highway, but at an altitude of 105 m along a steep slope! - Avi.)

The battalion commissar, senior political instructor E. A. Melnik, who replaced the ill commander, chose political instructor Filchenkov and Red Navy Komsomol members Ivan Krasnoselsky, Daniil Odintsov, Yuri Parshin and Vasily Tsibulko from among the volunteers who volunteered, setting them the task of taking up defense behind the height by the morning of November 7, dig in and not let the enemy tanks with infantry through. The group was armed with machine guns, rifles, grenades and Molotov cocktails...

... Having let the tanks come closer, he (Filchenkov. - Avi.) gave a signal to Tsibulko to open fire from a machine gun on the viewing slots. The lead tank whirled in place and stopped: Tsibulko's well-aimed burst killed the driver. (And what are these formidable tanks that can be mowed down with a burst?! - Avi.)

A bunch of grenades Krasnoselsky knocked out the second tank. Filchenkov, Odintsov and Parshin set fire to two more tanks with bottles of combustible mixture, which stopped in flames. Under machine-gun fire, the German infantry lay down. The remaining tanks turned back, and the submachine gunners rolled back behind them. (Not a fight, but a Hollywood scene with James Bond house. - Avi.)

The first attack was repulsed. But the sailors knew that they had to wait for a new, stronger attack, and prepared to repel it.

A few hours later tanks appeared again. Now there were fifteen of them. Machine gunners followed the tanks.

The sailors shook hands and took up positions. The Chernomorians clearly imagined that the fight would be mortal, but everyone was firm and ready to fight the hated enemy. They knew what they were fighting for.

The tanks approached, and Tsibulko fired his machine gun. One tank stopped. The brave sailor was wounded in the arm and

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shoulder. However, he continued to fire from a machine gun at machine gunners. But soon the cartridges ran out, and the machine gun fell silent. Then Tsibulko, leaving a bloody trail on the ground, crawled up to another tank with a bunch of grenades and threw it under the caterpillar. The tank caught fire, Tsibulko lost consciousness for a while. (And the tomato drivers, while the hero was crawling, as in the propaganda song: "A trail of blood is spreading on the damp earth," frantically fled. And may the veterans forgive me for unflattering comparisons; but a sensible person has never perceived this ridiculous fake in any other way - Avi.)

Krasnoselsky rushed to the tank that broke through to the height and set it on fire with a bottle of combustible mixture, but he himself was seriously wounded. Gathering the last of his strength, the sailor crawled up to the second tank and broke two more bottles on it. The tank caught fire. (The comment is the same. - Avi.)

All this time, Filchenkov, Parshin and Odintsov supported the actions of their comrades, repelling the attack of the auto-matchers with fire and destroying the tankers escaping from the burning tanks. But the ammo ran out. Parshin is wounded. You could throw grenades and move away. But the Soviet sailors did not leave until they had completed the task. (Throw grenades and retreat, and the stupid fascists would not have chased them, they, along with their terrible tanks, were so frightened of the fearless Soviet sailors that they hid on the bare Crimean rocks. - Av.)

Filchenkov tied the remaining grenades to his belt and went towards the tank. When the armored vehicle approached, the hero threw himself under the caterpillars of the tank, which exploded along with the brave political commissar... (Such is the role of the righteous political commissar of the most fearless army in the world - the Red Army! Only I had long ago realized: a man who sends another with a grenade under a tank, - CRIMINAL. Especially those warriors who had a manyfold numerical superiority over the enemy both in equipment and in manpower. - Avi.)

All this happened in front of Odintsov and Parshin. Another Ava tank exploded and shrouded in flames, but the last hero's Ava also perished.

7 Stalin could strike first 1 9 no.)

At this time, the marines approached and hit the enemy. The enemy retreated in disarray. The brave five sailors completed their combat mission. (Help came just in time, but late, when the job was done; isn't this the way action movies are made in Hollywood?! So the Americans are not new here, Soviet agitprop has long ago "hammered" the templates of world blockbusters. Only millions of people they didn't die with us for fun ... - Av.)

At the site of the battle among the burning tanks was found bleeding from the Red Navy Tsibulko. Dying, he managed to

tell Commissar Melnikov and Party Bureau Secretary I. L. Shipaev about the heroic death of their comrades ... "(pp. 62-63, 81-82). (But others didn't have time, what an injustice, otherwise, maybe everything would have been completely WRONG?! - Auth.)

Of course, it is not good to mock the dead; and the author did not pursue such a goal at all. I sincerely feel sorry for these unfortunate people who really died, sent to certain death by narrow-minded commanders.

I have no doubt that General Morgunov, being the deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet for coastal defense, at that time did not know about what happened on November 7 at a height near the village of Duvankoy. For the general, sitting in the adit opposite the Morzavod or being in Tuapse, could not see what was happening on the front line. But after all, he willingly signed the text prepared for him (or copied by him from other sources), "forgetting" to mention the most important thing in this whole heroic story: that these about 600 sailors and soldiers of the 17th BMP, like the 18th, were penalty battles! And there were no volunteers willing to put their young bodies under the tanks among them! This is also confirmed by the fact that the four sailors were not under the command of a squad leader with the rank of foreman of the 2nd class (junior sergeant), but a political instructor. For by that time, most of the junior (foreman) staff had been knocked out or taken prisoner. The situation was so tense, so tragic for the Soviet army, that the commissar of the battalion in the most cruel way, most likely brandishing a revolver in front of Filchenkov's nose, ordered to stop the advancing Wehrmacht soldiers at the cost of their lives.

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So the exciting battle is just a scary tale written by a front-line soldier-general; a fiction that can NOT be taken seriously by any admiral or general. However, like most of the exploits told by the agitpropists to the citizens of the USSR, young and old. I'm sorry, but it is.

And another nuance, which the author again safely "forgets" about: that behind the back of the political instructor was not a battalion of marines, but a barrage detachment of the NKVD. And if one of the sailors faltered, the political instructor would shoot him - such is his task. And if he had not done this, then a sniper would have taken him out of the row with one well-aimed shot. Such is the price of many, many tragedies presented to the Soviet generations by "the heroic deeds of courageous soldiers and sailors who willingly sacrificed themselves"...

One of those who served, more precisely, was serving a "forced labor" in the 17th battalion of the Marine Corps, was Uncle Andrei, Andrei Cherkasov, who was well known to me from early childhood, who alone during the defense of Sevastopol was three times (!!! the first time for jumping out of line and running behind a bush to celebrate a natural

I am waiting. The second one was for exchanging a few words only for a short time on the march with Olga, a salesman of a military trade lorry, who became his wife and mother of his children after the war. For the third time, when Andrey Cherkasov, burned out and surviving in the attacks of the penalty box, but not surrendering to the Germans, sent the battalion commander far away, measured by the weighty letter "x ...". WHO can say WHICH of the named reasons is worth shooting?! The execution to him, like his "guilty" comrades, was replaced by 25 years and right there, in the next line in the verdict, they wrote: replace 25 years with a penal battalion. This allows us to conclude that VIOLENCE, and not patriotism, was the main force that forced the soldiers and sailors to rush into battle. And when breathtaking information is heard that Soviet soldiers in the 40s at one or another battlefield died in three or four (!) Rows, littering the fields with their corpses, do not rush to blame the Germans ... more often all they did was stop shooting when they saw the pada

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under a hail of bullets fired into their backs, Soviet soldiers with their hands raised in the air; soldiers and sailors who knew the fear and hunger of collective-farm serfdom, the horrors of camp slavery and the constant lies of the "popularly beloved" rulers ... Here, in the Crimea, there were also those who did not want to fight for Oktyabrsky and other senior officers who were on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, and only by force and by holding relatives hostage could they be forced to go into battle against the insignificant forces of the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht! No wonder one of our contemporaries said: fine you won the war ...

Only the need to conceal the tragic truth of UNWANTING TO FIGHT FOR THE REGIME can explain

the exhausting inventions of commissars and historians that the Wehrmacht's forces were many times greater than the forces of the Red Army ...

Chapter 24

And now, since the fate of the Black Sea Fleet was decided on land, and the sailors and soldiers of the Crimean Front had a chance to conduct land battles, it will be necessary to clarify even more clearly the myth about those invented hundreds of tanks that the soldiers and sailors of the Crimean Front so "heroically" urged on; about tanks wandering from one historical source to another, where we are talking about the epic of the Crimean Front and the defense of Sevastopol. Why let me remind you that only once did Field Marshal von Rundstedt allocated 75 tanks from the 22nd Panzer Division to General von Manstein in the area of the Parpach Isthmus near Theodosius, and took them a day or two later. Since then, during the time of command of the 11th Army, the German commander never had them. The presence of tanks in this army is a bluff of the Soviet military leaders, who cover up their cowardice and prefer not to organize battles, but to wait for the decision of the Headquarters on the evacuation.

TsII - "drapes" to the Caucasus.

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Let us turn to a knowledgeable author who meticulously studied this side of the war from archival sources - M. Solonin. "Let's start simple. From definitions. What does the phrase "German tanks were better than ours" even mean? Which non-German ones are better than which Soviet ones? Is a five-ton Pz-Kfz tankette with two machine guns better than a heavy KV with a three-inch gun? (There were three times as many of the latter in the 9th USC as in any Soviet corps. - Auth.) I think that even the most zealous agitpropists will not say this. Or are we talking about the fact that the best German tank R2-Sh was superior to our light tank T-26, discontinued in 1934? This is true, but why compare them? |

The only one in the southern theater of operations (the German grouping of troops that we are interested in, part of which was the 11th army of General von Manstein. - Avi.) Ia in its arsenal 728 tanks.

According to their tactical and technical characteristics and functional purpose, they can be conditionally divided into FOUR categories:

- wedges;
- good light tanks;
- artillery support tanks;
- good medium tanks.

To the category of "tankettes" we will classify 8 R7-Kfz units, 211 R7-P units and 54 so-called "commander's tanks", a total of 273 tanks (which is 38% of the total strength of the 1st Panzer Group). Here is how G. Guderian, the main ideologist and creator of the German tank forces, describes the history of the development of these "formidable combat vehicles": "... we considered it necessary to create for the time being such tanks that could be used for training purposes ... this type of tank allowed only the installation of machine guns in a rotating turret. Such tanks, designated P2-Kfz, could be produced by 1934 and used as training vehicles until the battle tanks were ready ... no one, of course, thought in 1932, as a result with these small training tanks we will have to go into battle ... "

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However, P7-Kfz also had quite tangible advantages. This is how Guderian describes the advantages that his first tanks had in comparison with plywood and cardboard

mi models that were used before in the teachings of the Reichswehr: "... schoolchildren who had previously pierced our models with their pencils to look inside were amazed by new armored vehicles ..." (What about schoolchildren, when the Red Army soldier I.P. Sereda jumped on such a tank and with blows of a sapper ax "disabled" the tank machine gun and the entire crew! I didn't even have to throw grenades under such a "tank."

Let us continue, however, reading Guderian's memoirs: "... in view of the fact that the production of the main types of tanks dragged on for more time than we expected, General Luti decided to build another intermediate type of tank, armed with a 20-mm automatic gun and one him with a machine gun..."

What can these German wedges be compared to? In the absence of anything worse in service with the Red Army than the outdated and already discontinued tank 'T-26' by the beginning of the war, we will compare it with the German RYa-P.

R7-P. Weight 9.50 tons, engine power 140 hp, forehead armor / side. 30/20 mm, speed 40 km/h. Power reserve 190 km. Gun caliber 20 mm. Destruction distance 500 m (!!!).

T-26. Weight 9.75 tons, power 90 hp, armor 15/10 mm, speed 35 km/h. Power reserve 170 km. Gun caliber 45 mm. Destruction distance 1200 m (!!!).

By and large, both of them, as they say, "worth each other." Low power engines, short range, bulletproof armor - typical light tanks of the early 1930s.

This combination of armament and armor parameters allowed the Soviet tank, with tactically competent use of it, to shoot the R7.-P. with virtually impunity. (Not only to shoot, but also to crush with their own weight. It was for this reason that General von Manstein abandoned this R / - P tankette, or, as Soviet generals and historians stubbornly call it, "tank", because he was convinced how

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one of the Soviet tanks near Ishun almost point-blank shot and crushed fourteen R7-Ps. - Auth.)

It is also worth noting that in terms of ballistic characteristics, the "gun" of the German RI-P is slightly inferior to the parameters of the Soviet anti-tank 14.5-mm gun Degtyarev. So the most accurate name for the R7,-P would be "self-propelled anti-tank rifle with a machine gun."

To perform the main tasks of the tank - the destruction of enemy firepower and manpower - the shell of the 20-mm cannon mounted on the R / -P was completely unsuitable, while under our main tank gun

20K, a "normal" high-explosive fragmentation shell was developed with a weight of 1.4 kg. In addition, every tenth T-26 (to be exact, 1336 out of a total of 11,302 tanks produced) was armed with a heavy flamethrower KS 24/25 with a reserve of 350 liters of fire mixture to "burn out" the enemy who had settled in trenches or light field shelters.

Now it remains only to estimate the quantity. As of June 1, 1941, there were 1894 T-26 tanks against 219 "tankettes" of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht alone in the troops of the Kyiv District. The ratio of the number in this class is 1:8.6, etc. (M. Solonin, pp. 206-210 selectively)

And for even greater clarity, I will cite the composition and armament of the tank troops of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in the theater of interest to us (see *ibid.*, p. 498):

Army Group South

1st Panzer Group:

3rd shopping mall (13th TD, 14th TD) 296/90/4.2/140/

48th shopping mall (11th TD, 16th TD) 289/189/147/1135/

14th shopping mall (9th TD) 143/40/11/80/

Total tanks: 728

Southwestern and Southern fronts of the 22nd MK (19th TD, 41st TD, 215th Motor Rifle Division) 712/31/ |

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15th MK (10th ta, 37th TD, 215th motorized rifle division)

749/136/

4th MK (8th TD, 32nd TD, 81st MDDA 979/414/

8th MK (12th TD, 34th TD, 7th MRD) 899/171/

9th MK (20th ta, 35th TD, 131st motor division) 316/0

19th MK (40th ta, 43rd TD, 213th motorized rifle division) 45315

16th MK (15th TD, 39th TD, 240th Motor Rifle Division) 4/78 [76]

24. MK (45 TD, 49 TD, 216 MSD) 220/0

109 MSD (5th MK) 209/0

2nd MK (11th TD, 16 TD, 15 MRD) 527/60

18th MK (44th TD, 47 TD, 218 RD) 282/0

Total tanks: 5826

Note:

1. The number of tanks in the formations of the Wehrmacht is indicated as follows: total tanks in the hull / wedges / light tanks / medium tanks /.

2. The total number of Wehrmacht tanks is greater than the number of tankettes, light and medium tanks, since each division had 10-15 so-called. "commander tanks".

3. The R7-Gi R7-P are classified as "tankettes", the Czech R7-38 (@ and R7-Sh of the first series with a 37-mm gun are classified as "light tanks", the R7- Sh with 50 mm gun and R7-GU.

4. The number of tanks in the mechanized corps of the Red Army is indicated as follows: total tanks in the mechanized corps (including T-34 and KV).

Such figures, using official Soviet sources, are given to us by M. Solonin. 22nd TD (mention

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May in the book) was in reserve at von Rundstedt, then was transferred to Army Group Center; but from there she was sent to the rear for reorganization.

But! In any case, no matter how much we name the tanks shown in underestimated Soviet sources, there will be no number of Soviet tanks in service with the NKVD and the Navy. But then, when we irrilysee also these tanks not mentioned in the writings of Soviet military commanders and historians, the balance of forces will become simply unbelievable in favor of the Red Army!

A similar pattern can be seen in aviation; the preponderance of forces will not be in favor of the Luftwaffe.

By the beginning of the battles of the 11th Army in the Crimea, and even more so near Sevastopol and Kerch, von Manstein had such a meager number of tankettes (taken by Soviet historians for tanks) that, apart from a burden, they did nothing for the general. And in battles they were practically not used. When von Manstein reported on the state of affairs in his sector of the front to the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South, von Rundstedt, after listening, he only said: "You will complete the assigned tasks with the forces you have. Go." Field Marshal Schaal von Rundstedt knew his general very well, who had served under him for a long time and had previously developed brilliant plans for military campaigns in Europe. And we must pay tribute to the outstanding commander of the twentieth century, von Manstein, he fulfilled the tasks assigned to him, relying, as he personally admitted to me, not so much on his talent as on his ingenuity. Only!

And now, dear reader, answer yourself the question: could Field Marshal von Rundstedt provide the commander and his 11th Army, which stormed the Crimea (Sevastopol and Kerch), at least one tank?

At that time, the main direction of Army Group South and its shock fist - the 1st Panzer Group of General Kleist - was the bend of the Don, Donbass and Caucasian oil. And in this sector, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command concentrated under the

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under the leadership of Marshal Budyonny of the Soviet Union, a huge number of troops, many times greater than the enemy forces. It was for this reason that Field Marshal Schaal von Rundstedt could not withdraw a single tank from the army of General von Kleist and transfer them to the 11th Army of General von Manstein.

Among other things, one more nuance should be taken into account. Soviet historians claim that the battles in the north of Crimea, near Kerch and in Sevastopol fettered the German forces from October 1941 to July 2, 1942 and inflicted significant damage to the Wehrmacht during this period.

This is not true in every way.

niyakh.

The general justified the highest confidence of von Rundstedt, who offered him a candidacy for the post of commander of the 11th Army after the death of the commander general von Schobert. With a minimum number of troops - from 75,000 to 100,000 people - he systematically drove out the Soviet troops, first at Perekop, then at the Kerch bridgehead, and finally at Sevastopol. Precisely planned, because from the very first days of the Wehrmacht's invasion of the USSR, von Manstein realized that most of the rank and file and command personnel of the Red

the army does not want to fight for the interests of the Bolshevik regime and surrenders in huge masses. The general also understood that in order to preserve the regime, the Soviet leader would drive people to the front - more and more and more. And especially in the direction headed by Marshal Budyonny. After all, the problem of oil for the Red Army was born in 1941, it was relevant all the pre-war years, and all the time of the hostilities of the Army Group South, up to its renaming.

This allowed von Manstein, using the current situation, NOT to rush to seize the Crimea.

If von Manstein in the fall of 1941 had destroyed the troops of the Red Army in the Crimea and occupied the peninsula, then in this case the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny, would have had a reserve still within the limits of more than a million troops.

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It was then that the Germans would certainly have had a hard time. And so the marshal was forced, in accordance with the requirement of the Headquarters, to send these forces to the Crimea. Like a cunning fox, the German commander lured forces from the enemy. After that, as you already understood, von Manstein systematically and gradually knocked them out in such a way as to drag out the capture of the Crimea for as long as possible - until Budyonny's reserves of forces sent to the Crimea ran out.

Chapter 25

IF THE CAUCASUS EXPLODES

In the book of N. G. Kuznetsov "On the Course to Victory" there are the following words: "In a report at a theoretical conference dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the defense of Sevastopol, F. S. Oktyabrsky reproached the command of the Navy for having ordered him then "all artillery ships to leave in Sevastopol. However, I did not find such a wording in the orders given to the command of the Black Sea Fleet. And if the command could understand the instructions of the People's Commissar of the Navy or the head of the Main Staff, then, apparently, only because of their vagueness. I take this blame on myself ... "How easily (outwardly, but deep down - very hard) Nikolai Gerasimovich indulges impudence, well, what can you do, he is Russian, a man of a simple and open soul ...

But here it is appropriate, he believes, to approach the question of risking expensive ships. And he argues: something like this has always influenced the decision of the command to use battleships and cruisers. "...ships are built for battle, not Alya parade," Kuznetsov laments, describing the events of those days. And he adds (emphasis added): "Care for the preservation of ships should never become an end in itself. Co-

Of course, all unnecessary ships should have been withdrawn from attack to the rear bases on the Caucasian coast, but it seems wrong to me to achieve the safety of the battleship and cruisers at all costs, when the task is set to "hold Sevastopol at any cost". The ships of the squadron in those

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days there was no task more responsible than the protection of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. This, of course, was fraught with risk, but the risk was justified by the importance of the task. It is bad when a large ship dies, but it is even worse if it is not used at the most critical moment just so that this ship remains unharmed.

So, already warmer; maybe in the text we will find the reasons for the tragedy of the Black Sea Fleet, because who should tell about this if not the former People's Commissar of the Navy?

"Now one can sometimes hear the opinion that, in addition to solving purely military tasks for the defense of the main base of Seva Stopol, a squadron of ships still had to play a certain role in the defense of the Caucasus and, with its presence in the theater, influence the struggle for the coast. However, if one mentally transports himself to the situation of those days, then hardly anyone was able to predict how military operations would develop in the future. Of course, it is a pity that we did not lose any warships, but it would be unforgivable to keep the squadron intact in anticipation of some more responsible moment. The worst thing in such a situation is excessive caution and inaction. And to explain and criticize certain actions after the war, when all the cards are laid out on the table, is much easier than making decisions during battles. It is in this case that it is customary to say: "everyone fancies himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side." By the way, subsequent events showed that there was no more acute and critical situation in the Black Sea, in which a squadron would be required.

The correct use of surface ships, of course, did not provide for their accumulation in the harbors of Sevastopol and immovable parking in certain places, but for continuous maneuvering both on the scale of the entire sea theater and in the base area ... "

So, smoothly, competently and so far - nothing. Answer: who is to blame for the tragedy of the fleet? - No. Direct instructions: what was the secret mission of the Black Sea Fleet? - also no. But there is a clue to the last question.

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It seems worth paying close attention to this wording: "... in addition to solving purely military tasks for the defense of the main base of Sevastopol, a squadron of ships still has to

on was to play a certain role in the defense of the Caucasus ... "

... The ships of the Black Sea Fleet left for Novorossiysk, Poti, Tuapse, Ochamchiri, Sukhumi, Batumi. In all heavenly places, at all these bases, excellent conditions have been created and the headquarters of the commanders of the naval base - according to the staffing table, they are all vice admirals with the corresponding easy apparatus: headquarters headed by rear admirals, political agencies, chiefs of affairs - captains of the 1st rank, operational departments, intelligence, communications, various other structures and counterintelligence SMERSH, which has specialists in its units to combat ... highlanders and Muslims living in the mountains (!).

If the political climate of the war begins to change, then these naval bases will take command of the entire personnel of units and ships of the Black Sea Fleet!

So, Oktyabrsky transferred the squadron to the Caucasus, having received the approval of Admiral Isakov, who had finally arrived from Leningrad in Tuapse. Due to the fact that neither Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky nor Admiral Isakov were involved in the direct organization of the battles, they indulged in cold and bliss: one in Tuapse, the other in Poti, enjoying local wines, juicy grapes, ripe fleshy pomegranates, spicy dishes of the unique Caucasian cuisine... Their example was followed by the commanders of the naval base, who were in the aforementioned ports. And because they did not have fully deployed personnel, it was not even a service, but a resort pastime (in the Crimea, as you remember, there are bloody battles, death mows down thousands of strong men, small rivers carry bloody waters into the sea ...).

And here ... upon arrival in the Caucasus, the battleship "Paris Commune" and cruisers work out training tasks. But, what is characteristic: sometimes they move 3-6 miles from the coast and play practice shooting at land targets located in the Caucasus mountains. And their shooting is corrected by spotters who have settled at a high altitude in the mountains.

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Why all this?! What study?! - if there are large-scale hostilities, there are wars ...

And why in Odessa there was not a single (!) Chic correction, when the ships fired at the positions of the Romanians, and here they are in abundance ...

And why are the crews of the ships, and especially their commandos (artillerymen), practicing firing practice towards the mountains?!

And why, in this most difficult situation, which was created by the German Wehrmacht for the Soviet troops in the Crimea, they are doing such an amazing thing here instead of firing at the right flank of the German troops of the army group?

Miy "South"?!

Only after asking all these questions, you begin to understand what's what ...

However, in order to comprehend to the end, you need to know some more nuances.

Everyone can take what is said below as a version, as an assumption, fiction, finally. And they can unconditionally believe. Ziiit sewing - to each his own.

It is worth mentioning, for example, the motives motivated by Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Leeb, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North, and Field Marshal von Bock, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center. These three people understood perfectly well that they could not win the war with the available forces, and they staked on ... the Caucasus. A special role was assigned to Army Group South, whose right flank entered the Crimea. However, in their convinced opinion, the aim was not so much to subdue the Soviet people as to liberate them from Bolshevism. Von Rundstedt, like his colleagues (all from aristocratic families), who led the army groups that invaded the USSR, pursued a voiced goal: the liberation of Russia from the Jews and the Bolshevik regime of Stalin.

Many researchers and historians have noted the "spread" blow of the three Wehrmacht army groups: von Leeb inflicts

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a blow to Petersburg (as he himself then called this holy city); von Bock - in Moscow, and von Rundstedt - cuts off the south from Moscow.

Soviet historians explain it this way: Hitler sought to destroy the "cradle of the Great October Socialist Revolution" - Leningrad; the strike of the Army Group "Center" is aimed at destroying Moscow as the capital, in order to allegedly make a lake in its place. (Is this why Moscow was promptly abandoned during the very first bombardments by all the "carriers" of the Bolshevik ideology, representatives of the Soviet government, their trusted and close associates, who fled to Gorky and Tashkent and created there, as many harshly ironized, "Fierce Ukrainian Front?") And, finally, the action of Army Group South was explained to us by the fact that Hitler wanted to cut off Moscow from the industrial south and the oil of Baku, Maykop, Grozny. It is quite reasonable if we focus on this, without other nuances and explanations.

Whereas the essence of the matter was quite different!

Von Leeb led his troops to Petersburg in order to destroy

to end the dominance of the Bolsheviks, Chekists, party functionaries and their accomplices in this city, significant for every Russian heart. The German aristocrat blockaded the city of Peter, but did not destroy it and did not even think of encroaching on shrine...

As for the Army Group Center, von Bock led the army to liberate the Mother See from the dominance of all the same elements. And as soon as von Leeb and von Bock became aware that they massively and in an organized manner left both Russian capitals, they stopped the assault on the cities in anticipation of permission to redeploy part of the forces of their groups to Army Group South. Yes, for example, when Field Marshal von Bock, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center, sent to Berlin a project to create a "Liberation Army" of 1,200,000 volunteers and form a Russian, as a national, government in Smolensk, then in November 1941 his the report was returned with Keitel's resolution: "Such ideas cannot be discussed with the Führer."

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By the autumn of 1941, the number of Soviet soldiers and officers who had surrendered began to exceed the number of Wehrmacht soldiers on the Eastern Front!

It was then that von Rundstedt, von Bock and von Leeb decided to transfer most of the forces from Moscow and St. Commissar 1st rank Mehlis. But Hitler objected categorically to such steps; and this was not his personal and self-made decision, but the result of intrigues in the environment of the Führer and the influence of justifiably frightened international forces, who were betting on the further degeneration of the Russians and the appropriation of their wealth. In response, von Rundstedt declared that ... the campaign against Stalin was lost, and resigned.

From that moment on, the crusade against the Bolsheviks and their international patronages, making revolutions and unleashing 'continental wars', was indeed lost...

Instead of von Rundstedt, the 57-year-old Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau was appointed commander-in-chief of Army Group South, who soon, a month later, on January 17, 1942, died suddenly of acute heart failure. On January 18, Hitler summoned Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center, to Headquarters and announced his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South. And 60-year-old Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge was appointed commander in chief of Army Group Center.

Due to further disagreements, Field Marshal General

von Bock with the Fuhrer, he did not stay long at his post. And in June 1942, 61-year-old von Bock, fully sharing the views of von Rundstedt regarding the Eastern campaign, resigned. After that, Hitler divided the army group "South" into two - "A" and "B"; 61-year-old Field Marshal Baron Sigmund Wilhelm von List was placed at the head of Group A, and 60-year-old Field Marshal Baron Maximilian von Weichs headed Group B.

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But while these events had not yet taken place, von Rundstedt's troops were heading towards the Caucasus.

Stalin knew perfectly well the goals and objectives of the German General Field Marshal: not only intelligence is needed here, knowledge of a completely different order is needed here! Higher sociology, analysis and psychoanalysis - and Stalin was well versed in the rarest quality of human knowledge - system analysis - that's what now gave him food for thought ... And his conclusions were disappointing, because the leader perfectly remembered the suppression of the uprising of the Kuban and Don Cossacks 10 years after the bloody Bolshevik revolution. The memory of this grandiose uprising was almost succeeded in being erased from the memory of the Soviet people; the repressive machine worked without interruption: you will forget something else... But the leader understood that the Cossacks did not reconcile themselves, did not agree with the Bolshevik regime, yes, they quieted down, but for a while, until the first opportunity... Stalin sent to the South direction a folk hero, a peasant from the Cossacks, Semyon Budyonny, although he understands that this is a "gulkin dick", and not an influence on the Cossacks.

And if the Cossacks of the Don and Kuban and the Muslims of the Caucasus rise, then the Third Reich will give weapons to the 1.5 millionth Russian Liberation Army (ROA) of General A. Vlasov and arm more than 5 million former Red Army soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who have surrendered who are in captivity... The Don and Kuban Cossacks who were interned by the Germans in the Balkans and have been there since the time of emigration will be added to them.

This will be strength, this will be power ...

And it was here that the brilliant Stalin sent his legs and sent Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis to the created Crimean Front with the words:

"Your task, comrade Mekhlis, is simple, you must remember: if Rundstedt reaches the Maikop, Mozdok, Grozny and Baku oil, the Kuban, Don and Caucasus will explode. The Kalmyks and other Muslims of the Asian republics will follow them. And they will come out on the side of Rundstedt! And will our Soviet power stand then?!

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And such power as that of von Rundstedt, and such a betrayal of Soviet soldiers, when countless thousands of soldiers surrendered to the mercy of the enemy, not wanting to fight for this anti-people power, his Stalinist army has not yet encountered. 2 million 100 thousand people have already surrendered near Kiev, 1 million 600 thousand people near Minsk, about 300 thousand near Tiraspol; on the other fronts from the Baltic to the Black Sea, a little more than 1 million people surrendered, and in total - more than 5 million and about 3 million died, i.e. almost the entire First Strategic Echelon and part of the forces of the Second Strate

logical echelon.

But the Soviet people were not supposed to, let alone know, even guess about that disastrous apotheosis for the Bolshevik regime (now this is hushed up as carefully as then).

O yes! Stalin knew what could happen if the Caucasus exploded (after all, he himself was an ardent mountaineer by his mother), and the Cossacks rose behind him; and this together is already a seething volcano, ready to erupt with seething angry lava. And it is worth learning about this in the Ukraine and the Baltic occupied by the Germans, and the population of these "republics" will join the liberators - and then Stalin will definitely not resist ... Then the whole army will run away from him, and even his loyal legionnaires from the barrage regiments, along with Beria and Mekhlis will not stop the enraged lava of human emotions.

So, the southern direction, the Crimea... The deaths of people here are of no importance... The main red game is being played not here, but very close by, in the Caucasus. And Mekhlis, perfectly understanding Stalin, as they say, writes off three armies on the Kerch bridgehead with a stroke of a pen, as Stalin wrote off the 9th Special Rifle Corps, which had not previously fulfilled the main order. All responsibility for the failure of the Crimean Front falls on Vice Admiral Levchenko, then on the new commander, Lieutenant General Kozlov, and the most guilty, "scapegoat" in this matter turned out to be the Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Grigory Ivanovich Kulik, as a representative of the Stavka on the Crimean front, reduced in military rank to Mayo General

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ra. Yes, Mekhlis was also demoted - to brigadier commissar. To divert eyes; after all, is it really a demotion when he remained a member of the Orgburo of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, one of the secret, narrow circle of close and knowledgeable people. Punish somehow." And he made a coquettish proposal to demote himself to brigade commissar. Stalin called Poskrebyshev to his place and, taking the box from him, took out the Order of Lenin, which he handed to his faithful comrade L. 3. Mekhlis. It was one of those unrecorded awards that are worn in a very narrow circle of all the same, the most approximate and knowledgeable

shchih. Great directing! And we see the main director well ...

During the bloody battles in the Crimea, the main core of the squadron of the Black Sea Fleet practiced exercises, aiming gun barrels at the snow-capped mountains of the Caucasus. The targets were clearly fixed, so that, if necessary, the shells would hit exactly the previously designated places.

The task of artillery was to destroy the passages in the passes and thus block all the passes along which representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus could secretly move.

Only a few knew about this secret mission of the Black Sea Fleet ...

Chapter 26

HATE AS A DIRECTION

November, as you know, was the main holiday for the leaders of the USSR, because on October 25 (November 7), 1917, the so-called Great October Socialist Revolution took place, when the "Aurora" cruiser announced the beginning of a new era with the thunder of its guns. Usually, on this holiday, party leaders of all ranks were in an upbeat, downright fighting mood. But it is unlikely that on the "red day of the calendar" of November 1941, the command

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of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, the mood was upbeat. However, the whole of November of that year was not an easy period for them. Fleet reconnaissance, headed by Colonel Namgaladze, overslept another Luftwaffe raid on the Sevastopol Bay, SNiS posts no longer reacted to the appearance of aircraft in the same way as on June 22, 1941, and the underdeveloped air defense of the Black Sea Fleet was already completely paralyzed by raids.

By this time, as is known, the headquarters for the most part had already been located in the fertile and calm Tuans.

So, without meeting a worthy rebuff, the cruiser "Chervona Ukraine" located in the bay, one of the main warships of the Black Sea Fleet of the cruiser brigade, which was part of the cruiser brigade, which at that time commanded by the captain of the 1st rank S. G. Gorshkov. The brigade commander was not punished for the death of the ship and most of the crew; and this, however, is not an isolated case for him: when he became the commander-in-chief of the USSR Navy, then during his leadership, two (!) The latest nuclear submarines, designed and created at the Rubin design bureau, perished: K-8 in 1970, one of the first Soviet nuclear submarines; K-219 in 1986,

one of the first strategic missile submarines; not counting accidents on diesel submarines and nuclear submarines.

Simultaneously with the cruiser Chervona Ukraine, the hydrographic vessel Hydrograph, minesweeper Rabotnik, floating dock, minesweeper boat Stalinets, several torpedo boats and transports were sunk; several berths and submarines were destroyed. There were also losses of a different plan: the minesweeper Egur Cha and the transport Desna were killed by mines, which were dropped by German pilots on parachutes back in June 1941.

Well, on the holiday itself on November 7, the transport port "Armenia" was torpedoed. Subsequently, Soviet historians will write that this transport delivered the wounded and evacuees from Yalta and, according to their conclusions, out of 5,000 people, only eight were saved! Only now such a fake (working to incite hatred - first of all, secondly - to hide his personal bungling) was concocted

And

intelligence department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet. Indeed, the transport was torpedoed, but on board were not the wounded, but the evacuees, and all the same: employees of the NKVD, state security, employees of the prosecutor's office and the court of Big Yalta, as well as the leadership of the party organization of the resort and the city executive committee, along with their families. In connection with the threat of the capture of the southern coast of Crimea (South Coast) by the enemy, Soviet leaders fled on this transport, and this caused justified indignation among a number of residents of Yalta: both Russians and Tatars. The buildings of the local population, abandoned to the mercy of fate, became known to the command of the German troops (at that time their intelligence worked quite professionally), and a blow was dealt to transport. And the fake, concocted at the headquarters of the fleet and sanctioned by the political department, was far from the only one; this was done on all fronts so that hatred for the "fascist occupiers", for the "German barbarians" flared up brighter and brighter and was a great incentive to fight to the last drop of blood for the Soviet Bolshevik power ... So that there would be no time for this fierce hatred clarification: who managed to escape and survive ...

Thus, artificially cultivated hatred became a doubly beneficial distraction: it called for battle and diverted attention from those who were scrambled out of grief.

what dots?

The Soviet 51st Army celebrated the Great October holiday by ... abandoning its positions and very quickly moving away from the front line to the Taman Peninsula. And therefore, on November 9, Vice Admiral G. I. Levchenko arrived at the bridgehead, who tried to stop the fleeing. First of all, he decided to stop the deserters. Historians carry out a cunning trick, pointing out that there were 150-200 fighters in divisions, all reserves were exhausted, and there were no replenishments, which is why, they say, they draped (only in which direction

and who?)... By November 15, there was no longer a common front line, and on the night of November 16, the troops of the 51st Army left Kerch.

Let's be clear: indeed, the 51st Army fled, but for the most part not in the direction of Kerch, but ... in the direction of the advancing Wehrmacht!

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The command, headquarters, military council and political department of the army fled to Kerch, and with them employees of special departments of SMERSH, most of the fighters and commanders, who were considered by political leaders to be a "conscious and active" part of the Red Army. Simply put, informers, of whom there were many in the ranks of the entire army. Together with this "active part", political workers also ran to Kerch. So historians are right: there were 150-200 people in these divisions.

But where were the others? THEM that defeated the Wehrmacht?

I repeat. With each division, special departments of SMERSH created battalions of penalists, or suicide bombers, each of them had 1,500 people, after which the battle was sent to the front line. And it often happened that this battalion of suicide bombers, knowing full well that the commissars and security officers had abandoned them, surrendered to the Wehrmacht without a fight. Who and when will tell about this terrible page of that war; who is ready to honestly admit that itafniks are the cruelest experiment of genocide by the Bolshevik regime against the peoples of the country? It is also possible, by calling the front-line soldiers to be frank, to hear from some of the most frank ones that the war was won by the penitentiaries at the cost of their lives. Accepting this as a fact, we learn about a new, still unknown to us war.

But... you will practically not find documents about this, except for the stories of the few surviving participants in the war of 1941-1945. For everyone who survived in the penal battalion at the cost of a slight or severe injury gave a subscription to 25 years of oath silence, and his injury was not included in the medical history (!). For the disclosure of this subscription, a term was threatened - 25 years for the talker and 10 years for family members (!).

Tell me, who will talk about this from those who survived in the penal battalions ?! Except perhaps the prisoners who fled under the leadership of a former major military commander of the Air Force across the tundra to Alaska - after the uprising in the Soviet camp; if anyone reached the "territory of freedom and democracy", then ... and there he hid from the American authorities (who had an allied fashion to extradite prisoners of war to the Soviets) among the native American Indians. Yes, there have been such cases, until now

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hidden behind seven seals for citizens of the post-Soviet

country.

And who will believe these narrators, who remained within the borders of the Soviet country and dared to speak after 25 years of silence?! Considered an old talkative fool, at best ...

And if a person turns to the social security authorities about being wounded at the front in the penal battalion, they will immediately tell him: where is the certificate that you were in the penal battalion and were you injured there? There were cases when some of these penalized after the war "for disclosing a subscription" received their quarter of a century in prison, and upon leaving the camp in the same social security they were denied pensions and other benefits, because again, no certificates that they are "participants in the war."

Yes, this period of 25 years was invented for a reason.

This is so that the surviving soldiers of the penal battalions, as well as other categories who gave a subscription to silence (witnesses of other vile sacraments of that war, hidden from their own people!), Do not annoy the Ministry of Defense, the government of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU, do not claim benefits as a front tovyki and disabled people; and there you look, and: there is no person - there are no problems ...

But, thank God, already in one book, then in another, or even in the media or on movie frames (for example, the film "Fine Bat", starring the demoted battalion commander, major, artist Serebryakov) we meet still vaguely defined the same thought ...

Well, who will be responsible for the lawlessness perpetrated on ordinary citizens? Who will answer for the warped fates of millions and millions of people? Rhetorical questions; There is no answer, but there are those responsible - the system and the people who served it in certain positions ...

So, maybe it was not in vain that the Luftwaffe torpedoed the "Armenia" transport, because, in addition to the leaders of the party and Soviet bodies who had fled, there were also employees of the punitive bodies who were sent to the Caucasus in order to organize new formations of suicide bombers to fight on

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Crimean TVD. So let's not jump to conclusions when we read the lines of Soviet propaganda that the Germans committed atrocities in the occupied territory... The Soviets also committed atrocities. War is not a cheerful quadrille, but a bloody slaughter for someone's interests. For example, the same von Manstein wrote in his memoirs: "Already on this first day (meaning the day of June 22, 1941. - Auth.), the Soviet military leadership showed its true face. One of our reconnaissance detachments, cut off by the enemy, was later found by our troops; he was cut and

brutally mutilated." The field marshal talked about the atrocities committed by Soviet partisans dressed in German uniforms against the peaceful civilian population - all to arouse fierce hatred for the invaders, to generate a powerful desire to fight to the death with enemies; he wrote about this in his first version of Lost Victories.

The German officers at the headquarters always practiced very carefully the delivery of strikes by their troops, including the Luftwaffe of the 8th Air Corps. And the fake that became the norm among Soviet propagandists about the sinking (murders). wounded and unfortunate old people, women and children by the Germans - this is an agitation from the same series: on the one hand - cowardly enemies and barbarians, fascists and subhumans, on the second - just fighters and heroes, Soviet people and a new community ...

Of course, when the retreat of the 51st Army took on the character of an outright stampede, Vice Admiral Levchenko tried to restore order. Gordey Ivanovich found himself in an extremely difficult situation, just right to put a TT to his temple. It was necessary to understand his psycho-physiological tension, because he knew well how the first deputy people's commissar, the head of the Main Military School, Admiral I.S. Isakov, set him up, who convinced Mekhlis to "press" the people's commissar of the Navy and Levchenko was sent to the Crimea. And in this situation of super tension, suppressing and inciting complex internal emotions, Vice Admiral Levchenko, as commander of the Crimean Front, made his decision. He summoned the leaders

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operative bodies of the front and in a harsh form demanded that they restore order, and not so much among the retreating Red Army soldiers, but ... in their own ranks and in the ranks of political workers, who hurriedly abandoned combat positions. This state security commissars will not be able to forgive him until the end of his days ...

Mekhlis, a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, was immediately notified of this decision, who, in turn, ordered his thugs to act. On the Taman Peninsula, employees of the GUGB and soldiers from the detachment surrounded about 3,000 retreating Red Army soldiers and cut them with machine-gun bursts, after which they spread the word among the inhabitants of the surrounding villages that the SS men were atrocious in this way, and through their asset they notified the residents that if someone thinks otherwise, he will suffer the same fate as the executed soldiers... Many residents (not only in the Crimea!), telling after the war about the events of those days and years, held deep in their hearts a completely different iravda, which in no way fits into the general ideological line of the Communist Party...

One cannot take seriously the conclusion of historians that all reserves were exhausted, and no replenishment was received; this is far from true. For Comrade Stalin created his own

Gion of commissars of the GUGB is not in vain. Also, under machine-gun fire or accompanied by dogs specially trained for this purpose, wheezing and tearing to pieces, they drove more and more victims from the Kuban, from the Don farms and from the villages of vast Russia; an endless stream of people directed to the front. So the replenishment was not slow to arrive in the Crimean Front.

Yes, here I would like to mention the notorious German "commissar order" received by Wehrmacht commanders shortly before the start of hostilities with the USSR. The "Directive on the treatment of political commissars" was adopted on June 6, 1941. It said that all captured political commissars of the Red Army should immediately be shot as carriers of the Bolshevik ideology. They could not be treated as prisoners of war, according to

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because from the point of view of international law, as the German command claimed, they were not military men, they were not soldiers, but only played the illegal role of guards. However, the red commissars turned out to be fanatical fighters (knowing what fate awaits them) and also fanatically, furiously drove their fellow citizens into battle. Speaking about the institution of the Soviet commissars, Erich von Manstein stated: "Their task was not only to exercise political control over the commanders, but also to impart to the war a special cruelty and character that completely contradicted the soldier's understanding of warfare. In fact, it was the commissars who first of all introduced those methods of treatment of prisoners of war that were contrary to the provisions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. And in this the field marshal was completely right.

However, based on the principles of soldier morality, von Manstein did not allow the commissars who were taken prisoner to be shot, because "the fulfillment of this order threatened not only the honor of the troops, but also their morale." The commander informed his superiors that this order to shoot his troops would not be carried out. By the way, the judicial investigation conducted within the framework of the Nuremberg trials over the German Field Marshal proved that by the beginning of the Russian campaign, Manstein, as commander of the 57th motorized army corps, had indeed prohibited the execution of this order - a directive signed by Adolf Hitler. The same was true when he was commander of the 11th Wehrmacht Army. And von Manstein could not be charged with crimes in this area. During the investigation, the following figures were also given: out of 430,000 army prisoners, about 4,000 people were commissars; however, only 14 of them were killed as partisans "caught at the scene of the crime", and five more were handed over to the SD. The rest were treated like prisoners of war.

Also, the field marshal was fully acquitted both on the point regarding the execution of Jews, and on some other

points of indictment.

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But back to our story.

From the foregoing, it becomes clear: in the tragic situation that has happened, someone must be appointed as the culprit of the surrender of the Kerch Peninsula; and Mekhlis appointed Vice Admiral G. I. Levchenko as such a "sleeping goat", and this decision was unanimously supported by the command and the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet. How else?! After all, at any moment Lev Zakharovich could appoint the same Oktyabrsky or Azarov, Kulakov as the culprits. No, they were all trained, all served faithfully in the legion; each of them knew that it was important to support the decision of the personal representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in time.

Well, Admiral of Ukrainian blood G. I. Levchenko was arrested, deprived of orders and medals, admiral rank; in 5 minutes - by a fair Soviet court - they were sentenced to 10 years in the camps with a loss of rights for 5 years. And only over time, after sorting out the events over the tragedy near Kerch, Levchenko's criminal record was removed and, with the rank of captain of the 1st rank, he was appointed with a demotion to the Baltic Fleet - the commander of the Kronstadt naval base.

The retreating (fled) Primorsky Army failed to break through Bakhchisaray, and it was forced to retreat through the mountains along the Gavro-Kokkozy route, through Ai-Petri to Yalta and further to Sevastopol.

One of the divisions of the Primorsky Army - the 184th Rifle Division of the NKVD (commander - Colonel V. L. Abramov, military commissar - battalion commissar I. I. Kalchenko) - also made its way to Sevastopol through the mountains. At the head of the column moved the headquarters of the division in the order of the 262nd Infantry Regiment of the NKVD (commander - Major of State Security A. G. Rubtsov). The remnants of the 184th Infantry Division arrived at Sevastopol on November 17; on the basis of them and the battalion of the NKVD school, an NKVD regiment was formed under the command of Major of State Security Rubtsov. The fleeing units of the 51st Army, which was losing personnel, weapons and military equipment, also rushed to Sevastopol.

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Shortly after the arrival of the Primorsky Army, which had lost most of its military personnel and heavy weapons, a combat organizational order for the SORU of November 9, 1941, signed by Major General Petrov, was issued in Sevastopol. The already existing sectoral organization was taken as the basis of the defense plan. For the post of sector commanders, army commandants were planned from among

the commanders of the arrived rifle divisions, all units of the marine corps were included in the sectors, and the battalions of the marine corps were merged into the rifle regiments and subsequently completely transferred to the army, and the regiments and brigades of the marine corps were given operational subordination to the Primorsky army. So it will be: as a result of urgent measures taken by the command of the Black Sea Fleet together with the command of the Primorsky Army, it was brought to a combat-ready state by manning it with marines, by issuing artillery ammunition, fuel, food, etc.

The draft order, which was based on the considerations of General I.E. Petrov, was finalized by P.A. Morgunov, N.I. Krylov, I.F. Kabalyuk.

At the same time, the headquarters of the Primorsky Army, headed by its head, Colonel N.I., actually became the headquarters for the land defense of Sevastopol. Krylov. I.E. Petr. All artillery of the BO was consolidated into an independent group led by the nachart of the BO, Colonel B.E. Fine. At the same time, the appointment by the Headquarters of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky at the same time as the commander of the SOR, in fact, concentrated in one hand all the power to use all the forces of the fleet and the Primorsky Army. It remained only to competently apply these considerable forces against a skilled enemy.

But after the surrender of the Kerch bridgehead, the post of commander of the Crimean troops was abolished, and the commander of the SOR, at the suggestion of Mekhlis, was directly subordinated to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

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Chapter 27

THE BRUTAL SCIENCE OF FALSE
AND ARITHMETICS OF LOSSES

Historians claim that the land defense of the Sevastopol field began to be created only at the beginning of July 1941, choosing convenient positions on the ground for a solid defense. And General Morgunov in his memoirs even cites the minutes of the meeting of special commissions to select the area for military formations. Anyone who has even the slightest understanding of military affairs and visits the valley of the Belbek River, the heights of the Mekenziev mountains, the Fedukhin heights, the Sapun Mountains, will understand that nature itself has created a powerful defensive system for Sevastopol. It was only necessary to place the troops wisely, place the batteries and also use them wisely.

After the war, many books were written about the heroic

defense of this southern city, but no answer was given why von Manstein, with the help of two infantry divisions of the 54th corps, without tanks, but with the support of siege guns and artillery, aviation of the 8th Air Corps, with the support of one brigade of Major General H. Ziegler and three Romanian brigades - without significant losses, only waiting for a convenient time, took Sevastopol by July 1, 1942.

And he had to wait (but not be inactive!) not so little: from the autumn of 1941 to the summer of 1942.

... Anyone who now drives up to the Ukrainian village of Verkh non-Sadovoye, and in 1941 it was the Russian village of Duvankoy, can see a concrete structure at the entrance - a bunker (long-term firing point). Exactly the same bunker is located opposite the Kamyshlovsky bridge (in the past - a water canal, now the village of Vavilova has been built there); if you go further to Sevastopol, then the road near the village of Fruit turns to the Mekenziev mountains, and on the right you can again see the bunker. After the war, when the city was considered closed, there was a checkpoint in this capital building. This is all

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Pillboxes from the same "Stalin Line" as in Western Ukraine, the construction of which was coordinated before the war by Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov and Doctor of Military Sciences, professor, well-known fortifier Lieutenant General of the Engineer Troops Amitri Mikhailovich Karbyshev. |

Only now, the construction, for which no small public funds were spent, was nothing more than a decamouflage calculated on the public interest of Europe - "proof" that Comrade Stalin in those years cared about nothing more than the defense of the USSR! Calculated, of course, and on the fact that the descendants of the Soviet people, like numerous researchers of this topic, will unfoundedly prove to the Soviet people and mankind that the USSR is not an aggressor!

Chupoba no one - neither then nor after! - the whole world did not understand that the Soviet country was actually preparing not for defense, but for a large-scale aggressive war.

But the war did not start according to Stalin's plan, and the retreating units of the Red Army practically did not use the so-called URs (fortified areas).

It was in these three bunkers that Major General Khrenov, Chief of Engineering Troops of the Black Sea Fleet (later Commander of the Sapper Army, Colonel General of the Engineering Troops), was recommended to use as a human shield ... Marines of Separate Marine Battalions. I note that each bunker is a small garrison, autonomous from other units.

When the vanguard of the 54th Corps - the brigade of General Heinz Ziegler - went out on the right flank 3-4 km south of the station

Biyuk-Syuren (now the station of Siren), and on the left flank approached the villages of Zalankoy and Biyuk-Atarkoy (after the war - Frontovoye and Kholmovka, now in connection with the unification of these villages - Kholmovka), the German general decided to send a reconnaissance patrol to the village of Duvankoy. I think it's worth saying that Heinz Ziegler is a unique commando (according to modern estimates), who was fluent in Russian and martial arts; and his subordinates were professional special forces, all as a match. It was only in Soviet films shot in Tashkent that the Germans looked frail and stupid freaks... In fact, it was not at all like that.

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The reconnaissance patrol, having crept up to the bunker at the entrance to the village, found two sailors chained in it, one at the machine gun, the second a little further away so that he could feed the tape with cartridges. Returning, the reconnaissance patrol reported to the general about what he had seen, and he ordered the sailors to be unchained. During the interrogation, they declared that they were fined because they were not going to fight against the Germans, but so that they would not run away, the detective of the special department, together with the soldiers of the detachment, chained them up. They also notified that on the way to Sevastopol, their comrades were in the same position in two more bunkers.

Major General Ziegler reported this to the corps commander, Lieutenant General von Hansen, who informed Commander General von Manstein. At dawn, Erich von Manstein arrived by car in the area of the village of Biyuk Atarkoy from his NP in Yukhari-Karalez, the local population of which, according to his adjutant, consisted of Tatars and Russians. The colonel-general stopped near the railway in a two-story mansion in which, until 1917, one of the administrators of the estate lived, which belonged to the Grand Duke Ekaterina Yuryevskaya, the morganatic wife of Emperor Alexander II (and after the war, children of the lower classes of Verkhne-Sadovskaya secondary school, including ia, in the 80s-90s of the XX century the building was demolished).

Von Manstein ordered Ziegler to move forward units of the brigade along the road to the Mekenziev mountains. One of the battalions of the brigade, in order to prevent a possible breakthrough of units of the 51st Separate Army from the east, headed for the wooded-mountain ranges and made the first stop at Kaya-Bash and in Temnaya Balka, where warehouses would later be placed by the Wehrmacht. The next battalion entrenched itself in the second manager's house on Gorny Klyuch near the railroad itself, on the opposite side of the Belbek station. Where in the church on a high hill, built in the Greek style, there was a service of Archpriest Father Nikodim. The unique ancient temple was destroyed by the advancing units of the Red Army in May 1944; but the colored azure painting has survived to this day on the ruins.

After a short halt, the battalion from Temnaya Balka headed for the village of Kamyshly, where it was met by the fire of the 11th bunker (long-term earthen firing point) led by the foreman of the 1st article S. Raenko, as well as the foreman of the 1st hundred Tyi I. Chetvertakov, sailors A. Kalyuzhny, G. Dolya and N. Eremko. The local forester Zhurko warned the commander of the bunker, Raenko, about the approach of the forward detachment of the Wehrmacht. And the commander ordered Grigory Dole to go to the Meken Ziev mountains, to the headquarters of a separate marine battalion for help. By the agreed time, Dolya did not return, then Raenko sent the sailor Eremko for the same purpose. But he did not return either (both survived after the war).

The command of the German forward battalion, led by Hauptmann (Captain) Korrens, having studied the area, reported to the headquarters of General Ziegler that it was possible to take the bunker, but the entire area was being shot from it and losses were not ruled out. Therefore, the officer suggested that the general send a "thing" to the agreed time, accompanied by two "messerschmitts", and he would correct the attack of the Luftwaffe by radio. Which is what was done. With an accurate blow, the bunker was blown apart by a dropped German bomb. All sailors died. That's how it was: firmly, in a military way, prudently and tragically. Well, Soviet historians and writers, according to the rules of political propaganda they once and for all deduced, described the "feat" of bunker No. 11 as something unique, as if a whole squadron bombed a small garrison of Soviet patriot sailors day and night. And that during these days they held back the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the total number reaching, according to various printed sources, from a battalion to several regiments! Moreover, Soviet falsifiers did not disdain to come up with a note from which, for the sake of time and politics, words "disappeared", and which was supposedly written by one of the defenders, sailor Kalyuzhny. The note was allegedly found on the ruins of a bunker, after which it was placed in the Black Sea Fleet Museum. It was: "My Motherland! Russian land! I am the son of the Leninist-Stalinist Komsomol, his pupil ... I am dying, but I know that we will win. Sailors of the Black Sea! Fight harder, destroy the fascists

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stsky rabid dogs! I kept my warrior oath. Kalyuzhny. And then, when Khrushchev and his officials "exposed Stalin's personality cult," the text of the note suddenly became a little shorter: "My Motherland! Russian land! I am the son of the Leninist Komsomol, his pupil..." The same metamorphosis happened in the museum with other exhibits...

However, let's give the floor to the propagandists themselves, because it is really interesting to read when the red communist blindfold falls from the eyes. "The news spread throughout the country about the glorious feat of the heroic garrison of bunker No. 11, which consisted of Komsomol sailors ... The Nazis attacked this firing point (here it should be written according

analogies; steel firing point. - Auth.), But they could not take it. Then they fired at the bunker with heavy mortars and at the same time went around it from three sides. The bunker was bombed by aviation. For three days, Komsomol sailors repelled the enemy's frenzied attacks, in which up to an infantry battalion participated. In the battle, the commander of the department, Raenko, fell. ... Already hundreds of corpses (!!! - Auth.) of German soldiers and officers littered the approaches to the bunker, and the Nazis did not stop attacking. On the night of December 20, reinforcements came to the aid of the heroes-sailors: deputy political instructor M. N. Potaienko and communist sailors P. Korzh and K. I. Korol. (That's great: hundreds of "rabid fascists" cannot break through to the bunker along with aircraft, and here three brave communists led by the deputy political instructor - here they crawled! - Auth.) They delivered ammunition and light machine guns. The Germans continued to besiege - to wait for the bunker. And only on the evening of December 20, when three seriously wounded Red Navy sailors survived, did the Nazis manage to surround the firing point. The heroes fought to the last bullet and did not surrender to the enemy. A few days later, a division of sailors knocked the Nazis out of the bunker. A note was found in it ... "etc. and so on. ("History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945". In 6 volumes. M., 1961, vol. 2, pp. 306-307). But this is lying, impudent nonsense: supposedly in the pocket of one of the "many hundreds of killed Germans" lying in the area of the bunker, there was a note in which he wrote: "In two days we attacked the height occupied by the Russians nine times, the loss

8 Stalin could strike first a)

whether more than a hundred people, and when, after the tenth attack, they finally occupied it, they found three people and two broken machine guns there. Wow: they occupied the height, and then someone unknown took and killed the unfortunate German "in the area of the bunker" (71); this stupidity is given in the book of P.A. Morgunov "Heroic Sevastopol" (p. 180).

The operation with bunker No. 11 was completed quickly. It took less than an hour (!). The advanced base airfield of the Luftwaffe was located in Sarabuz (now the Ostryakovo station, the village of Gvardeyskoye).

Perhaps the only thing that the naval command did to strengthen the defense of the sectors of Sevastopol was to significantly increase the number of ground units due to the sailors removed from the ships.

The city then had more than 100 aircraft. Although historians, like later General of the Army Batov, describing that period in detail, indicate that the enemy fought many times superior forces with the support of 13 artillery battalions and 700 aircraft (the numbers vary upwards) and sought to capture Sevastopol on the move. As they say, no comment...

The 54th corps of General von Hansen, which had only 2 infantry divisions, General Ziegler's brigade and 3 Romanian cavalry brigades, was not easy to move towards Sevastopol. Once again, I draw your attention to the fact that von Manstein, at that time organizing battles of local importance so that "the enemy would not doze off", was waiting for a tactical moment for a change in the general situation on the Eastern (in the terminology of the other side - the Soviet-German) front. So there was no talk of any capture on the move, as the red commanders liked to do - the German Field Marshal knew the price of human life. So this is not a weakness and not a lack of knowledge of military affairs by Erich von Manstein, but highly professional intuition and calculation, as with the least

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take the enemy's plaidarm at the most advantageous moment for yourself. This is the smallest force to crush the many times superior enemy forces; not only thanks to talent and intelligence, but also - thanks to well-placed military and intelligence intelligence, which is why he always had the necessary information about the enemy, the advance of his troops and intentions.

Intelligence made a significant contribution to the brilliant victories of the German Field Marshal von Manstein. Perhaps for many this will be a discovery, but I will indicate that they worked for him:

- German reconnaissance unit on the territory of Romania MAK ("Marine Einsatzkommando des Schwar zen Mer"),
- a division of the Abwehr NBO ("Nachrichtenbeobachter"),
- Naval reconnaissance "Condor",
- army intelligence "Abwehr-2",
- reconnaissance of the 8th air corps,
- directly the brigade of General Ziegler,
- Romanian "Special Information Service", which had 3 divisions: "Center-1, -2, -3",
- personal intelligence of Field Marshal von Manstein (worked in contact with the Vatican's residency in the Balkans, which Field Marshal von Rundstedt handed over to him when he retired).

Von Manstein did not need the heroic deeds of his soldiers and officers. For him, the war is a cruel arithmetic of the loss of his subordinates, who in Germany have relatives and friends who will never forgive him for the mediocre death (if any) of their sons,

husbands, fathers, brothers, loved ones.

And the Soviet command needed the mass heroism of cretinism, when huge crowds of Red Army and Red Navy men are sent to the deadly lead fire of enemy machine guns - in the name of victory, in the name of a well-fed and free life of the Mekhlis, October, Azar, kulaks, lions, Chernyaks, Kolganovs, in the name of the comfortable existence of the state security commissars, whose name is legion...

8 Paradise

And another touch of "righteous" lies. At the end of the day on October 30, the right wing of the 54th Corps, the Germans near the village of Nikolaevka, came into combat contact with the coastal battery No. 54 under the command of Lieutenant I.I. Zaika. And - again, the same story with falsification: the intelligence department of the fleet and the counterintelligence department of SMERSH reported to Moscow that "only two days later, as a result of a long battle, the Nazis managed to capture the battery", but the sailors managed to destroy 16 (!) Tanks and 7 infantry vehicles. In all respects, the tanks in the Crimea were a terrible fantasy of the commissars and Chekists. By the way, why should Wehrmacht battalions be sent to the battery that fires fragmentation shells at the infantry? After all, von Manstein had siege artillery, and it was the Karl gun that could destroy it, but ... Lieutenant Ivan Zaika on the day of the tragic denouement transmitted over the radio station that he was running out of ammunition and that, according to his assumption, the battery, left without shells, can be surrounded by the enemy if he appears. The encryption was reported to Major General Morgunov, who immediately informed the commander of its contents. To which he reacted: "Make a decision as you know!" Vladimir Yermolaev, an employee of the counterintelligence department of SMERSH, who was present at the same time (a child from an orphanage, a pupil of A.S. Makarenko; he was shot in 1943 as "not ensuring the retention of the height by Soviet soldiers" - near Kursk) confidently expressed that Zaika was going to surrender to the Nazis, and introduced a proposal to destroy the battery before that happens. General Morgunov tried to object, but seeing that the special officer's hand lay on his holster, he unquestioningly transmitted the order to ... strike at the command post of the 54th battery; a few minutes later, with a deafening roar, shells began to plow through the positions of the batteries. The last thing Zaika managed to shout about was: "Go away! Go away! They are beating their own!" These bitter orders he gave to the natives who were nearby; they rushed in different directions, but they did not forget these words, and after the war they passed on this truth ... All the battery members died.

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The same fate befell the battery of Senior Lieutenant Ivan Pyanzin. When this was reported to the member of the Military Council, divisional commissar N.I. Kulakov, he ordered

write in the Black Sea Fleet's combat log that the commanders of these batteries "caused fire upon themselves when they realized that they were surrounded by an enemy many times superior"; that's how it went down in history...

Chapter 28

HOW TO MAKE A VICTORY FROM THE IMPOSSIBLE?

Having regrouped the German units in agreement with the commander of the 11th Wehrmacht Army, the commander of the 54th Corps, Lieutenant General von Hansen, stormed Sevastopol from the southeast.

On November 11, near Balaklava, in the area of Fedyukhin Heights and Sugar Loaf, a battle began, with varying success lasting for 10 days.

These heights were held by penal battalions, and behind them were detachments that, with machine-gun fire in the back, drove the sailors and soldiers to the positions of the 22nd Infantry Division of the 54th Army Corps of General von Hansen. The penitentiaries, who went into counterattacks, fought in despair with the German soldiers with bayonets and butts of Russian three-line rifles. And the German soldiers poured fire on them with machine guns and machine guns. And so, as already mentioned, with varying success within 10 days.

On November 10, the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet issued an order calling for "a steadfast and selfless struggle", forcing the personnel to turn Sevastopol into an impregnable fortress at the cost of their lives: "We have thousands of wonderful fighters, a powerful Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol coastal defense, glorious aviation. Together with us, the battle-hardened Primorsky Army, its glorious fighters and commanders. Selflessly, not sparing our blood and life itself, we will defeat, destroy not

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German invaders. "Forward for our beautiful Motherland!" "Comrades, Komsomol members!.. Let's give the powerful Black Sea from now on to the enemy! No step back!" demanded another agitation.

Let me remind you that on the afternoon of November 12, Junkers-87 aircraft bombed the ships that were in the base. The cruiser "Chervona Ukraine" has been near the Grafskaya Pier for three days, without changing the parking lot (!). Not surprisingly, he received several direct hits on the deck and near the sides. For several hours, the personnel fought for the survivability of the ship, but by 3 o'clock in the morning the ship sank. Of the sailors and officers sent ashore, an artillery battalion of the Coastal Defense was formed from four (in other sources - from three) batteries; the guns were removed from the cruiser. Sta-

The standard coastal battery No. 705 was located 500-800 m from the platform of the Mekenzievy Gory station in an area covered with dense bushes. The 130-mm and 100-mm caliber guns removed from the sunken cruiser were installed both on temporary bases and in a concrete pillbox; 75% of the personnel were staffed with sailors from the "Chervona Ukraine" (battery commander - Senior Lieutenant V.I. Durikov). Here is the phrase of Lieutenant General P.A. Morgunova: "I must say that the fire of naval artillery was of great moral importance. The fighters of the fleet and army, seeing and hearing the firing of ships at the land enemy, experienced great excitement, knowing that the fleet continues to be in Sevastopol and helps them "(p. 133). When on November 14, during the next bombing, the Perfect destroyer, which was standing in the western dock, was killed, by decision of the command, the guns were removed from the ship and installed on Malakhov Kurgan (in the 701st battery of Lieutenant Commander A.P. Matyukhin, 177th Artillery Battalion Major V.F. Mozdalevsky).

Naval artillery ceased to be such when the guns were removed from warships and carried ashore; what effect, what inspiration did their shooting cause among the Soviet defenders? So, a tragedy had to happen - the death of the "Chervona Ukraine" - due to carelessness, so that the ships to carry out combat missions began to arrive only for a short time, and then, as a rule, in the evening, and in the morning leave for the Caucasus.

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On November 12, all departments and departments of the fleet headquarters, headed by the chief of the fleet headquarters, Rear Admiral I.D., left for the Caucasus. Eliseev; he was supposed to organize the flag of the Mansk command post in Tuapse. Whereas the task force of the fleet, headed by the deputy chief of staff of the fleet, captain 1st rank A.G., was left in Sevastopol field. Vasiliev.

By order of the commander of the fleet on November 12, the air defense of the fleet with the 11th VNOS battalion, the 73rd, 122nd and 62nd anti-aircraft regiments and the 243rd separate anti-aircraft division were also redeployed to the Caucasus. Whereas only the 61st anti-aircraft regiment and two separate divisions remained in Sevastopol, which significantly worsened air cover.

After the departure of the engineering department of the Black Sea Fleet to the Caucasus in Sevastopol, an operational group was left headed by the deputy head of the engineering department, military engineer 1st rank I.V. Panov. Of course, for such a huge defensive area there were not enough engineering units and departments of military field construction.

On November 13, the commander of the SOR, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky ordered all coastal units of the Black Sea Fleet, such as: separate brigades, regiments, detachments, battalions of marines participating in the defense of the Main Base, to attach to the Marine Army with direct subordination to the deputy

for the ground forces, Major General I.E. Petrov.

And on the same day another telegram was sent to Moscow about the plight of the defenders of Sevastopol, who for some reason no longer had the means and strength to maintain a powerful defense.

Late in the evening of November 15, at the SOR command post, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, Divisional Commissar Kulakov, Rear Admiral Zhukov, Major Generals Petrov, Morgunov, Ostryakov, and Rear Admiral Fadeev, who were present at a meeting of the Military Council of the Fleet, were again discussing another telegram to Headquarters with a request for immediate assistance with people, weapons and ammunition. By the way, as a touch - only in 10 days of December at the enterprises and factories of Sevastopol it was produced and sent to the defense:

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93 mortars, 8,000 grenades, 4,439 mines, 9,650 anti-personnel mines, "many other military weapons and equipment." An answer came to the incessant requests for help: the Chief of the General Staff, B. M. Shaposhnikov, ordered the allocation of ammunition and replenishment to the Black Sea Fleet. "Novorossiysk was established as the food base for Sevastopol. Delivery to Novorossiysk by order of the People's Commissar of the Navy and the head of the rear of the Red Army. From Novorossiysk to Sevastopol - by the order and means of the Black Sea Fleet ... Comrade. Oktyabrsky, I ask you to urgently take away the presence of shells and cartridges in Novorossiysk. Receipt to confirm," read the telegram of the Chief of the General Staff, who ordered to coordinate all actions with the People's Commissar of the Navy.

On November 17, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet received from the commander of the No Vorossiysk naval base G.N. Kholostyakov's report on the dispatch of the transport "Kursk" with ammunition; the ship arrived in the city on 19 November. So, the supply of ammunition themselves was established.

In view of the devastating situation on the Kerch Peninsula, the Headquarters instructed the Transcaucasian Front to transfer the 302nd Rifle Division to cover the coast of the Kerch Strait (Chushka-Taman region). On November 15, marching reinforcements arrived in Sevastopol on the Abkhazia transport. After a short time, 12 more marching and 2 machine-gun companies arrived in the city.

On November 16, German troops captured the entire Kerch Peninsula.

On November 19, a directive from the Headquarters was received, announcing the dissolution of the command of the Crimean troops and the direct subordination of the SOR to the Headquarters.

At the end of November, Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky decides to involve in the defense the aviation of the fleet, which, of course, is located in the Caucasus; On November 20, he gives a telegram: "To Ostryakov,

Eliseev, Ermachenkov, Kalmykov. I demand the fulfillment of all applications for aviation from Sevastopol. There is a fierce struggle for Sevastopol. On November 20, Chief of the Army General Staff Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov gives an order to place the Morzavod evacuated from Sevastopol in Tuapse (it was located in Tuapse and Poti).

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At the end of November, General von Hansen reported to the army commander, von Manstein, that the losses of the 22nd Infantry Division had reached 65% and that he proposed to stop fighting here, transfer the remnants of the units to the area of Severnaya and Bartenevka, establish a crossing across the bay and thereby redeploy move to the city center. But von Manstein ordered von Hansen to gain a foothold in the occupied positions and hold a tough defense. The only thing that consoled General von Hanse was that his soldiers wedged into the defense of the penalty box up to 5 km. In the meantime, von Manstein, having regrouped and transferred forces from the eastern direction of the Crimea, put them into action on December 17, after powerful artillery and aviation preparation. In the direction of the main attack, the maximum density of artillery fire per 1 km of the front was created. The activation of siege artillery operations also began.

On the next day of the assault, the German commander brought fresh forces into battle and broke through the defenses along the entire perimeter of the defense of Sevastopol. On the right flank, the Wehrmacht went to the Northern Bay, where von Manstein ordered his generals, officers and soldiers to consolidate. Historians describe this as the most critical days of the defense of Seva Stopol, indicating that only reinforcements saved the city from surrender. And again a lie! There were more than three times (!) More sailors and soldiers in the city than Wehrmacht soldiers! And again the same reason prevailed: the unwillingness of the defenders of Sevastopol to fight for the interests of the command and the Armed Forces of the Black Sea Fleet, which were alien to them, leaving them to the mercy of fate. And it was the concealment of this that forced propagandists and historians to write that the forces of the defenders were quickly dwindling, and in order to gather a sufficient number of troops in the Sevastopol field and give a worthy rebuff to the enemy, they had to mobilize the entire strength of the Communist Party and the GUGB.

In the meantime, there was a temporary lull at the front.

They explain to us that by the end of November 1941, the enemy had run out of steam and exhausted his reserves, besides, he had to transfer part of his forces to Kerch to fight the amphibious assault. And that thanks to this, the second assault on Sevastopol was repulsed.

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But you already know that this is for the Soviet commissars in par-

tia and state security needed mass heroism, and von Manstein needed exact calculation in his rigid mathematical formula of war. "The general is the one who makes the impossible out of the impossible," von Manstein said, and these words were his motto. He again calculated the general front situation developing from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and thus gave the opportunity for a respite to his soldiers, exhausted in battles, and bringing units and formations into combat form. Some of the officers and soldiers of his army were not only treated, but also on vacation in Germany with their relatives. And after returning to the Crimea, they felt inspired and ready for further battles.

In the December days of 1941, the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, Krasny Krym, the leader Kharkiv, the destroyers Nezamozhnik and Vigorous arrived in Sevastopol, which delivered the 79th Separate Marine Brigade under the command of Colonel A.S. Potapov (during the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation: the 79th separate marine rifle brigade) and a battalion of the 9th marine brigade. And three days later, the destroyers "Shaumyan", "Boikiy", "Able", the minzags "Komintern", "Ostrovsky", the base minesweepers "Mina" and "Vzryv", the transports "Krasnogvardeets", "Dimitrov", "Kursk", "Serov", "Jean-Jores", "Fabricius" delivered the 345th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel N. O. Guz to Sevastopol.

Also in the dark and long December nights, the leader "Tashkent", the destroyers "Savvy", "Bodry", the gunboat "Red Georgia", the transports "Kalinin", "Bialystok" and minesweepers successfully approached Sevastopol. At the same time, the battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna, the cruiser Molotov, and the destroyers Smyslishy and Impeccable, which supported the Soviet troops with their artillery fire, took part in the delivery of units to the city. More than 8,000 shells were fired from the ships. Delivered to Sevastopol more than 33,000 people, more than 30 tanks, 350 guns and mortars, about 200 vehicles, almost 5,000 tons of ammunition

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passes, more than 4000 tons of liquid fuel. Thousands of tons of technological equipment from enterprises were evacuated from the city and, as some sources indicate, "10,630 tons of cargo and about 13,000 residents of the city and wounded soldiers were transported" (according to other sources, more than 10,000 tons of cargo and more than 32 000 wounded and civilians). Both warships and the transport fleet participated in this difficult work.

But all this delivered amount of weapons and ammunition did not cause much damage to the Wehrmacht. For example, more than 8000 (!) shells fired plowed the land of Crimea where ... there were no Germans. And fragments of these shells, and even whole ammunition, are found on the land of Crimea throughout the territory from Balaklava to Nikolaevka, from the Kacha River to

Belbek River until now.

Chapter 29

"SAMPLES" OF SOVIET NAVIGATION ART

In the meantime, taking advantage of the lull in the German camp, the Transcaucasian Front, together with the Black Sea Fleet, in pursuance of the "theory of military art" of Admiral Isakov, carried out a landing operation to seize the Kerch Peninsula. The purpose of the landing was, firstly, to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Crimea, and secondly, to weaken the offensive of the Wehrmacht on Sevastopol and create conditions for the subsequent liberation of Crimea. But the main thing is to eliminate the threat of a German invasion of the Caucasus through Taman.

On December 5, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky reports to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Operational Directorate, General A.M. Vasilevsky: "The landing operation on the Kerch Peninsula can be carried out. But it is necessary on warships - landing from Novorossiysk

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ska, but not from Anapa. On the Azov ice situation may not allow. I propose: 1. The main landing sites are Kerch, Feodosia. 2. Constraining direction - Sudak. 3. Land from warships with strong artillery preparation of ships. 4. At the same time, launch an offensive from Sevastopol, when 388 days arrive. It's hard for me to entrust Isakov with leadership from Sevastopol.

The Headquarters and People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov decided to entrust the command of the naval part of the operation to Oktyabrsky, for which he had to go to Novorossiysk.

On December 10, units of the 388th Infantry Division began to be sent from Poti to Sevastopol. At the same time, marching companies were transferred from all bases in the Caucasus. On December 23, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky ordered I.D. Eliseev to leave for Novorossiysk from Tuapse to provide and control the operation. At the same time, Oktyabrsky sends N.G. Kuznetsov and the Military Council of the Transcaucasian Front telegram: "Analysis of the hostilities showed that the Germans are aware of the readiness for the landing operation, which is confirmed by the following facts ..." Etc.

In connection with this operation, reflecting on those long-standing events, Field Marshal von Manstein recalled, decades after the war, when we met:

- ... The local population helped us in the Crimea, especially the Tatars, who did not tolerate Stalin's Bolshevik regime. Often, in conversations with me, they expressed that they always had good relations with the inhabitants of the Crimea - Russians and Greeks, and never had any problems in mutual relations. I myself did not plan to leave the Crimea, and I did not receive such an order. Knowing my tactics, the General Staff of the Wehrmacht and the command of the Army Group "South" fully approved my plan to preserve the remaining forces of the army and completely demoralize the defenders of Sevastopol. And then, after the slushy Crimean winter, as soon as it gets warmer, blockade Sevastopol and prevent the ships of the Black Sea Fleet from breaking through to the main base. Although I knew that Oktyabrsky, in fulfillment of the will of Steel

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on holding the main forces of the squadron in the Caucasus. And that he saves them for the destruction of mountain passes in case of an uprising of the Caucasians. ... Well, this landing is the sheer absurdity of the Soviet command. The concept of the operation provided for a simultaneous landing along the entire coast of the Kerch Peninsula, up to Feodosia. Commander Oktyabrsky naively believed that the landing would be carried out suddenly. The main blow was planned by the forces of the 44th Army, newly formed on the Taman Peninsula. For this purpose, about 100,000 people were involved together with the personnel

rear, well, what came out of it - time showed ... My plans came true. After the thaw, early spring set in, and at the end of April it was already summer in the Crimea. And a little more than a month was enough for me to complete the Crimean operation, and thereby guarantee the further oil supply of the Reich and the Wehrmacht with Romanian oil.

During the December days, fleet ships and transports continued to bring military units, marching reinforcements, weapons, and ammunition to Sevastopol; even the old cruiser Comintern (former Memory of Mercury), commissioned back in 1901, took part in the operations. Forces kept coming and coming; On December 23 and 24, the 345th rifle division and the 81st separate tank battalion with T-26 tanks were delivered; then - the 386th rifle division, a division of rocket launchers and five marching companies; two battalions of the 1165th rifle regiment of the 345th rifle division, etc. But due to the fact that almost the entire fleet was busy preparing for the landing operation, the combat support of the Main Base deteriorated.

Indeed, the forces of the 44th Army were supposed to destroy the formations of the 11th Army of the enemy with cutting blows, but this plan was not realized. For at that time the main task for the fleet and army formations was the defense of Sevastopol. And the conceived, but not thought out landing, only tore off the forces necessary for this. And because of the low organization, it failed.

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The remnants of the 345th Rifle Division (commander - Lieutenant Colonel N.O. Guz) and the 79th Marine Rifle Brigade, after the failure of the landing on Feodosia, had to be transferred near Sevastopol. Major changes were made to the plan of operation. At the same time, it is important to point out that on the Kerch floor of the island the total number of German troops did not exceed 25,000 people with 180 guns.

On December 26, 1941, the troops of the 51st Separate Army under the command of Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov were planned to land on the northern and eastern coasts of the peninsula, and on December 29, the 44th Army under the command of Major General A.N. Pervushina.

So, the sequence of the operation was disrupted due to changes in the composition of forces and the time of its implementation. Which, of course, affected its disastrous results.

There were problems with disembarkation and vehicles. Both the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla found themselves without special landing craft, as a result of which the command took away boats, longboats, and other watercraft from private individuals. In total, about 300 barges, boats, fishing boats were selected, but even they could not ensure the prompt delivery of troops to the landing bridgehead. After all, the watercraft used by the paratroopers were primitive, did not have good seaworthiness, not to mention navigational equipment and means of communication. The pace of the cages was frustrated.

From December 26 to December 30, 1941, the Azov Flotilla (commander - Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov; military commissar - regimental commissar S. S. Prokofiev; head of the political department - battalion commissar V. A. Lizarsky; chief of staff - captain 2- senior rank A.V. Sverdlov) and the Kerch Naval Forces, led by counter-admiral A.S. Frolov (the naval base was located on Taman; military commissar - battalion commissar V.A. Martynov) landed on the northern and eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula more than 15 000 people. This in itself was a crime, because these forces were not enough to gain a foothold in the area well shot by the enemy - on the coast of the Kazantip Bay in the area of Zyuk, Khro capes

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research institute Tarkhan; in the areas of Kamysh-Burun and Eltigen of the Kerch Strait. The landing was carried out in extremely difficult weather conditions and with organized artillery and small arms fire from German positions. The storm, which often rages at this time of the year, disrupted the schedule for the passage of the landing ships, which were late to the landing sites and landed not in the dark, but in the daytime. Low air temperature, large wave roll on the paratroopers, up to the chest

in ice water had a negative impact on the overall operation. And since it was already light, the Germans also used aircraft.

On December 27, Oktyabrsky sends a telegram to the command of the Transcaucasian Front, where he reports that he considers it impossible to carry out the operation with the main forces from Novorossiysk and Tuapse and asks to wait two or three days in the hope of ... better weather. But at the same time he insists on carrying out (continuing) the operation with the forces that have already arrived in the designated area. Dooming people to inevitable death.

The state of affairs was not saved by the appearance on the bridgehead and the landing of part of the troops of the 44th Army.

And while the forces of the 345th Infantry Division and the 79th Infantry Brigade were fighting, ships arrived to Sevastopol under the cover of those notes on December 28: the battleship "Paris Commune" (commander - Captain 1st Rank F.I. Kravchenko), cruiser "Molotov" (commander - captain 1st rank Yu.K. Zinoviev), destroyers "Imperfect" (commander - captain-lieutenant P.M. Buryak) and "Smyshlenny" (captain 3rd rank V.M. Tikho worlds-Shegula) fired at concentrations of enemy troops. During the day, the ships fired more than 1000 shots. On December 29, new reinforcements and ammunition were delivered on the battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna, the cruiser Molotov, and on the destroyers Smart and Impeccable. In total, when the enemy repulsed the second assault on Sevastopol, Soviet ships completed 280 fire missions; for example, from 21 to 31 December, more than 500 shells were fired from ships at enemy battle formations. The flagship gunner of the fleet captain of the 1st rank was responsible for controlling the fire of naval artillery

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A.I. Rull; he received applications for the performance of fire missions from the chief of artillery of the Primorsky Army, at the same command post with which the chief of artillery of the Coast Guard was located, which was supposed to ensure the synchronism of fire in the threatened direction ..

In this situation, von Manstein decided to regroup the troops. However, the commander of the army was outstripped by the commander of the 42nd Corps, Count General von Sponeck, who gave the order to withdraw the forces of the corps. As a result, the army commander was forced to dismiss General von Sponeck from his post. After that, he left for the Reich, and after a long investigation of this incident, he was withdrawn to the reserve of the General Staff of the Ground Forces.

Already after the capture of the Crimea, Field Marshal von Manstein, while in Army Group North, filed a report addressed to Field Marshal Keitel, explaining the reasons that prompted General von Sponeck to retreat. There, the situation was explained in detail and that von Sponeck

just anticipated von Manstein's further actions as commander of the 11th Army. The count was thereby justified, but at a meeting with Field Marshal von Manstein, he admitted that he was tormented by the hasty abandonment of positions then, in December 1941, near Kerch, which made him feel guilty. Von Manstein tried to calm him down, but after some time he found out that the count ... had shot himself (however, the truth, as they say, is different and does not relate to the essence of our story ...).

But back to December 1941. The Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, with the incredible efforts of sailors and officers, nevertheless ended with the capture of a bridgehead (temporary); and immediately the main mouthpieces of political propaganda — the newspapers Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda — broke out with solemnly patriotic materials that this landing was "very successful", that "the enemy grouping suffered enormous losses" and that "the brilliant talent of the Soviet commanders forced the enemy to divert significant

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forces from under Sevastopol, which facilitated the position of the defenders of the city. On the night of December 30-31, party and Komsomol meetings were held in all units and divisions, where the Pravda editorial of December 28, 1941, "Communists are the foremost fighters at the front and in the rear," was discussed. At the meetings, as expected, they adopted a resolution on the "military friendship" of the seashores and sailors to fight "to the last drop of blood"; no comments...

In connection with the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, Admiral of the Fleet Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov wrote: "The enormous efforts of the troops and sailors during the landing period did not bring the results that the Stavka had hoped for. ...Landing operations should be planned looking rather far ahead, because after the landing one should expect a quick and decisive reaction from the enemy. ...Analyzing the results of this largest landing operation during the Great Patriotic War, I come to the following conclusion. The implementation of the fundamentally correct decision of the Headquarters - to assist Sevastopol by landing troops on the Kerch Peninsula in order to chain part of Manstein's army there - was greatly complicated by the fact that the too wide landing front turned out to be not provided with the necessary reserves. And yet, Kuznetsov, drawing conclusions and analyzing the shortcomings of this operation, due to the then existing trend, bypasses the actual situation of the political and military aspects of the war on the Black Sea.

For obvious reasons, most of the participants in these events basically exaggerated the success of the operation and in every possible way brightened up its shortcomings, which, if they were affected, then basically reduced to "multiple superiority of enemy forces."

One of the organizers and inspirers of this landing operation was Admiral Isakov, head of the General Staff, who, as will be written later, was recalled from near Leningrad and sent to the south; "Even at this difficult time, he summarized the experience and prepared notes to the People's Commissar of the Navy on the role of aviation in the fight against enemy ships, the features of base defense in new

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conditions ... After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the admiral was sent to the Pacific Ocean, where he had to work to ensure that this did not happen in the Far East "(see N. Skritsky "The Most Famous Naval Commanders of Russia", M., 2000, p. 396). All this is nonsense. I. S. Isakov, as soon as he felt that the landing operation, built on his theoretical views, had failed and Stalin could bring down anger on him, he fled and, not without the help of Mekhlis, convinced the Commissar of the Navy that he should definitely leave to Vladivostok to study (!) the tragedy of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. And as for the notes to the People's Commissar of the Navy on summarizing the experience ... then one cannot but agree with this: in the silence of the cypresses and magnolias of Tuapse, one can dream, pee, and lie in the sun.

It is known that Isakov was a deputy commander and a member of the Military Council of the North Caucasian Front and in the same position in the South-West direction in the maritime sector. Officially, his duties were charged with coordinating the actions of the army troops with the operations carried out by the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov and Caspian military flotillas. Historians justify his inaction in the southern direction in relation to the so-called coordination of army and navy operations by the fact that, they say, this leader himself was more than once in places where there were battles and fell under shelling. So on October 4, 1942, Isakov came under bombardment at the Goyth pass and was seriously wounded in the thigh; only supposedly two days later it was possible to deliver the admiral to the hospital. And because of the onset of gangrene, his leg was amputated. There was another interpretation about the wound, it was more often said (especially in high-ranking circles) that it was an unsuccessful crossbow. They say that when Isakov agreed to the amputation, he pathetically asked: "Save my head!" To which Stalin then declared: "If he once again runs away from responsibility, then he will have to cut off not his leg, but his head!" Nuav during 1942-1943, Isakov had no time for battles - he was on treatment.

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And this was the only period in the Navy when Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy, confidently and calmly managed the associations entrusted to him.

In the postwar years, at lectures at the academies of the General Staff, the Naval Academy and at scientific conferences held under the leadership of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergey Georgievich Gorshkov, it was indicated that the Kerch-Feodosiya operation was a brilliant operation, it provided valuable experience in preparing and conducting amphibious operations on an operational scale, and should become - no less - an example in the further development of Soviet naval art.

This "classical" landing operation by Soviet standards created "favorable conditions for the development of the offensive, the deblockade of Sevastopol and the liberation of Crimea as a whole. Moreover, the enemy did not have time to bring up reserves in time and had only one infantry division and two incomplete Romanian brigades on the 32-km defense sector, which, moreover, lost a significant part of artillery and military equipment during the retreat. But with the beginning of the offensive, the front commander, Lieutenant-General D.T. Kozlov, clearly hesitated, although he had a significant superiority over the enemy. The Germans, having pulled up their reserves, on January 15, 1942, delivered a preemptive strike at the junction between the 51st and 44th armies, and then captured Feodosia, the most important port on the Kerch Peninsula. Repeated attempts by our troops to go on the offensive ended in vain. In the interests of the ground forces in January 1942, the forces of the Black Sea Fleet landed three tactical landings in the Sudak region. But due to the fact that the offensive of the troops did not receive its development, all landing forces were cut off from the coast, surrounded and destroyed by superior enemy forces "(V. Dotsenko. "Fleet. War. Victory", St. Petersburg, 1995, p. 129 —130 The same quote, word V word in another book by this author: "The Fleet in the Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. St. Petersburg and Moscow, 2005, pp. 236-237). It must be said that the author, captain of the 1st rank, candidate of historical sciences, professor V. D. Dotsenko, one of the first

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notes the close to reality state of affairs in the corps of General von Sponeck, that there were only one infantry division and two incomplete Romanian brigades. And in this way the professor takes bold steps towards the events of that war, covering them more or less objectively. But then the author memorizes the superiority of the forces of the enemy, and this is regrettable ...

Chapter 30

"MY 11th ARMY AVOID DEATH"

During this favorable period, the Soviet troops make a new attempt to liberate the Crimea.

The command of the Caucasian Front set the task before the SOR: with the transition of Soviet troops to the offensive on the Kerch Peninsula in the direction of Karasubazar-Simferopol, the troops of the Primorsky Army should simultaneously advance in the direction of Bakhchisaray-Simferopol. The SOR was also ordered to land tactical landings in Evpatoria and Yalta.

Local factories are also working to defeat the German troops; so, for example, in January-April, the following were produced in Sevastopol: 556 mortars, 30,800 hand grenades, 66,800 various mines, telephone cable, etc. This "heroic", exhausting work fell on the shoulders of women, children and the elderly. "If we sum up what we have done directly for the defense of Sevastopol," writes the already mentioned author M. Surguchev, "quite impressive figures can be obtained. Only the branch in the Novo-Troitskaya adit (which was subsequently blown up by Soviet demolition workers; the branch's chief engineer Lazar Yakovlevich Gotte. - Auth.) produced hundreds of thousands of mines, grenades and other weapons. If it were possible to simultaneously deploy mortars made by a branch of the plant along the entire defense line of the city

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during the siege of Sevastopol, then for every 16 linear meters of the 40-kilometer defense line there would be one company or battalion mortar" (see "The ships are returning to service", p. 215); unique evidence, so clearly contradicting the constant pleas of the command about the "lack" of ammunition to fight the "armed to the teeth" enemy.

The Black Sea Fleet continued to transfer troops and equipment to the Kerch Peninsula; but after the recent Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, the strength of the fleet decreased, because several small ships sank, some were damaged and were being repaired at the Morzavod. There, in Tuapse and Poti, the minesweepers "Semyon Roshal", "Harpoon", the submarine L-23 (evacuated from the city of Nikolayev), and other surface and underwater ships were being completed.

Throughout the confrontation under the Main Naval Base between the Caucasian coast and Sevastopol, along with the more than once mentioned cruisers Krasny Kavkaz (commander - 2nd rank captain Alexei Matveyevich Gushchin), Voroshilov (commander - 1st rank captain F. S. Markov), "Krasny Krym" (commander - captain of the 2nd rank Alexander Illarionovich Zubkov), leader of the "Kharkov", destroyers "Vigilant", "Bodry" (commander - captain of the 3rd rank of V. M. Mitin), "Courageous", "Nezamozhny" - the tankers "Vaillant Couturier", "Moskva" cruised; patrol ships "Storm" and "Shkval"; transports "Chernomorets" (Captain Sofron Alekseevich Perlov), "Berezina" (Captain Sergei Averyanovich Yezhel, Commissioner I.I. Kotlyarov), "Nogin" (Captain Petr Ferdinandovich Beizas) "Kuban", "Communist", "A. Serov"; minesweeper "Anchor"; schooner "Papanin". And also es-

framed destroyers "Svobodny", "Imperfect" (commander - captain of the 3rd rank Pyotr Maksimovich Buryak; sank after the attack of the "Junkers" on June 26, 1942; along with his father, his minor son Volodya, who was swimming as a cabin boy, also perished. Part of the crew rescued two Soviet submarines ki-"babies"). The ambulances "Armenia", "N. Ostrovsky" (sank on March 23, 1942 at the pier from a direct hit by bombs), "Svaneti" (for

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sank on April 17, 1942), "Abkhazia" (died on June 10, 1942 near Sevastopol, along with the destroyer "Svobodny" accompanying him on the campaign). It is also worth mentioning the cargo-and-passenger motor ship "Gruziya" (in peacetime, it sailed along the Odessa-Sochi-Batumi line), which for a time became an ambulance transport; during the evacuation from Sevastopol, "learning from a conversation that in two or three days ... transport departs, Schreiber (Head of the Department of Shipbuilding and Ship Repair S.I. Schreiber. - Auth.) asked to be appointed senior, while assuring that will fully cope with the tasks assigned" (M. Surguchev. "The ships are returning to service", p. 85). Schreiber, who was rushing to Tuapse with the first sea transport, fell ill with pneumonia, was sent on a steam train along with repairmen; it is known that the captain and the senior assistant of the ship "Georgia" were absent.

On February 28, 1942, the Chapaev transport (ship captain A.I. Chirkov) was raided by German aviation on the high seas; he managed to survive, but already on March 1, the transport ran into a mine in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Sarych and sank. Back in January 1942, in the Myskhako area, the destroyer Sposobny was blown up by a mine; "survived", partly restored in Tuapse, and partly in the Poti branch of the plant. Combat missions were also carried out by tugboats, among them the Vezhilov; the floating boat behind the Neva (on March 23, 1942, from a direct hit by a bomb, the keel sat on the bottom at the pier). During a raid on the port of Tuapse on March 26, a large tanker "Sovetskaya Neft" caught fire, the motor ship "Georgia" was damaged, as well as other surface and underwater ships standing near the wall.

All these ships, which have passed many trials, deserve to be remembered by posterity...

At the beginning of 1942, from January 2 to 5, units of the SOR were regrouping in preparation for the offensive.

At the same time, a landing was being prepared for Evpatoria; the landing was scheduled for 5 January. The landing force consisted of a reinforced marine battalion (commander - Captain G.K. Buzinov) and a reconnaissance group attached to it from the reconnaissance department of the fleet headquarters (commander - Captain V.P. Topchiev). On the night of

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4. On January 5, on the minesweeper "Vzryvatel", the tugboat "SP-14" and seven boats "MO-4" the landing force reached its destination. Landing commander - captain of the 2nd rank N.V. Buslaev (will die in this operation), military commissar - regimental commissar A.O. Boyko. The landing began at 3 am.

And again, there was nothing surprising that, when approaching the port, the ships were discovered, illuminated by searchlights and fired upon by German artillery. At 10 o'clock in the morning, a telegram from military commissar Boyko arrived in Sevastopol: "The situation is threatening, immediate assistance is required by people, aircraft, ships"; an hour later he said: "There is no radio contact with the battalions."

Recalling the events described here at our meeting in the early 70s of the last century at his villa in Bavaria, Field Marshal von Manstein told me, a native of the beautiful and long-suffering Crimea (of which my interlocutor was, of course, notified in advance), occasionally interrupting his monologue and genuinely and sympathetically sighing:

"On January 5, a new landing of Soviet troops followed under the cover of the Black Sea Fleet in Evpatoria. At the same time, NKVD officers came out of the underground in the city, who tried to raise the population of the city against our soldiers, and partly they succeeded. The small security forces allocated for the defense of the city and port were unable to prevent the landing and suppress this uprising. The Romanian artillery regiment, intended for coastal defense, abandoned its positions in fear. And only thanks to the fact that some local residents had warned us even earlier about the possible activation of the underground NKVD officers, we managed to quickly localize this demonstration and restore anti-Bolshevik order in the city.

We decided to send the 105th Infantry Regiment, at least part of its forces, to Evpatoria, the next to the Feodosia sector from near Sevastopol, to destroy the landing troops and suppress the NKVD employees who had come out of the underground. The army headquarters sent a reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd infantry division, as well as the 70th engineer battalion, to Evpatoria.

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The units sent to Evpatoria, first under the command of Colonel von Geigl, and then Colonel Müller (commander of the 105th regiment), managed to defeat the enemy in street battles. The NKVD officers put up fierce resistance, sowing in a large building, so that with the help of assault groups of sappers, this building, together with the Chekists, had to be blown up. Many brave soldiers fell in the battles in Yevpatoriya, and a brave officer, the commander of the reconnaissance battalion, Lieutenant Colonel von Boddin, who, after the battle, was buried in the Yevpatoriya cemetery along with those who died then, also fell.

comrades. Baron von Boddin was dearly loved by the soldiers, he shared with them all the hardships of military life, one might say, he lived in battle trenches and on the battlefield. He was shot dead by the Chekists, who were in ambush ...

By January 7, 1942, the fighting in Evpatoria was completed. The landing troops of the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, practically unprepared for this purpose, were mostly destroyed, and partly taken prisoner... These unfortunate sailors, almost unarmed, were sent to capture Evpatoria and the coast around... My God, for what, for who did they fight for such commanders?!

Perhaps the only consolation for two days of fighting was that we had destroyed more than a thousand NKVD officers who had come from God knows where in Evpatoria. In hot pursuit, an investigation was carried out. It turned out that most of the Chekists were from the so-called detachment, which operated in the area of the villages of Nikolaevka, Peschanoe and the city of Saki. When parts of the 54th Corps captured the western part of the Crimea, the senior among the Chekists of the detachment was ordered to go underground in Evpatoria, Coastal and Saki in order to organize a partisan formation. The signal for the capture of the western part of Crimea was received by the Chekists on the day of the landing, January 5th. How it ended, you already know ...

Suddenly, for the enemy, I landed an assault force of General Ziegler's brigade near Feodosiya, which made it impossible for the Soviet troops to develop an offensive in this area. There were also two divisions from near Sevastopol on the way, and after them the 30th Army Corps was sent to attack

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seniya counterstrike to the Soviets. To be honest, near Sevastopol it was possible to do without it, because we already knew well the tactics of the actions of Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky and the army command in Sevastopol, in other words, their inaction. There was no regrouping of troops, no! — sailors and soldiers were gathered at the forefront by forces of detachments for a new meat grinder.

The command of the 30th ak instead of Botkin, who was seriously ill with jaundice, General von Salmuth was taken over by General Fretter-Pico. Meanwhile, new enemy troops appeared in Feodosia, and the same thing happened in Kerch. The front near Sevastopol was now held by only four of our divisions and one Rumanian mountain brigade.

Already on January 15, everything was ready for an attack on Feodosia by the forces of the 30th and 42nd army corps. Consider that the blow was carried out by three and a half German divisions and one Rumanian mountain brigade - and this was against the enemy, whose forces had now increased to eight divisions and two brigades. According to other information that came to me, there were already 12 enemy divisions in the area of Kerch and Feodosiya. However, this was not confirmed information.

But we knew for sure: the enemy had tanks, albeit in small numbers, but we didn't have them at all. In addition, air support was in question due to non-flying weather. And yet I decided to attack; something told me that success was possible, again, there was hope that the Soviets would follow the old pattern. Thanks to the ability of the officers and the bravery of the soldiers of the 105th Infantry Regiment and the 213th Infantry Regiment (under the command of a highly professional commander, Colonel Gitzfeld), the offensive was indeed a success. The regiment of this officer distinguished himself in his time during the storming of the Tatar ditch and during the capture of Kerch. By January 18, Feodosia was in our hands. The enemy lost about 7,000 killed, more than 10,000 prisoners, 177 guns, 85 tanks. Aviation, despite the bad weather, did an excellent job in the port of Feodosiya and sank several transports.

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Yes, in those days a small enemy landing was landed in Sudak, but we immediately destroyed it. After the success in Feodosia, I had to reflect on the question: how to consolidate our victories and quickly free the Kerch Peninsula from the Soviet armies? While this was not possible, we had too little strength; thoughtless decisions and indulgence of ambitions could lead to failures and irreversible losses ... Then I decided to limit myself to throwing the enemy back to the Isthmus of Paryaz, where we could cut off the enemy troops at the narrowest point: between the Black and Azov Seas.

My 11th Army escaped mortal danger. But we did not flatter ourselves with the illusion that the enemy would not try once more to drive us out of the Crimea. And dominance in the Black Sea provided him with special advantages for this ... "

Chapter 31

"WE HAVE COMPLETED THE MAIN TASK!"

On January 16, a general offensive of Soviet troops in the Crimea was scheduled. However, the date of the onset varied more than once depending on the circumstances.

On the night of January 17, the landing force of the 226th Mountain Rifle Regiment under the command of Major Selikhov in the amount of 1750 people was transferred to the Sudak region by a detachment of cruisers, which included: the cruiser "Red Crimea", the destroyers "Shaumyan" and "Savvy", gunboat "Red Adjaristan", six boats "MO-4", two schooners. The disembarkation was carried out from 0 h. 45 min. until 4 am. At the same time, the enemy was advancing in the Feodosia area, capturing it in the middle of the day on January 17th. So the landing of Major Selikhov could not affect the general situation in any way. Moreover, after a week, the ships of the fleet could not unload food due to storms and

ammunition for the 226th gsp. On the night of January 23, the destroyer Bodry, which finally delivered the necessary supplies, took the wounded paratroopers.

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The commander of the troops of the Caucasian Front set the next task for the Black Sea Fleet: on the night of January 25, to land troops in Sudak-Novy Svet as part of the 554th mountain rifle regiment of the 138th mountain rifle division; the fleet to allocate 150 people for the first throw; at the same time, merge the 226th and 554th Guards Rifle Regiments into a separate group under the command of Major Selikhov; group to establish contact with the partisans and be ready for action on special orders ...

Due to the quickness of the enemy, the assigned tasks were not fulfilled: the landing was failed, the remaining paratroopers had to join the partisans and act with them.

Due to the fact that the troops of the Caucasian Front never went over to the offensive, the offensive operations of the troops of the SOR and the landing forces could not give any positive decisive results.

On January 28, 1942, by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Crimean Front, the Transcaucasian Military District and the Caucasian Front were divided among themselves. The SOR, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov Flotilla and the Kerch Naval Base were operationally subordinated to the commander of the Crimean Front, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov (member of the Military Council - divisional commissar F.A. Shamanin, chief of staff - F.I. Tolbukhin). The Crimean Front also included the 44th, 51st and 47th armies.

The reorganization was to be completed by February 8, 1942.

Curious figures in connection with the preparation of the offensive in the Crimea are given by Lieutenant General P.A. Morgunov. "On February 11, the commander of the SOR reported on the composition of the troops of the SOR ... 1. The coastal army, consisting of: 7 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 tank battalions, 2 army artillery regiments, 1 separate mortar division and 1 guards mortar division ("Katyusha") with a total number of 69,853 people ... 2. 7th, 8th and 79th brigades of marines, 2nd Perekop and 3rd regiments of marines, which are operationally subordinated to Primor

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Russian army - 12,128 people. 3. Coastal defense of 4096 people ... 4. Air Force and air defense units; in total in air defense - 3153 people. 5. Water protection

of the area and ships of the fleet based at the Main Base ... The length of the front is 36 km ... Density per 1 km of the front: guns of various calibers - 5.3. Medium and large mortars - 10.8. Machine guns - 13.6. light machine guns - 22.0 ... (" Heroic Sevastopol ". S. 256-257). In total, even according to the lowest figures, there were more defenders of the city of Sevastopol on February 11, 1942, numbering 89,230 people, than there were fighters in the entire 11th army of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein!

During the winter months of 1942, warships of the Black Sea Fleet shelled the coastline, where enemy positions could be located. From February 26 to March 1, 14 ships of the fleet, including the battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna, shelled the area of Feodosia, Sary Krym, Near and Far Kamyshe. The destroyer "Zheleznyak" operated in the area of Sudak, firing along the coastal road; the Molotov cruiser opened fire on the Near and Far Kamyshe; destroyer "Shaumyan" shelled Yalta.

With the spring, the Crimean nights became shorter, the transports could no longer cover the distance Novorossiysk-Sevastopol during the darkness. Due to the large losses of transport and the poor provision of communications, People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov ordered Rear Admiral Eliseev to reconsider the routes of the ships and ensure their safety at the crossing.

On March 6, the commander of the Crimean Front set the troops the task of being in constant readiness for an offensive in the Feodosiya direction. The Black Sea Fleet and the SOR were instructed to: 1. Defend Sevastopol, carry out a demonstrative attack on Duvanka; 2. The ships of the fleet should support the troops of the 44th Army with artillery fire, striking at Art. Vladislavovka, Feodosiya and Near Kamyshe; 3. Fleet aviation to cover warships at the transition to the coast of the Kerch Peninsula.

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And again, Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky reports to the Military Council of the Crimean Front that it is very dangerous to send warships during the day to shell enemy positions, and suggests using them only at night.

In the spring of 1942, Army Group South carried out a series of powerful strikes against Red Army formations, destroying most of the Soviet troops, and, not without success, continued to advance into the bend of the Don.

The German historian, General Kurt Toppelskirch wrote: "At a time when the German troops, preparing for the upcoming broad offensive, were still receiving reinforcements and regrouping, two strong blows were made in the Crimea in order to eliminate the threat to the southern flank of the Germans and free the 11th army." As a result of these

In May 1942, the Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula and in Sevastopol found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. And if there was still comparative calm in early spring, it was the calm before the coming storm. The German command carefully prepared the spring attack on Sevastopol and Kerch, using the forces of the Luftwaffe, cut off all communications going to the Crimea. A large number of transports were destroyed and the supply of Sevastopol with everything necessary for the war was practically interrupted. Deliveries could only be carried out by warships.

Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov recalled that on the issue of the best organization of fleet management, he turned to Marshal Shaposhnikov, but he recommended reporting everything to the Supreme. Stalin did not give a clear answer. But after some time, a short conversation took place. Stalin asked the people's commissar:

- And who would you suggest to the commanders of the Sevastopol defensive region instead of the Oktyabrsky one?

Kuznetsov replied that he considered Lieutenant General S. I. Kabanov, who had shown himself well at Kharkov and Leningrad, to be the most suitable candidate. But Stalin did not make a final decision, and, as emphasized in his

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Kuznetsov's thoughts, he was still not convinced of the need for any replacement.

Of course, in his books, Nikolai Gerasimovich does not say much, although he could hardly have known everything. But as a talented leader of the Navy, he understood the real role of Oktyabrsky and the Black Sea Fleet squadron stationed in the Caucasus.

During the second half of April and early May, von Manstein, after analyzing the situation on the perimeter of the entire Eastern Front and weighing his possibilities once again, decided to go over to the offensive. Which began with the infliction of massive strikes by siege artillery, as well as artillery of smaller calibers and aircraft at headquarters, command posts, communication centers and at the junctions of units and formations defending Sevastopol. As a result of the skillfully planned initial period of the offensive operation, von Manstein succeeded in paralyzing the command and control system of the troops of the Crimean Front.

From the inflicted blow, as in the autumn of 1941, the Soviet troops fled towards the Kerch Strait, to Taman. In these battles, the entire defense system was completely crushed.

By May 20, 1942, the Crimean Front was defeated and ceased to exist.

After its defeat, many military leaders were demoted in positions and in Ingian ranks; for example, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov was demoted to lieutenant colonel, removed from his post and demoted, member of the Military Council, Divisional Commissar F.A. Shamanin, removed chief of staff of the front, Major General P.P. Lieutenant General S. I. Chernyak, Commander of the 47th Army, Major General K. S. Kolganov, Commander of the Front Air Force, Major General Aviation E. M. Nikolaenko. About the representative of the Headquarters, the army commissar of the 1st rank L. 3. Mehlis has already been mentioned. All leaders of the Crimean Front and military

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associations. Moreover, Mekhlis, in his usual harsh form, demanded that Kozlov, Tolbukhin, Batov, Chernyak, Kolganov and other military leaders be shot. To which Stalin ironically reacted:

- Comrade Mekhlis, why don't you demand that Isakov, Oktyabrsky, Azarov, Kulakov be shot?

And without waiting for Mekhlis's answer, he continued:

- If we shoot those people that you named, then these comrades will not understand us. Maybe you and I will shoot Comrade Mekhlis, and send the rest with rifles in their hands to the penal battalion? If you don't mind, comrade Mekhlis, we'll decide that.

This was the case when Lev Zakharovich realized that his life was hanging by a thread, he, shrinking, dutifully remained silent.

"Your silence, Comrade Mekhlis, speaks of the correctness of my proposal. But I think ... you and I got excited. We have completed the main task - we did not allow the Caucasus to explode. We have done a good job. And our General Staff will take care of the rest, and, I think, the troops of our former friend will find their big grave in the foothills of the Caucasus. But for the loss of Crimea, think about who and how to discipline. Still, there must be order.

Chapter 32

FALSE - A YOKE ON THE NECK OF DESCENDANTS

After the completion of the operation to destroy the Crimean Front, von Manstein, as they say, without taking a breath, began the regrouping of troops for the assault on Sevastopol, which was scheduled for June 7th.

For decades now, military historians have been convincing their naive readers that by this date the German side had:

- "the total number of enemy troops reached 230,000 people, who were armed with 450 tanks and more than 2,000 guns and mortars, there were up to

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600 aircraft. From the sea, Sevastopol was blocked by 19 torpedo and 30 patrol boats and 8 hunters for submarines";

- "the command of the 11th army concentrated near Seva stopol 204,000 soldiers and officers, 2045 guns and mortars, 450 tanks, about 600 aircraft";

- "in May, 6 Italian small submarines were transferred to the Black Sea (complete nonsense. - Avia.), the Germans allocated up to 150 aircraft to disrupt the supply of Sevastopol";

- "In July 1942, the Nazis had an auxiliary cruiser on the Black Sea, 4 destroyers, 3 destroyers, 4 patrol ships, 4 gunboats and 7 submarines (2! - Auth.), 13 minesweepers, 16 torpedo and 30 patrol boats Terov, about 100 self-propelled barges and over 300 aircraft";

- "For the naval blockade of Sevastopol, the fascist German command created a special group consisting of aircraft, torpedo boats and submarines. In May, the enemy, using aviation, began to mine the inner raid and the Sevastopol Bay";

- "for air support of the third assault, the enemy. concentrated 600 (on some days over 1,000 aircraft, including 700 bombers and 200 fighters)";

- "Enemy aviation daily made 600-1000 sorties." —

Whereas, according to the same numerous sources, the Soviet side had:

- "the garrison of Sevastopol consisted of 120,000 people with 606 guns, 1999 mortars, 38 tanks and 109 aircraft";

- "the defenders of the city were able to oppose the enemy much less: 106,000 fighters, more than 600 guns and mortars, 38 tanks and 53 aircraft";

- "the total number of personnel of the combat units of the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region was 106,625 people, 606 different artillery pieces, 38 tanks, 109 aircraft";

- "at that time the Black Sea Fleet consisted of linear

ship, 4 cruisers, leader, 7 destroyers, 5 gunboats and 41 submarines (!! - Avia.), 62 torpedo boats, 3 mines

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minelayers, 30 minesweepers and other ships, as well as 216 aircraft.

(Taken from various printed publications already mentioned in the book, and also see the collection "Museum of the Heroic Defense and Liberation of Sevastopol". Simferopol, 1978; p. 103.)

The table of the balance of forces in General Morgunov's book "Heroic Sevastopol" (p. 313) is very curious; it states in particular:

- The Soviet side had infantry battalions - 70 with a total number of 106,625 people, the German side had 87 with a total number of 203,800 people. Ratio 1:1, 9.

- Anti-tank guns: 189 Soviet and 655 German. The ratio is 1:3.5.

- Guns 75 mm and above: 417 Soviet and 670 German. Ratio: 1:1.5.

- Tanks: 38 Soviet and 450 German. Ratio: 1:12.

- Aircraft: 115 Soviet and 600 German. Ratio: 1:5.2.

Falsehood, replicated once, turned into a heavy yoke around the neck of descendants; but if this yoke falls, and from the former greatness of the sacrificial struggle "to the last drop of blood", from countless feats and glory, absolutely nothing will remain ... except that the violence of some people over others, their use in slaughter in the name of protecting the interests of those who will remain in power ...

And if, as mentioned above, "the total number of enemy troops reached 230,000 people," then why are more of them dying there than supposedly there?!

Here is a quote: "In the struggle for Sevastopol, the enemy lost up to 300 thousand people killed and wounded." These words belong to Rear Admiral I. Rusanov, Deputy Head of the Department of Operational Art of the Navy, VAGSh of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (see Marine Collection, No. 5, 2002, p. 28).

Or: "In the June battles near Sevastopol, the Nazi troops suffered heavy losses. In the last 25 days of fighting alone, the enemy has lost up to 150,000 soldiers and officers, more than 250 tanks, up to 250 guns and more than 300 aircraft.

9 Stalin could strike first Hey

In total, during the defense, the enemy lost near Sevastopol up to 300,000 killed and wounded, more than 370 tanks, more than 350 tankettes and armored vehicles, 760 guns, about 600 aircraft, about 2,000 mortars and many other weapons "(Sat: " Black Sea Fleet of Russia " Edited by Admiral V.P. Komoedov, p. 252).

Or: "The aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet also inflicted serious damage on the enemy, operating in extremely difficult conditions of basing with a limited composition of forces. During the period of the third assault on Sevastopol, the 3rd Special Air Group made 3,144 sorties, shot down 61 enemy aircraft in air battles and damaged 70, destroyed 43 aircraft at airfields and damaged 29. The air group destroyed 87 tanks, 312 vehicles, 82 wagons. (Ibid., p. 253)

Thanks to the Soviet "historians" and their thoughtlessly copying followers, in just a few days of fighting, the valiant Red Army and the Black Sea Fleet destroyed more enemy forces than he had in the entire Crimean campaign! So why, then, did the liberation of Crimea cost hundreds of thousands of lives of Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Belarusians and other peoples of the country?!

Think about why, citing such "numbers", we are not told about the losses on the Soviet side during the defense of Seva Stopol?

Or maybe just the mentioned figures of "German losses" are the losses of Soviet sailors and soldiers of the army near Sevastopol, not counting the losses of itrafbats and penal companies ?!

... If we correct the Soviet historians and military leaders of the falsifiers - the so-called leading participants in the defense of Sevastopol, who sat out in the Caucasus, then we get the following picture. The strength of the Wehrmacht of all three corps of the 11th Army of Colonel General (from 01/01/1942; he will become Field Marshal General from 07/01/1942) von Manstein remained within 6 divisions, that is, 2 divisions for each smoke body. But the Romanian army was added to them, which included 3 cavalry brigades and 3 mountain divisions, which

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since the beginning of the fighting in the Crimea, they have already lost almost 2/3 of their personnel. Even with the Romanians, the number of troops did not exceed 140,000 people (a more realistic figure is 75,000 Wehrmacht people). Am I repeating? Yes, but this is the only way to bring the truth to the reader, to make him think, think, think and compare ...

During the time that von Manstein was calculating the possible development of the course of a future military operation, he was insignificant.

but, but still replenished his strength. Firstly, due to the soldiers and officers who had been in Germany (or in the sanatoriums of Ukraine) and recovered from their wounds, and secondly, 2 motorized regiments and ... not a single tank unit were assigned to the reserve. From the air, the army continued to be supported by the Luftwaffe corps, but its task was no longer aimed at Sevastopol, because the order was expected to transfer the corps to the bend of the Don.

About 450 (and not 600) bombers, attack aircraft and fighters, as well as auxiliary aircraft, actually accumulated in the Crimea, which almost did not participate in the raids on Sevastopol. If only for the reason that von Manstein by that time had destroyed many key defensive structures around the city, suppressed large-caliber batteries, destroyed the main reserves in the arsenals, destroyed oil depots, communication centers and command posts.

Therefore, even such a number of aircraft in this planned operation is not beneficial not only from the tactical side, but also from a purely material point of view. Something, and von Manstein, unlike the red commanders, knew how to count ammunition, gasoline, weapons, military equipment, his losses and the losses of the enemy.

By the way, Sevastopol was not blocked by the Romanian Navy either, because the command of the Romanian Navy knew that their forces were not enough to cope with the Black Sea Fleet squadron. However, the squadron of the Black Sea Fleet in June 1942 almost did not participate in the defense of Sevastopol, performing the main task, which was mentioned above.

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Having secured his rear, the commander of the 11th Army again returned to the abandoned task - the assault on Sevastopol.

On June 3, 1942, his troops launched a powerful artillery attack on the fortress, using a total of 1300 guns. Combat operations were carried out with the support of aviation of the 8th Air Corps.

Between the Belbek and Biyuk-Syuren stations, literally 70 meters from the manager's house, where von Manstein stayed, a special battery of Vermacht was placed under the mountain. They were siege guns "Gamma", "Karl-60" caliber 420 mm with a range of 48 km with 5-ton projectiles. As well as the siege gun "Dora" ("Gustlov")) with a firing range of 37 km with 7-ton shells. The calculation of this gun was 500 soldiers and officers in service and 420 - directly engaged in firing. The regular category of the battery commander is Major General; the batteries "Gamma" and "Karl" were subordinate to him. These tools frightened the imagination of Soviet historians; while the benefit of them to the Germans was ridiculous. Seven shots "Dora" destroyed the towers of Fort Molotov, and "Karl" destroyed the towers of the 30th Battalion

yards - Fort "Maxim Gorky" in the Mekenziev mountains.

At the same time, the 30th corps, together with the Romanian corps, entrenched itself on Eagle Hill near Sapun Mountain; and the rear and warehouses were in the Dark Balka and Kamyshly. The 54th Army Corps moved along the valley of the Belbek River; it included: the 132nd and 22nd infantry divisions, the 50th Romanian division and a special forces brigade under the command of Major General Ziegler, under whose leadership a brilliant landing operation in the Feodosiya region had recently been carried out, which ensured the success of 5 (out of 6 divisions) of the 11th Army in the defeat of three (!) Soviet armies on the Kerch bridgehead.

Here is a deliberately forgotten secret page of the military history of the period of interest to us; from the secrets surrounding the tragedy of the Black Sea Fleet during World War II, several impressive books can be written; however, for their publication and perception, a different mentality is needed: the mentality of a NOT destroyed and NOT humiliated Russian person.

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One of the most important operations of Major General Ziegler was the operation approved by von Manstein to destroy the tunnel of the Black Sea Fleet arsenal, which was dug in Sevastopol in the 30s of the 20th century at the cost of the incredible efforts of Soviet prisoner slaves from the village of Holland to Apollo Bay (where the "Chernomorsk Fleet's thirteenth ship-repair plant", well-known to Sevastopol and Black Sea residents, is now located, to which Coal Quay adjoins, passing under the bottom of the bay. A unique and one of a kind project, it can only be compared with the tunnel that passed under the English Channel and connected England and France - but this happened already in the second half of the 20th century, and with the help of the latest technologies. The basis for the construction of the tunnel under the bay was a unique project developed at the end of the 20th century by Russian scientists and engineers for the construction of a tunnel between Chukotka and Alaska through the Bering Strait, which our "historians" are also not aware of! The operation process was as follows: the trains arrived at the Coal Quay, then separately each wagon with ammunition descended from a hydraulic slide (railroad workers simply call the brakes "hills") into the tunnel, accompanied by two motor locomotives. Shells, bombs, mines, grenades and torpedoes were unloaded and stored partly in the niches of the tunnel, but mostly delivered to the adits of the arsenal. The secret arsenal of ammunition began to function two years before the start of the war. The sappers and saboteurs of the Ziegler brigade, together with their commander, managed to penetrate in two groups from the side of the village of Holland and the Gypsy railway tunnel at night into the territory of the arsenal, and then into the tunnel, having mined it. The operation was carried out so professionally that the soldiers from the naval guard who were on vacation did not hear the German soldiers

The dates of the air assault detachment (saboteurs) one by one liquidate the guards, and the sappers mine the object. When the paratroopers silently reached the hill and headed towards the Mekenziev mountains to the location of their troops, a monstrous explosion was heard behind them. Those,

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those who did not sleep that night on both sides, on Severnaya and Korabelnaya, saw how a wave of water rose above the bay with a height higher than the natural hills that could be seen, gigantic waves hit the Grafskaya pier and ripped off the nets of the boom gates at the Konstantinovsky ravelin.

June 1942 was the hardest month for the defenders of Sevastopol. At dawn on June 27, carefully prepared sea and air assault forces under the command of Major General Ziegler were suddenly landed, entrenched in the bridgeheads of the central part of the city. Then the spotters among the paratroopers began to correct the fire of artillery and aviation, and powerful artillery and aviation preparation began.

After that, the troops of Erich von Manstein went on the offensive and after some time his avant-garde units broke into the city.

And then the command of the Black Sea Fleet decided to send the destroyer "Perfect" to Sevastopol, followed by the destroyer "Svobodny", the transport "Abkhazia" and the ship "Guys", so that they delivered ammunition and took out the remaining command staff. But the ships failed to break through. During the defense of the city, Soviet ships carried out 407 firings and used up more than 12,000 shells. Characteristically, the number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers from artillery attacks by the Soviet fleet was almost equal to ... zero. The lack of correction (and you already know where and why the spotters were assembled) made it impossible to hit specific targets, which is why shells from ships plowed the hot Crimean land, maimed and killed civilians in the Belbek Valley.

The last surface ship that passed through Sevastopol was the leader "Tashkent" under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Vasily Nikolaevich Eroshenko. On the night of June 27, 2000 wounded soldiers and commanders of the barriers of the ranks were taken out on it, who took on board fragments of the canvas of the famous panorama "Defense of Sevastopol 1854-1855".

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Many historians and the command of the Navy, party and Soviet leaders argued that when the war began on the Crimean Peninsula, the territory

Historical boulevard, on which the famous 4th bastion and the panorama are located, were declared "territory out of war", i.e. the Germans were asked to perform a humane act: not to bomb the famous treasure - the canvas of the founder of Russian panoramic art, battle painter Franz Alekseevich Roubaud (1856-1928), who painted the panorama "The Defense of Sevastopol" by 1905, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Crimean War. And Erich von Manstein also confirmed to me that not a single bomb, and General von Richt Gofen, commander of the 8th Air Corps, assured him of this, did not fall on the territory of the Historical Boulevard.

But some people who were especially close to the authorities knew something else, which was talked about in close Kremlin circles: that Mekhlis had given a special order to the GUGB units, whose employees, together with the pilots of the notorious Chekist General I. Serov trained for such purposes, carried out a bombing strike on German aircraft. along the Historical Boulevard, as a result of which the panorama was damaged. And this is also a closed page of that monstrous war. Our reader knows NOTHING about this general and his bands of thugs! I affirm with full responsibility for my words. Because if they knew at least partially about their atrocities against their own people, then they would understand: who else should have been tried during the Nuremberg Tribunal!

The residents of Sevastopol, who survived not only the defense, but also the occupation (according to eyewitnesses, the residents of the Ship Side who were then irynem nah felt more protected than during the red occupation in the 20-30s), - claim that during this During the bombardment, several bombs fell near the monument to Lieutenant General Count Edvard Iogannovich (and not Eduard Ivanovich, as they call him!) Totleben, but there was no damage, except that a fragment hit the thigh of a monumental soldier with a rifle at the ready. This hole was until the end of the 50s. (I myself

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I remember it well; even now the "patch" is visible)); and the tour guides, including the former commissars of the marine brigades, and after the war, retired colonels Nikolai Evdokimovich Yekhlakov and Aram Isaakovich Sunguryan, spoke with rapture about how the "fascist beasts" broke the panorama from the monument to General Totleben, a German by origin, had his head cut off and that the entire period of the occupation the statue remained mutilated. Only the residents of Sevastopol and the surrounding villages know and remember that this act of vandalism was carried out on one of the June nights of 1942 by the hands of state security officers. It was then "explained" to people on the radio and through the local press that the head on the monument had been cut off by shrapnel during the bombardment.

Chapter 33

HOPE. RESPONSIBLE ON... THE DOOMED

By the beginning of the battle, or, as Soviet historians call it, the third assault on Sevastopol, the number of soldiers and sailors of the fleet and the Primorsky Army defending in the city-fortress had reached 230,000-250,000 people.

But let us turn once again to the testimony of a direct participant in those tragic events, Field Marshal von Manstein. His account of the fighting in 1942 near Sevastopol may be fiction for some readers, but true for others, depending on perception. I will not impose my judgments on how to read and perceive the following. Bent over the maps laid out in front of us from his home archive, Erich von Manstein shows and argues:

- The offensive in the north was to be carried out by the 54th AK as part of the 22nd Lower Saxon Infantry Division led by Lieutenant General Wolf, the 24th Infantry Division led by Lieutenant General Baron von Tetten, the 132nd Infantry Division led by General Lieutenant Lindemann, 50th Infantry Division led by Lieutenant General Schmidt and reinforced 213th Infantry Division of the 22nd Division

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zii under the command of Colonel Hitzfeld (who would later capture the 30th battery of Captain Alexander near the village of Lyubimovka. - Avi.). The strength of our divisions, which did not have reinforcements after the battles on the Kerch bridgehead, which according to the state should have 15,860 (or rather, 15,859), actually had from 8,000 to 10,000 people, and in the 132nd lpd the number of soldiers and there were not much more than 6000 officers. Do you think? So how is it?

I ordered the 54th Corps to concentrate its forces on the heights north of the eastern extremity of Severnaya Bay. The sections of the fortified area had to be suppressed by fire in order to take them from the rear. The left flank of the corps must seize the heights near the village of Gaitany and southeast of it in order to ensure the offensive of the Rumanian mountain corps.

I instructed the 30th Air Corps to advance on the southern sector, consisting of the 72nd Infantry Division led by Lieutenant General Muller-Gep Guard, the 170th Infantry Division led by Lieutenant General Zander and the 28th Light Infantry Division led by General Lieutenant Singuber. The 30th Corps was supposed to capture the starting positions and artillery NPs in order to further advance towards Sapun Gora. But first it was necessary to seize the enemy's first line of defense on the Northern Nose-Kamary line. To accomplish this task, the 72nd Infantry Division was ordered to advance on both sides of the highway towards Sevastopol. And the 28th lpd - to capture the northern ridge east of Balaklava Bay. The 170th infantry division was left in reserve. The terrain there, as you know, is sharply broken, so that everyone is obliged to perform a precise and well-calculated concrete task. The Romanian mountain corps was supposed to tie down the enemy in front of its front

volume. Romanian 18th division - to cover the offensive of the left 54th ak. To the south, the 1st Romanian mountain division was to support the offensive of the northern flank of the 30th ak in the Sugarloaf area.

As regards the artillery preparation for the offensive itself, we have abandoned the barrage, which, if you know, is our enemy's favorite method. Firstly, the situation was not the same, and there was not enough ammunition. Therefore, the artillery fired corrective fire five days before

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start of the infantry advance. After that, during corrective fire, the 8th air corps began to work, making continuous raids on the military and military rear facilities of Sevastopol, on port facilities and airfields.

The High Command placed powerful weapons at our disposal. On the positions of the 54th, as the chief of artillery, General Zuckertort had 56 high-capacity batteries and 40 light artillery batteries, 18 mortar batteries, they were served by soldiers of the 10th and 14th divisions. I know that after the war there was a lot of talk about the famous 800 mm Dora cannon, designed to destroy the structures of the Maginot Line. But its effectiveness is low, so, a formidable toy. However, the Dora hit an ammunition depot on the North Side and several minor targets. The artillery of the 30th ak was commanded by General Martinek, an Austrian by nationality. He died, later commanding the corps. And in 1930, just as he simply brilliantly organized the use of artillery fire, almost all the shells of the divisions hit enemy targets. There were 25 batteries under his command in two divisions. The 30th corps was given the 300th separate battle of tankettes, which, unfortunately, turned out to be completely useless in battles (and not tanks, as indicated in the memoirs and on maps at a height of 555.6, where it says "72nd infantry regiment with tanks "; this is between Varnutka - Biyuk-Muskomya - the Blagodot state farm. Tanks will simply NOT climb there, on steep, densely overgrown mountains! In these places, only in the late 70s of the twentieth century, the road Yalta - Sevastopol was built, breaking through there are whole layers of soil between the mountains. - Avi.) Yes, the Romanian mountain corps also had 20 batteries.

A good help for the artillery was the fact that the commander of the 8th Air Corps, General von Richthofen, allocated four anti-aircraft artillery regiments to AI for ground fighting. In Sevastopol, we showed a high level of massive use of artillery against specific enemy targets.

The command of the 54th ak forces of the 132nd lpd launched an offensive on the right flank of its corps through the valley of the Belbek river to the heights located to the south, leaving

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side of the enemy bridgehead in the Lyubimovka area. And to the left, the 22nd infantry division struck from the east, south of the same Belbek river through the Kamyshly gorge, thereby ensuring that the 132nd infantry division quickly crossed the river valley. The 50th Infantry Division advanced from Temnaya Balka through Kamyshly and struck in a southwestern direction. On the left flank of the corps, the 24th Infantry Division advanced to the Gaitan Heights. The left flank of this division was covered by the Romanian 18th Infantry Division.

On the first day, with the support of artillery and the 8th air corps, which made constant raids on enemy positions, it was possible to overcome Kamyshly, block the river valley and gain a foothold on the dominant heights along the Mekenzievy Gory-Lyubimovka line and make a breakthrough towards Bartenevka. On the southern flank, the 30th Ak, as planned, captured both sides of the Sevastopol road in order to launch an offensive with the main forces in a few days.

On June 13, the soldiers of the 16th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel von Choltitz from the 22nd Division managed to capture Fort Stalin. At the cost of heavy losses, they managed to penetrate the defensive line in the north and capture the defensive structures of the Cheka, GPU, Sibir, and Volga. In fierce battles, the 72nd Infantry Division captured the fortified points "Northern Nose", "Mount Capella", "Ruina", and the 170th Division finally occupied Kamara.

The second phase of the offensive began on 17 June. The battles reached a special tension. The 1st Romanian mountain rifle division, after repeated unsuccessful attacks, captured Sugarloaf. The 28th LPD was slowly advancing in the coastal mountains with fighting. Each success was obtained with difficulty and with incredible perseverance. And the enemy did not weaken, it seemed that his strength was inexhaustible ..

The command of the 54th AK withdrew the 132nd Infantry Division from the front, replacing its infantry regiments, which had suffered heavy losses, with regiments of the 46th Infantry Division from the Kerch bridgehead. Instead of the 46th division, the 24th infantry division was to appear there. At this time, a message came from the OKH, and, perhaps, for the first time they began to rush me to carry out an offensive in order to withdraw the 8th air corps from the Crimea and transfer it to attack on the Ukraine. But

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I believed that an offensive under any circumstances should be carried out until the final victory, and for this the 8th Air Corps was needed in the Crimea. I managed to defend my point of view. But the forces of the regiments were drying up, and the OKH demanded that a guarantee be given that the fortress city would soon fall. Then I asked for at least three infantry regiments to be allocated to us. OKH. gave his consent, the regiments had to arrive in time at least for the last phase of the battle.

The corps of my army, taking advantage of the offensive

the soldiers, at their own discretion, chose the direction of the main attack, thereby placing the enemy in front of the fact of surprise. I used this rule throughout World War II. This eliminated the template in the actions of the commanders. Great independence also guaranteed that the subordinate generals did not seek to please me.

The command of the 54th ak, having introduced the 213th infantry regiment of the 24th infantry division into battle, turned the front to the west. The 213th infantry regiment under the command of Colonel Hitzfeld captured the Maxim Gorky-1 armored battery.

Advancing, the 22nd division took possession of the rocky heights, breaking off at the northern shore of the bay. At the junction between the 22nd and 50th frontier divisions there were fierce battles for the railway tunnel, the so-called Gypsy. After we finally managed to take possession of it, hundreds of soldiers and sailors came out of there, and after them a large number of civilians: men, women, children. It turned out to be especially difficult to knock out the enemy from his last shelters on the northern shore of the bay ...

By June 26, 1942, our 11th Army had captured the entire outer defensive perimeter of the fortress; and the enemy was driven inside it. The army command had to decide in a short time how to break through the inner belt of defense ... In the last days of June, the brigade of General Ziegle again distinguished itself. His sappers blew up the underwater tunnel of the arsenal of the Black Sea Fleet.

We knew that the command of the fortress had officially declared that it was impossible to count on evacuation

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troops from the Sevastopol fortress. However, according to our intelligence, and we knew it, the command of the fortress and the Black Sea Fleet, as well as the Chekists and the command of the detachments on Soviet submarines, were secretly leaving Sevastopol, practically leaving the defenders of the city to the mercy of fate. I heard about such meanness more than once... Those security officers and commissars who were of lower rank remained in charge of the defense... but they knew: there was nowhere to retreat, because the Germans would shoot them for their devotion to the Soviet regime, and to flee to the Caucasus - they will be shot by their own as traitors. It was on these doomed ones that the hope was placed to ensure the delay of the enemy until all the commissars, Chekists, admirals and generals fled to the safe Caucasus.

... After the 22nd Infantry Division had established itself on the shores of Severnaya Bay, I arrived at the regiments of this division. In front of us lay a bay about 1000 meters wide, in which powerful fleet squadrons once anchored, and on the opposite side one could see Sevastopol, legendary from the Crimean War of 1854-1856. Then it was thought that it was from the north side, from where the enemy least expected

no, and it is necessary to begin the capture of Sevastopol. And so it turned out: no one thought that we would force the bay. And to further confuse them, in a matter of hours a "general offensive" was simulated against the positions of Sapun Gora.

However, the headquarters of the 54th AK was wary of the question of forcing; some subordinate division commanders expressed doubts: how to overcome the wide sea bay on assault boats in sight of the well-equipped and equipped heights of the southern coast? Did you give arguments: the sailors had long since shot down targets from the urban part along the North. After all, it was necessary somehow to deliver assault boats to the shore through the steep rocks, to load the assault battalions into them; while access to the coast was through several deep gorges, there is no doubt that the enemy from the opposite bank overlooked and kept them under fire. But this risky plan could be the key to good luck ...

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Literally a few days later, I talked with the captured Soviet General Novikov, who told me that it was during those 2-3 days when I discussed the situation with my subordinate officers that he reported his opinion to the leadership of the Black Sea Fleet and the Primorsky Army, that our 54th Corps would cross the Severnaya Bay, having previously landed an amphibious assault of the Feodosia type. And what do you think he heard in response? - what kind of talk is he, Novikov, going to be shot ... It was the army ... the army ... I can't pick a word so that it doesn't sound offensive ... disdained the concept of death, their own lives were worth nothing to them ... as if it were not people who fought, but doomed puppets ... "I also despised the mortal danger," the general told me, "but, despite the real threat, voiced by the Commissar of State Security of the 2nd rank addressed to me, stated that in order to prevent the Germans from forcing the Severnaya Bay, it was necessary to transfer the artillery available there from Sapun Gora and Maksimova Dacha to the city. But... no one wanted to listen..." The story of this Russian patriot, General Novikov, was confirmed during interrogation by the captured and state security commissar just a few minutes later.

After I gave the order to cross the Northern Bay, all the headquarters immediately set about implementing it, especially the sappers and infantrymen.

The day before, the 50th Division crossed the Chernaya River and occupied the station and the village of Inkerman. A tragedy occurred here, which once again showed the monstrous fanaticism of the Bolsheviks and Chekists. High above the station rises a long rocky wall extending far to the south, in which there were huge galleries and galleries that served as wine cellars of a champagne factory. There were still pain

We had plenty of champagne, but the Bolsheviks set up ammunition depots there and housed tens of thousands of wounded and fleeing civilians. When parts of the 50th division broke into the station, the whole huge rock hanging over

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Inkerman, trembled from the monstrous force of the explosion. The wall, 500-700 m long and up to 75 m high, collapsed, burying tens of thousands of wounded sailors, soldiers and civilians under its bulky debris. Is that really the price of loyalty to the regime? After all, those who blew up their fellow citizens remained alive and at large... Did those who were buried know that they were doomed? ...and the Crimeans, when they drink champagne, do they remember these unfortunate people who were innocently killed by the Soviets, or do they not even know, huh? ... you are silent ...

Extreme stress was experienced by everyone who participated in the crossing of the bay on the night of June 28-29, when preparations were underway for the landing of sea and air assault forces. And the bombardment of enemy positions in the city - I repeat once again: precisely the enemy's objects, and not the city itself! - was supposed to drown out the noise on the northern shore of the bay. All artillery was ready to open continuous fire on the heights of the southern coast. If counter fire were opened from there, it would immediately become clear to us that the enemy's plan was guessed. But luckily it was quiet there...

Both the launching of the assault boats and their loading were successful; at one in the morning, the first echelon of the 22nd and 24th divisions set sail from the northern coast. At dawn on June 29, a general offensive began on the inner part of the fortress: in the zone of the 54th ak across the Northern Bay, in the zone of the 30th ak on Sapun Mountain. Early on the night of June 29, two hours before dawn, we landed an amphibious assault, which in a short bayonet attack destroyed the outposts in the inner part of the fortress. Simultaneously, from the side of the sea, several of our landing planes dropped onto the central part of the city paratroopers from the brigade of General Ziegler, who "from the air to the ground" began combat operations, working harmoniously with the paratroopers who had crossed the bay. They completed their operation with a gleam of light in the east. Immediately, the troops of the two corps entered into combat operations.

Unexpected for the Soviets, the jump across the sea bay was a success. When the enemy entered into action on the southern

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cells, our attack aircraft from the Ziegler brigade and the infantrymen of the 22nd and 24th divisions had already entrenched themselves on the coast, one by one destroying firepower on the slopes of the southern coast. The infantry rose to the plateau. The same success awaited us on the positions of Sapun Mountain. On the left flank of the 54th army

1st Corps, the 50th division and the 132nd lpd, again brought into battle with regiments of the 46th division from the Gaitana region and to the south, began an attack on the heights near Inkerman and to the south of it. Their fire was supported by artillery stationed on the northern shore of the bay. The Romanian mountain rifle corps also went on the attack. And at dawn, the 30th Air Corps launched an attack on Sapun Mountain, supported by long-range batteries of the 54th Air Corps and successive air raids by the 8th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe.

At a time when the corps was demonstrating offensive artillery fire along the entire front, the 170th Infantry Division of the 54th Air Corps began an assault on the Fedyukhin Heights. The offensive was accompanied by dagger fire from an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, assault guns and a battalion of tankettes. The division reached both sides of the main road, captured the frontal sector in the northern, eastern and southern directions, which provided the corps with the opportunity to pull up its other formations to the heights.

With the successful crossing of the bay, the occupation of the Inkerman Heights and the breakthrough of the 30th Ak Sapun position, the fate of the Sevastopol garrison was a foregone conclusion. |

... Part of the units of the Primorsky Army tried to hide in the large caves of Chersonese, hoping that Soviet ships would come for them. But by the evening of July 2, more than 50,000 of them had surrendered. Enemy losses in manpower exceeded ours by several times! The number of trophies was so huge that at first they could not even be counted.

Sevastopol, protected by the natural terrain, was equipped with all possible means of defense. But the Primorskaya Army, as well as the coastal forces of the Black Sea Fleet, were destroyed. The whole Crimea was in our hands. From an operational point of view, the 11th Army

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once in time it was freed up for use in a large offensive on a different sector of the Eastern Front. The exceptional organization and ability to brilliantly develop strategic and operational-tactical tasks and implement them in a combat situation is also evidenced by the fact that during the Crimean campaign they were promoted from the positions of chief of staff of the 11th Army: Lieutenant General Busse became Chief of Staff of the Army Group "South"; Lieutenant General Weller - Chief of Staff of Army Group Center; Lieutenant General Schultz was promoted to command work, where he distinguished himself as a corps commander in Army Group South.

On the evening of July 1, 1942, with my closest assistants, I was at our command post in the village of Yukhary-Kara Les. Surely we were all thinking about the same thing that evening: about the battles we had experienced, about the house, about relatives and friends, about our comrades who found their graves on the Crimean land. I was

sad to think about it. In January 1942, the commander of the 16th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Gimer, a benevolent and correct person and officer, who more than once provided material and moral assistance to the inhabitants of the Crimea, died. On May 8, 1942, the brave brigade commander, Colonel Groddek, fell in battle during Operation Bustard Hunting. In Evpatoria, the commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd Lower Saxon Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Baron von Boddin, was killed, who was buried by soldiers and officers at the Evpatoria cemetery. He was dearly loved as a brave and courageous commander. The head of the port of Yalta, captain zur see (captain of the 1st rank), Baron von Bredow, is buried at the Yalta cemetery. Next to him lies my driver and my devoted comrade Fritz Nagel from Karlsruhe. Sadness mixed with joy... On the radio tuned to Berlin, we heard the victorious fanfares that began a special announcement about the capture of Sevastopol and the destruction of Soviet units in this fortress. Then a telegram was sent to me - the troops of the 11th Army were marked by the German authorities, and I was awarded the rank of Field Marshal.

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Chapter 34

ON MARINE COMMUNICATIONS

In the battles on sea lanes in the June days and nights of 1942, there were victories and defeats.

During the first four days of the assault, the transports "Georgia", "Abkhazia", the destroyers "Svobodny", "Vigilant", "Nezazozhnik", four minesweepers and boats broke into the Main Base; as well as submarines L-23, L-24, D-4, S-31, S-32, L-5.

For some clarity of the picture of what is happening, I will cite some figures from official sources. However, I must point out that they are clearly underestimated and DO NOT correspond to real information on the Black Sea Fleet, just as the officially published figures on the entire Soviet-German front are also false. However, it is quite possible to imagine the general scale from them.

So, according to official sources, thousands of sailors and soldiers, 887 tons of ammunition, 452 tons of food, 200 tons of gasoline, etc. were delivered to the city in four days.

On June 8, the destroyer "Perfect" and the hydrographic vessel "Guys" were sunk; On the 10th, the destroyer Svobodny and the transport Abkhazia, and sea tug No. 14 washed ashore.

But on June 12, the Molotov cruiser and the Vigilant destroyer were able to, firing from the main and universal calibers

enemy manpower in the Belbek Valley, break through to Sevastopol twice and deliver marching reinforcements and ammunition, repeating a successful flight in a few days. From June 12 to June 17, Sevastopol was visited by: the cruiser Molotov (2 times), the destroyers Vigilant and Impeccable; 5 minesweepers and 11 submarines. They delivered more than 7,000 personnel of the 138th Rifle Brigade and marching reinforcements; 900 tons of ammunition, weapons and 200 tons of FOOD.

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In the same days, near Sevastopol, the Luftwaffe sank the Georgia transport, which carried more than 500 tons of ammunition, the minesweeper No. 27 and the boat MO-4.

On June 18, in the area of Cape Feolent (the spelling Fiolent is now found), the transport "Bialystok" was sunk.

From June 20, due to the fact that the enemy reached the northern side of the Inkerman Bay, the entry of ships into Sevastopol became almost impossible. On June 20, the SOR command telegraphed Eliseev and Isakov: "Surface ships cannot enter the Northern Bay. We are finishing organizing the reception of ships in the bays of Kamyshovaya, Kazachya and the open coast of the BB-35 area. we can accept with obligatory departure the same night back: leaders, EM and BTS. Submarines at any time. It is impossible to accept cruisers now... Ships will have to enter the bays in reverse, turning around in front of the bay. In the area of BB-35 approach with the bow to the shore, a small pier.

Oktyabrsky, Kulakov.

On June 20 and 21, the destroyers Impeccable and Vigilant, the Shkval patrol ship, minesweepers Mina and Zashchitnik, 4 boats, submarines Shch-209, M-31 and A-4 passed into the city. In two days, more than 1,500 people, 405 tons of ammunition, 190 tons of gasoline and food were delivered.

On June 22, 23 and 24, the leader "Tashkent", the destroyers "Imperfect" and "Vigilant", 6 submarines arrived at the Main Base, delivering more than 2000 people from the 142nd rifle brigade, 350 tons of ammunition, 200 tons of gasoline and etc.

From 25 to 27 June, the leader "Tashkent", the destroyer "Vigilant", the minesweepers "Defender" and "Vzryv", No. 412, the patrol ship "Shkval" and 3 PA arrived in Sevastopol. They delivered more than 2,000 soldiers of the 142nd Infantry Brigade, as well as ammunition, gasoline and food.

June 26 at the transition to Sevastopol, the destroyer "Bezu Prechny" was lost. The last surface ship to break through to the Main Base was the leader of the "Tashkent" - the mysterious "Blue Ghost" under the command of Captain 3rd Rank V.N. Yeroshenko. This happened on the night of June 27th. On the way back, the ship was badly damaged by air raids.

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twaffe. Why did he arrive in Novorossiysk on the evening of the 27th in a book. By the way, it was after this campaign that commander V.N. Yeroshenko received another military rank ahead of schedule, becoming a captain of the 2nd rank. And the entire personnel of the ship was awarded orders and medals. You already know the rest of the history of this unique ship.

On average, according to the information of Lieutenant General P.A. Morgunov, 620 personnel and 120 tons of gasoline arrived daily in the besieged Sevastopol.

During the defense of Sevastopol, the ships carried out 60-400 firings and used up more than 12,000 shells. But ... more than 75% of the shootings were carried out without adjustment, which means to no avail!

`Since the end of May, boats of the project "C" ("Stalinets") participated in the supply of Sevastopol and the export of people and cargo to the Caucasus, from mid-June - projects "M" ("Malyutka") and "Shch" ("Pike") . On the eve of the capture of Sevastopol by the Wehrmacht, the command of the Black Sea Fleet, with the permission of Admiral Isakov, nevertheless allocated submarines from the 1st submarine brigade to help the city: D-4, D-5, L-4, A-5, ^A-23 ("Decembrist" and "Leninets"). Also, in accordance with this order, technical (headed by Rear Admiral P.I. Boltunov) and economic (headed by Captain 1st Rank G.N. Kholostyakov) commissions were appointed. The first was engaged in the acceptance of goods, and the second classified their nomenclature, dimensions, containers, weight of each piece, and also was in charge of loading and unloading operations. To increase the carrying capacity of the submarines, "extra" cargo was removed from them. When everything was calculated, it turned out that the allocated submarines for the delivery of all cargo from Sevastopol to the Caucasus were not enough; three more boats were allocated.

Since June 18, arriving submarines have already evacuated not valuables, but people - whom, you already know; the same thing happened in Odessa...

In total, 24 submarines were involved in this period. On average, each boat took up to 85 tons of cargo per voyage; in total, 2,323 tons of ammunition and more than 1,000 tons of food were delivered by submarines to the besieged Sevastopol. Particularly significant cargo, especially since June, has become

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petrol; its daily consumption was about 90 tons. According to the order of the commander of the fleet, gasoline was delivered by all types of submarines, including small ones.

During the period of defense of the Main Base, the submarines made 81 trips. Of these, 69 were successful, in 12 cases submarines

ki returned halfway. 3 submarines were lost - perished: on June 20, the Shch-214 submarine was sunk during the transition from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk; June 26 - C-34, which was walking with cargo to Sevastopol; and June 27 - on the way back from Sevastopol Shch-212.

Both military historians and experts emphasize that one of the most important tasks of the fleet during the Second World War was the organization and defense of sea lanes.

As is known, from the very beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet performed tasks on communications in order to disrupt the supply of oil from the oil producing regions of Ploiesti, Sulina, and Constanta to the front. At the same time, the submarines acted by positional methods against the ships of Romania and Bulgaria. A method that turned out to be ineffective for a number of reasons, including: |

- the lack of proper study by the operational department of the fleet headquarters of the tasks assigned to the submarine commanders;
- ignorance by submarine commanders of the mine situation in the area of the Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish coasts, which is a flaw in the reconnaissance department of the fleet;
- ignorance of the minefields laid by the Black Sea Fleet in the pre-war years;
- low professional training of submarine commanders, other officers, foremen and sailors, which was due to the fact that a significant part of both officers and sailors were called up from the reserve from the People's Commissariat of the Fishing Industry and did not undergo proper training at least in the Red Banner training detachment scuba diving named after S.M. Kirov in Aeningrad; and other reasons.

Submarines of the Leninets project were used to lay mines along the entire coast of Romania and Bulgaria. In 1941, 260 mines were laid, on which 7 submarines were killed.

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Black Sea Fleet); many other Soviet submarines were seriously damaged. However, the fleet headquarters again and again sent untrained crews to the same positions.

In confirmation of these words, it would be useful to quote the words from the directive of the People's Commissar of the Fleet, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, sent to the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet on January 7, 1942. The People's Commissar sternly summed up (emphasis mine): "The results of the submarine war of the Black Sea Fleet for 6 months of the war showed absolutely unsatisfactory results and your failure to fulfill my orders regarding the use of submarines.

Of the total number of 44 submarines of the Black Sea Fleet by the beginning of the war and 54 by the end of the period, 7 trans-

enemy ports, at the same time 7 of our submarines were lost. Thus, each transport costs us the price of a boat.

... The reasons for the disruption of the submarine war on enemy communications:

1. Weak voltage of submarines. On the enemy's lines of communication from the Bosphorus to Odessa, only 5-6 submarines were deployed. On November 18, you were ordered to increase the number of positions to 14. Instead, the number of positions was reduced to three.
2. The aimless use of submarines for other purposes, such as shelling Yalta from one cannon, which I forbade you for. Now in Koktebel a landing force of 20 people has been landed from a submarine, which the MO boat could successfully do.
3. Aimless patrolling of submarines in front of Poti, where during the 6 months of the war not a single enemy ship or submarine appeared, which I also pointed out to you.
4. Poor work of the operational department and the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet in terms of planning and organizing submarine operations, without analyzing the situation, without helping the submarines in ensuring the solution of their main task.

Reconnaissance of the positions themselves is not done. Obviously, Shch-204, Shch-211, S-34 were killed, and Shch-205 and A-4 were blown up at position No. 28, and yet the submarines continued to be sent one after another, and on December 24 Shch-207 was sent there too .

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I await the fulfillment of my orders on the use of submarines and the report that you made as a result of an analysis of the experience of the first six months of the war in order to reduce the losses of our submarines and increase the impact on enemy communications.

This passage eloquently characterizes the work of the Black Sea Fleet Command and the work of the Black Sea Fleet Military Headquarters in 1941-1942. As they say, author's comments are superfluous.

But such bungling, thoughtless, senseless death continued further. And already on March 3, 1942, N.G. Kuznetsov sends a new directive to the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, which reads: "Since the beginning of the war on the Black Sea, a large number of transports have been lost due to poor organization of crossings.

The mines killed: transports "Kola", "Desna", "Lenin", "Crimea", "V. Chapaev", tanker "Absheron"; from unknown causes: icebreaker Makarov, Rot-Front; walking without security: "Bolshevik", "Kamenets-Podolsk" with insufficient security (1 SKA).

These events, and especially the latest death of the transports "Bolshevik" and "V. Chapaev" testify that the Military Council of the Fleet did not draw the necessary conclusions on the organization of transportation and did not ensure proper order and security in its communications under the dominance of the fleet on the Black Sea. Our submarines sank as many enemy transports as our own died on

their own mines.

I draw your attention to the continuing poor organization of the protection of their communications and order to restore order as soon as possible, paying attention to the verification of military pilots, ensuring the safety of transport crossings; I categorically forbid the release of transports without security ... "etc.

For obvious reasons, in the summer of 1942, submarines became more active on sea lanes. Instead of the positional method, the method of cruising in a designated area began to be used; the commanders preferred the

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new methods of firing, releasing from 2 to 4 torpedoes. From the middle of summer until the end of 1942, the submarines made 102 military campaigns, carrying out 41 attacks. The results of the attacks: 3 transports, a tanker, a tugboat, a paddle steamer and a steam scow were sunk; several ships were damaged. And the Black Sea Fleet, having "analyzed and taken into account", as the people's commissar insisted, "the previous negative experience", lost another... 8 submarines!

But back to the end of June 1942.

The operation to capture Sevastopol, which bore the code name "Sturgeon Fishing", was completed successfully for the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht.

On June 30, 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the troops to leave the city of Sevastopol.

By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 22, 1942, the medal "For the Defense of the Sevastopol Field" was established. All participants in the defense will be awarded this medal; 54 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, of which 26 were sailors.

Chapter 35

THE LAST NIGHT OF CHERSONESOS

And further. Speaking of Sevastopol, it should be recalled that

The political leadership, headed by Mekhlis, announced, and after agitprop circulated reports of the heroism of the defenders of the naval base of the fleet, but nothing about the tragedy of Sevastopol and people left to their fate.

"The 250-day heroic defense of the Main Naval Base of Sevastopol is over. The military-political assessment of this truly admirable epic and the strategic significance of the Sevastopol defense, in which the features of a Soviet person brought up by our Communist Party were revealed in full, are given in the message of the Soviet Information Bureau, published in

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newspaper "Pravda" of July 4, 1942" (P. A. Morgunov. "Heroic Sevastopol", p. 472).

"For the past 25 days, the enemy has been fiercely and continuously storming the city from land and air. Cut off from land communications with the rear, experiencing difficulties with the transport of ammunition and food, not having airfields at their disposal, and therefore sufficient air cover, Soviet infantrymen, sailors, commanders and political workers performed miracles of military prowess and heroism. in the defense of Sevastopol. This Message of the Soviet Information Bureau sounded on July 4, 1942, when "miracles of military prowess" were performed without top leadership.

About how the mass exodus of military leaders was carried out, it is said in printed sources more than modestly, and even the date is not always indicated (!): "According to the instructions of the Supreme High submarines. A small part of the people evacuated with difficulty on boats and other small vessels. Many had to go to sea by swimming, where they were picked up by submarines. The command of the Black Sea Fleet and the defensive area at the last moment took off from Sevastopol by plane. The defenders of Sevastopol, who remained on the shore, selflessly fought to the last opportunity, until ammunition, food and drinking water ran out ... After the Soviet troops left the Crimea, Turkey's neutrality began to acquire an increasingly conditional character ... Soviet Union 1941-1945", in 6 volumes. Vol. 2, pp. 410-411).

Other sources do NOT speak at all about the evacuation of leading and responsible persons, but only exclusively about the evacuation of troops: "On June 30 ... the enemy managed to break through to Sevastopol. In the evening of the same day, the evacuation of troops from Sevastopol began, which continued until July 3. The evacuation of the troops of the Primorye Army took place in exceptionally difficult conditions ... Everything that was possible was used for the evacuation: minesweepers, patrol boats, submarines

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and airplanes. But, nevertheless, it was not possible to completely evacuate the troops of the Primorsky Army ... The evacuation of Sevastopol ended its eight-month defense, which went down in history as an example of a long defense, as an unprecedented example of mass heroism and self-sacrifice of all defenders of the hero city (self-sacrifice of all, except for those who fled, self-sacrifice in the name of the beautiful and well-fed life of these same fugitives! - Havoi.). The decisive factor in the heroic defense of Sevastopol was the high moral and political condition of the troops and boundless devotion to the Motherland" ("Second World War. 1939-1945", p. 300).

"The evacuation of the defenders of Sevastopol was too late and poorly organized. About 80 thousand people were taken prisoner (about 150,000! - Avui.), including Major General 11. G. Novikov"; "the defenders of the garrison for 250 days tied down large forces of the German-Romanian troops and, in essence, disrupted the spring offensive of the Germans in 1942 ... The enemy in the struggle for Sevastopol lost up to 300,000 killed and wounded (the Germans then had all the forces near Sevastopol it was 1/3 of the named figure, and the losses of the German army amounted to about 8000 people! - Avui.) "(V. Dotsenko. "Fleet. War. Victory. 1941-1945"). -

"How successfully the Sevastopol garrison completed its task is best seen from the following factual data. Only in the last 25 days of the assault on the Polish defense of Sevasto, the 22nd, 24th, 28th, 50th, 132nd and 170th German infantry divisions and four separate regiments, the 22nd Panzer Division (nonsense, it was not at all under the Sevastopol field; on this Lieutenant General Morgunov also draws attention to the same "mistake" in his memoirs. - Author) and a separate mechanized brigade, the 1st, 4th and 18th Romanian divisions and a large number of units from other formations. During this short period, the Germans lost up to 150 thousand soldiers and officers near Sevastopol, of which at least 60 thousand were killed, more than 250 tanks, up to 250 guns. Over 300 German planes were shot down in air battles over the city. For the entire time of the defense of Sevastopol, the enemy lost up to 300 thousand of his soldiers killed and wounded ... From the Vinformburo "(Pravda newspaper, July 4, 1942).

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Well, a lie is one of the components of the country that has arisen on the blood of the murdered millions since October 25 (November 7), 1917; and in subsequent years, unfortunately, little has changed ... The false figures once put in the "mouthpiece of the Communist Party" for duped Soviet citizens pass from book to book, almost without being questioned ... because they hammered into consciousness:

"Glory to the main organizers of the heroic defense of Sevastopol - Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, Mayo-General

Re Petrov, Divisional Commissar Kulakov, Divisional Commissar Chukhnov, Major General Ryzhi, Major General Morgunov, Major General Aviation Ermachenkov, Major General Aviation Ostryakov, Major General Novikov, Major General Kolomiyets, Major General Krylov, Colonel Kapitokhine - will go down in the history of the Patriotic War against the Nazi bastards as one of the most brilliant countries. Sovinformburo»». (Ibid.; highlighted by me. - Avi.). True, a very short time will pass, and the name of one of this list of "heroes" on the page of "brilliant victories" will be painted over with black paint of contempt and oblivion - General Novikov, a true patriot and Russian officer ...

At 09:50 on June 30, 1942, F.S. Oktyabrsky sends a telegram:

"Kuznetsov, Budyonny and Isakov.

...Based on this specific situation, I ask you to allow me on the night of June 30 to July 1 to take 200-300 people of responsible workers, commanders to the Caucasus by plane, and also, if possible, to leave Sevastopol myself, leaving my Deputy Major General Petrov. This telegram was not known to anyone in the leadership of the SOR until the evening meeting of the Military Council of the Fleet. At 19 o'clock a response from the people's commissar was received with permission from the Headquarters for evacuation to the Caucasus. And at 8 pm the Military Council of the Fleet and the Primorsky Army held a meeting in one of the casemates of the 35th battery. Among those present was the commander of the SOR and the fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. October; Member of the Military Council of the Division Fleet

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Commissioner N.M. Fists; commander of the Primorsky Army, Major General I.E. Petrov; members of the Military Council of the Primorsky Army, divisional commissar I.F. Chukhnov and Brigadier Commissar M.G. Kuznetsov; Commander of the OVR Seva Stopolya Rear Admiral V.G. Fadeev; Head of the Special Department of the Black Sea Fleet, Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank Yermolaev; Chief of Staff of the SOR Captain 1st Rank A.G. Vasiliev; Commissioner of Coastal Defense Regimental Commissar K.S. Vershinin and Commander of the Coastal Defense of the Black Sea Fleet Major-General P.A. Morgunov.

After a debate about which of those present should be left for the defense of Sevastopol and "strong" arguments that none of them had anything else to do in the besieged city, it was decided to leave (run away! at night on submarines and aircraft. And in the city, to "take the rap" for the "genius" and "courage" of military leaders instead of the original candidacy of Major General I.E. Petrov was appointed Major General P.G. Novikov. The commander from the SOR headquarters, captain of the 3rd rank A.I., remained as an assistant in the marine unit. Ilyichev. By the way, in 1969, Admiral Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov confirmed that

for him at that time it was not clear why it was Major General Petrov, whose candidate was given the "go-ahead" by the Stavka, who did not stay in Sevastopol. |

The flight of senior officers from the theater of operations looked like this. When telling the story, let us turn partly to the description of the "last night of Chersonesus" given to us by V. Voronov in the article of the same name in the journal "Sea Collection" (Nos. 5–6, 2001), who wrote from the words of a participant in those events, the Hero of the Soviet Union (14 June 1942), Lieutenant General of Aviation Nikolai Alexandrovich Naumov.

At 1:30 a.m. on July 1, 1942, the Military Council of the Primorsky Army: I.E. Petrov, P.A. Morgunov, I.F. Chukhnov, as well as N.I. Krylov, K.S. Vershinin and other "trusted" from the headquarters of the army and the Coastal Defense went to the pier of coastal battery No. 35 through an underground passage,

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boarded a boat, and then switched to the Shch-209 submarine (commander Lieutenant Commander V.I. Ivanov). At 2 hours 59 minutes the boat headed for Novorossiysk.

"Certain" workers whose names are listed in the memoirs of various participants in those events more often without indicating their positions (deliberately edited! - but we will recall them again below): B.A. Borisov, A.A. Sarina, V.P. Efremov, commandant of the city lieutenant colonel A.P. Starushkin and others fled on the A-23 submarine (commander - Captain 2nd Rank N.F. Fartushny). This boat, as a reserve, was intended for F.S. Oktyabrsky and the headquarters of the fleet, however, the vice admiral decided to fly by plane and ordered the Li-2 to be kept ready for him.

During the night, 13 Douglas planes (Li-2 or C-47) from the Moscow transport group arrived in Chersonese. "In addition, three Li-2 planes returned "due to loss of orientation and junk engines." (Such tricks were sometimes resorted to by those whose fear overwhelmed their sense of duty.) Of course, to fly to a besieged city is to expose oneself to mortal danger..." Despite the fact that some authors, including V. Voronov, write that these planes, landing every 15–20 minutes, "took people according to a previously compiled list, first of all, the wounded", Lieutenant General P.A. Morgunov testifies: "222 people were taken out by the same planes, including F.S. Oktyabrsky, N.M. Kulakov, M.G. Kuznetsov and A.P. Yermilov, and 49 wounded (!!! - Avui.), as well as 3490 kg of important cargo (!!! Presumably, these were headquarters and Chekist documents. - Auth.). At about 5 o'clock in the morning the planes landed safely in Krasnodar" (p. 449).

Responsible for the reception and release of aircraft, where "according to a previously compiled list" tightly seated "their own",

Lieutenant Colonel N. Naumov, head of the flight inspection, was appointed. For Naumov, the crowd of Red Army and Red Navy soldiers from the incoming units, which surrounded the aircraft parking area in a dense ring, could not have been "their own" in any way. People were visibly nervous, with every hour, with every minute, they simply became furious. "During landing, the Cree rushed into the planes

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ki and abuse, threats were poured against the chiefs. Many understood their doom. With the help of armed guards, with great difficulty it was possible to restrain the pressure of the crowd. For conspiracy (so that they would NOT recognize their own ?!), dressed in a shabby jacket and a cap, a vice admiral arrived on the "Willis", who bore the bold "revolutionary" surname Oktyabrsky. Through the indignant crowd, the command of the SORG was pushing its way with him. At the same time, "the commander of the special air group, Colonel Dzyuba, could not get on the plane, someone's invisible hand grabbed him by the collar and roughly pushed him away from the ladder. ... A crowd of doomed people surrounded the plane in a dense ring and made it impossible to start the engines. The situation escalated to the limit. "The chiefs are running! We are being abandoned! Beat them, brothers! - the cries of distraught people rang out. As soon as the engines started, a crowd of thousands rushed to the plane, and only when the submachine gunners of the Black Sea Fleet's special task group began to shoot at point-blank range, was it possible to form some free space. But from the crowd. also began to shoot at the taxiing aircraft. ... Azyuba could not come to terms with the idea that he would have to share the fate of the people remaining at the airfield ... he decided on a desperate step, jumped on the bandwagon of the Willis and ordered the driver: "Chase after the plane! .." ... The driver complied with the colonel's request, rushed at full speed after the taxiing Li-2, overtook him. Dzyuba jumped off the footboard of the car and tried to persuade the commander of the crew to take him on board with signs ... as a result, the flight mechanic opened the door, installed the ladder and took on board the excited and sweaty colonel. The engines howled, and the overloaded Li-2 slowly, as if reluctantly picking up speed, rolled across the airfield, jumped several times at the end of the runway, took off from the ground and hung in the air ... This was the last flight of the transport aircraft from Chersonesus. The crew commander of this Li-2 was Senior Lieutenant M. Skrylnikov. Three Yak-1 planes still remained at the airfields, on which the Commander of the Air Force of the Fleet, Major General Vasily Vasilyevich Ermachenkov (later Colonel General of Aviation) with his deputies were to fly to Anapa

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as well as the head of the flight inspection, Lieutenant Colonel N. Naumov, the squadron commander of the 7th Guards Aviation Regiment, Captain K. Denisov, and some others. But they happened to wait in unceasing anxiety for dawn in order to take off. In the distant caponier there was still one UT-2 (never

was used)...

Eyewitnesses give us curious details. Following Naumov, who climbed on a Yak-1 fighter, a plane with tail number "24" came from nowhere. It turned out that this was a young pilot of the 45th Air Force Aviation Regiment, together with his technician, fixed the more or less repairable Yak-1 aircraft, refueled it, and, following the example of their military leaders, rushed to save their young lives away from these places.

The commandant of the Chersonese airfield, Major Popov, who was in charge of landing the commanding staff, flew away on the very first plane that arrived. For which he was subsequently sentenced to death, but fled to the Germans.

In total, 26 planes flew from Sevastopol to the Caucasus; 4 aircraft were lost; 36 defective aircraft were blown up in Chersonese. Of the 2072 people remaining at the airfield, a consolidated battalion was formed; most of them died or surrendered.

From the memoirs of F.S. Oktyabrsky: "Everything came to an end, which was reported to Moscow. The surviving senior officers and senior officials of city and regional organizations were evacuated, taken out in two submarines, which at that time were in the area of the Chersonesos lighthouse on the ground, awaiting orders ... Me personally with several comrades: a member of the Military Council N.M. Kulakov, head of the political department of the Sevastopol defensive region I.V. Maslov, commander of the air forces of the Sevastopol defensive region G.T. Dzyuboy, the head of the special department of the Sevastopol defensive region, Ermolaev (the main organizer of the evacuation of the leadership of the SOR), was taken out by the special officers on the only plane (and here it's a lie! - Avi.) from Chersonesos

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th airfield... The pilot miraculously took off, went towards the sea, and then turned to the Caucasus, and in the morning at dawn we found ourselves at the Krasnodar airfield. When I got off the plane, I thought that I would go crazy... So we survived... Naturally, we could not take out all those who were on the Chersonese patch. We have tens of thousands of wounded, hundreds of medical personnel left here. Didn't we know this? All the higher authorities knew this ... "

On the night of July 1, such a situation reigned on the berths. the same picture as at the airport. The crowd of those wishing to escape from this inferno was not included in the lists of "friends"; people, the mothers of those who run away, for the first time in their lives shouted to the authorities everything that they think about them. An uncontrollable crowd of thousands was held back by submachine gunners from the battalion of protection of coastal batteries, who were mowing down the attackers in short bursts. Hundreds of wounded fell into the water ...

Unable to bear the weight, the pier collapsed. In a mess of floundering bodies, hundreds of others simply drowned, unable to swim up... The lives of those who remained had no value...

About the flight on the submarine L-23 and its commander, captain of the 2nd rank N.F. Ivan Kuzmich Lysak, Chief Star Officer of the Operational Group of the Hydrographic Department of the Black Sea Fleet (later retired Lieutenant Commander) also recalls Fartushnoy. "There were more than a hundred passengers on the ship. Such an overload had a very serious effect on the general condition of the submarine. ... Among those who left the city ... and were with us were the first secretary of the Sevastopol City Party Committee, the chairman of the city defense committee B.A. Borisov, secretary of the city party committee A.A. Sarina, chairman of the city executive committee V.P. Efremov ... On the submarine were ... Rear Admiral V.G. Fadeev, captain 1st rank A.G. Vasiliev, commander of the 7th Marine Brigade Colonel E.I. Zhidilov, Head of the Political Department of the Primorsky Army, Brigadier Commissar L.P. Bocharov, commandant of the garrison Colonel A.P.J. Starushkin ... Soon, for the successful completion of a combat mission, the heroism and courage shown at the same time (! - in saving "our own" and "necessary" ?! - Auth.) The crew of the submarine was awarded high rights

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rewards" (see M. Surguchev. "Ships are returning to service", pp. 214-215).

If on board the overloaded submarine L-23, which headed for Novorossiysk, there were 1177 officers, then on the submarine Shch-209 - 63 people, who formed the backbone of the Military Council and the command staff of the Primorsky Army. Among them, as you already know, are the commander of the army, Major General I. E. Petrov, his son and adjutant Yuri Petrov; PMC, divisional commissar I. F. Chukhnov; Brigadier Commissar Vershinin; chief of staff, Major General N.I. Krylov (later twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union, second in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces), Major General P.A. Morgunov and others who successfully reached fertile Novorossiysk. Where at the pier they were met by representatives of the army and navy, as well as the commander of the naval base, Captain 1st Rank G.N. Bachelors.

In total, in those days, Soviet submarines took out almost 2000 commanders from the besieged Sevastopol (only on the night of July 1 - 600 people), political workers, Chekists, mainly from detachments, employees of the state security department and special departments of counterintelligence SMERI, as well as some senior and senior commanders (for junior positions, they remained only in the besieged fortress, not to mention the sailors, soldiers and residents of the city).

In addition to two submarines and 13 aircraft, on the night of June 1, 1942, 30 minesweepers (KTShch), 3 MO boats, 3 small boats, 4 tugboats, 2 motorboats left the bays of Sevastopol,

schooner. But not all of them reached the shores of the Caucasus; 17 ships arrived there, delivering 304 people. The rest of the boats, tugboats, and barges that were in the Sevastopol bays were destroyed as out of order, including the hydrographic vessel Gorizont, 3 cranes, minesweepers and a net barrier.

With the end of the night and the barely dawning dawn behind the roar of July 1, 1942, the flight of the top command staff of the city's defense acquired a massive and uncontrollable phenomenon.

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On July 1, 1942, a message was sent to Moscow and Krasnodar. Among other things, it notes:

"Moscow. Stalin, Kuznetsov.

Krasnodar. Budyonny.

2. Commander of the 109th Major General P.G. Novikov was left as the senior commander in Sevastopol, captain of the 3rd rank Ilyichev with the naval task force as his assistant in the marine unit ...

3. Novikov was tasked with continuing to destroy the enemy's manpower at the last line and ensure the withdrawal and evacuation of as many people as possible. For this, he was sent 5 submarines, 4 BTShch and 10 MO boats. In addition, if the situation permits, on July 1,

molets.

At the same time I report:

1. Together with me, on the night of July 1, about 600 people of the leadership of the army and navy and civilian organizations were taken out of Sevastopol using all available means.

2. Having captured Sevastopol, the enemy did not receive any trophies. The city as such has been destroyed and is a heap of ruins.

5. All the defenders of Sevastopol fulfilled their duty to the Motherland with dignity and honor. Novorossiysk 1/UP-42, 9:15 p.m. Oktyabrsky, Kulakov.

But abandoned to "heroically fight" for the sake of saving the lives of all these fugitives also tried to survive.

To the location of the 35th battery (exploded by the battalion commander Captain Leshchenko and his soldiers also

on the night of July 1, who managed to escape on a boat at 3.00 am) people made their way trying to find and use any kind of watercraft. After 12 days and nights, a group of five men from the 79th brigade managed to reach Batumi on a fishing rowboat. Another group of fighters on shes

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Tyveselny Yale sailed to Turkey in 11 days. In total, a little more than 100 people who miraculously survived on a long and unsafe journey got to Turkey; the Soviet embassy sent them all back across the Black Sea... to penal battalions...

So, Major General P. G. Novikov was appointed senior military commander in Chersonese over the remnants of the Soviet troops, numbering more than 150,000 people. Soon he was joined by the remnants of the formation of Colonel N. Umrikhin, recently introduced to the military rank of major general (until 1937 - division commander of the Red Army, which corresponds to lieutenant general; in the same year he was arrested, and at the end of July 1941 released with the assignment to him ... the rank of colonel instead of restoring the rank of divisional commander. He was assigned to Sevastopol in November 1941 and arrived from the Caucasus, where he formed the division entrusted to him).

Due to the lack of organized evacuation, the remaining defenders of Sevastopol were not taken out.

And these 150,000 people were captured, including General Novikov and Colonel Umrikhin. Among the prisoners who did not have time to escape were two commissars of state security of the 2nd rank and one commissar of state security of the 1st rank. It was extremely difficult to establish the names of these people at that time, but it is known that these senior officials of the GUGB were personally known by Novikov and other commanders who were with him; FOR THE FIRST TIME I will announce these names: they were Commissar of State Security 2nd rank Meyer Abramovich Katsnelson, Commissar of State Security 2nd rank Abram Abramovich Slutsky and Commissar of State Security 1st rank Lev Samuilovich Ioffe - they have been in reserve since the mid-30s and in early June 1941 were mobilized. The special ranks of the GUGB should be considered in the following sequence: the primary commanding (officer) rank - junior lieutenant of state security, has one "sleeper" in the buttonhole - corresponds to the army rank of captain; next come lieutenant GB, two "sleepers" - corresponds to the major; senior lieutenant of State Security, three "sleepers" - to the rank of lieutenant colonel; captain of the GB, four "sleepers" - colonel. Senior state officers

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security: senior major of the GB, one rhombus - corresponds to the military rank of major general (rear admiral); Commissioner of State Security of the 3rd rank, two rhombuses -

corresponds to the lieutenant general (vice admiral); Commissioner of State Security of the 2nd rank, three rhombuses - corresponds to Colonel General (Admiral); commissar of state security of the 1st rank, four rhombuses - corresponds to the general of the army (admiral of the fleet); The General Commissar of State Security, a large Marshal star - corresponds to the Marshal of the Soviet Union (Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union). Now you can imagine what level of Chekists were in captivity; it also becomes clear why THIS was subsequently hidden... The reason for the capture of such high-ranking commissars of the State Security was most likely either their personal carelessness, or the bungling of the command of the Black Sea Fleet and the SOR, which, due to the peculiarity of the mission of these high-ranking officials, carefully concealed their stay in Sevastopol and did not take care to take the elderly to the Caucasus. It is possible that they were deliberately left in abandoned Sevastopol for "secrecy" and "secrecy". Perhaps neither Oktyabrsky nor the head of counterintelligence of the Black Sea Fleet knew the actual mission of these commissars. It is only known that all three of these high-ranking officials worked for a long time under the leadership of prominent Chekists Vatslav Rudolfovich Menzhinsky, head of the OGPU-VChK and head of counterintelligence of the OGPU-VChK Artur Khristianovich Artuzov. They were sent to the Crimea in accordance with the Thunderstorm plan to carry out a special mission, connected primarily with the seizure of the Romanian oil fields from the Crimean bridgehead and the Black Sea. So, it does not matter, for some reason these Chekists, who were in the cozy mansions of Maximova Dacha, located in one of the tracts, were not notified of the abandonment of the city. According to some reports, the commissars, who had previously sent family members to the Caucasus, hid jewelry in a cave under a waterfall in Maksimova Dacha (you need to

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lag, confiscated from those arrested and sentenced to death). The GUGB did not confirm the capture of its employees; On the other hand, among the military leaders who fled to the Caucasus, an official message was spread that a group of senior and senior commanders, who did not have time to evacuate, heroically ... died in the last battle on Chersonese. True, in the post-war period it was casually reported that General Novikov was taken prisoner and died in the Flossenbug concentration camp; in fact, both Novikov and Umrikhin were released in 1945 by the British and sent to Soviet filtration camps, where they showed intractability with the leadership of the NKVD and were brutally murdered for refusing to cooperate. All other known data about these people is the usual Soviet fake, confirmed by falsified documents...

For saving their priceless lives and surrendering almost 150,000 people, the military leaders received "what they deserved".

In 1958, Admiral Filipp Sergeevich Oktyabrsky

received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, became an honorary citizen of the long-suffering Sevastopol, his name was given to a warship, a training detachment of the Black Sea Fleet, a street were named after Oktyabrsky. Awarded 3 orders of Lenin, 3 orders of the Red Banner, 2 orders of Ushakov 1st class, orders of Nakhimov 1st class, Suvorov 2nd class, Red Star.

Army General Ivan Efimovich Petrov in 1945 became a Hero of the Soviet Union, was awarded five Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov 1st class, Kutuzov 1st class, Red Banner of Labor, Red Star, etc.

In 1965, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union - "for feats during the Great Patriotic War" - was awarded to a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Nikolai Mikhailovich Kulakov. He was also awarded two orders of Lenin, the Red Banner, the Order of Nakhimov 2nd class, the Order of the Patriotic War 1st class, the Red Star and medals.

"Heroes" worthy of their era...

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Chapter 36

THIS IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE FALLEN,
THIS IS NECESSARY FOR THE LIVING...

... The commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, who was awarded the rank of Field Marshal by the Fuhrer for the capture of the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet and the city of Sevastopol, personally spoke with the captured top commanders.

Sitting in a comfortable chair and wrapping his legs in a checkered blanket, the aged commander, already quite tired of the attention of a listener who had come from afar with a specific mission, frankly told me, recalling those days:

- Receiving a field marshal's baton was a sign of a victoriously carried out campaign and probably meant the crown of my military career. I was proud. But at the same time, I did not forget how much a soldier's luck is needed to achieve this ... However, what are these honors worth in comparison with the burden of responsibility borne by the one who, along with the command of the army, is simultaneously responsible for a huge number of lives, partly even for the fate of their country. In that blessed hour, I and my comrades-in-arms thought that it was thanks to the courage and sense of responsibility of our soldiers that all incredible difficulties were overcome and success was achieved in the campaign, which was victoriously completed by the 11th Army ... my army, faithful to the German soldiers' traditions ... she fought like a knight

ski nobly ... I did not have the opportunity to see all my soldiers and officers to shake hands with them, I invited only commanders, up to battalion commanders, and all those officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, all those who had the Knight's Cross or the Golden German Cross, for a solemn act in the park of the Imperial Palace of Nicholas II in Livadia. Do you want to know what I really said to them? I said: "Soldiers, you have made a great contribution to the

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to free the Russians from Bolshevik slavery and to return this court to its true owners - the grandchildren of Emperor Alexander II, who live in Nice. To return this land to the Russians, Tatars, Greeks, Germans, who worthily appreciate the freedom that you brought them!"

My interlocutor paused to wait while the servant served us coffee, straightened the blanket on the owner's lap, carefully looked around and slowly left, after which, after enjoying the tart aroma and taking a sip, von Manstein slowly continued:

– There we honored the memory of the fallen soldiers, then the evening dawn "The Power of Love" sounded, and our quiet prayer ascended to heaven, to the Creator of our eternity. The last beat of the drum was replaced by a song about a good comrade, which, perhaps, was nowhere more appropriate than after the battles in the East - a farewell greeting to those whom we had to bury in the Crimean land.

I thanked all the soldiers of the 11th Army and the 8th Air Corps who were unable to participate in this celebration. In conclusion, a modest dinner was held, however, several Soviet planes flying over from the Caucasus treated us vengefully with bombs. Fortunately, there were no casualties, and the magnificent Imperial Palace was not damaged. An anti-aircraft gunner battery stationed in Lower Oreanda shot down four aircraft with accurate fire, while the other two retreated.

In the morning we swam with pleasure on the imperial beach in Livadia, I wanted to think only about the good ... I already learned that the sign "Crimean Shield" was established especially for my 11th Army. On this occasion, we gathered in the same house, and our head of the intelligence department, Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Eismann, said that he had recently arrived from Simferopol, where a Tatar, a goldsmith, made a pair of general field marshal's batons on my shoulder straps from a silver watch. And on July 2, 1942, these wands with fine engraving were already fixed on top of my general's epaulettes twisted with gold. Whatever my opponents, the Soviet marshals, might think of me, I was very pleased with this touching sign, which brought great

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joy. At the same time, a parcel arrived, the sender of which was the German crown prince. The package contained a heavy gold cigarette case with a plan of the Sevastopol fortress engraved on the lid, on the inside of which was inscribed the name of a high donor and an inscription in German and Russian: "Thanks to you, Field Marshal General, and your soldiers, Sevastopol is again Russian." . In his accompanying letter, the crown prince wrote that he was not destined to take possession of Verdun in due time and he sincerely envied the field marshal; these were the words of a kind man. And one Russian priest, who fled from the Bolshevik regime from Russia to France, sent me from Vichy a thick cane made from a knotted vine. Topaz was embedded in the baldashnik, and on a narrow metal ring there was an inscription in Russian. In the letter, the priest wrote that during the Crimean War, as a regiment commander, his grandfather participated in the heroic defense of Sevastopol, was seriously wounded in the leg, and then the soldiers of his regiment made him this cane. Pleased that I had occupied Sevastopol and liberated the Crimea from Bolshevik tyranny, he, the priest, sent me this commemorative cane in gratitude.

There were other gifts as well. Including memoirs in French of my namesake, General von Manstein, who during the time of Empress Anna Ioannovna, while in the Russian service, fought under the command of General Field Marshal Munnich on the shores of the Black Sea. Strange, isn't it? And symbolically...

At the end of the fighting in the Crimea, the troops of the 11th Army received several weeks of well-deserved rest in the wonderful countryside of the Southern Crimea. I also went on vacation, vacationing with my wife in the Carpathians as a guest of Marshal Antonescu. Hero's eldest son Erich Sylvester von der Manstein, who had graduated from a military school and had already fought in Russia as a lieutenant, came to see me.

At this phrase, Erich von Manstein fell silent and, closing his eyes, went into himself for a long time. More that day, I did not begin to worry about the elderly man, who calmly revealed to me his vision of that war and those ancient events, directly

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of which he was a member. Everything at that moment seemed to me anything: a fiction voiced by a retelling, a desire to pass off a fictitious as real, and even a delusional dream - just not realities. But I myself was from that organization where even the most monstrous events, which are not perceived by ordinary people, can only be real. And by that he was taught to look at everything soberly. Even if the whole world claims something completely different! And one more thing - I remembered that Hero Erich Sylvester von der Manstein, born on January 31, 1922, lived a short life and died on October 29, 1942 in that war, which many of his compatriots considered the Liberation War ... This young man is among thousands of others

Germans - sleeps eternal sleep in the Russian land.

A bitter eternal shelter was found by many thousands of Red Army and Red Navy men who died on the Crimean land, abundantly watered with blood. Here and there in Sevastopol and around it rise monuments, monuments, signs of the burial places of Soviet soldiers who fell during the defense and liberation of the Main Naval Base, the city and the Crimean peninsula. But you will hardly find German graves here...

At the end of the 20th century, the authorities of Sevastopol later allowed the British, who participated in the siege of the fortress city, to erect monuments at the burial place of their fallen ancestors, decorating everything in accordance with the canons of the Anglican Church. And this is what is characteristic: the British are now kind of like friends to us, and the Germans are still kind of like enemies.

But if we discard the propaganda nonsense that has been drummed into us for more than six decades, then we can understand that, it turns out, the German Helmut, Ernst or Karl, whose remains lie in the same Sevastopol land, had a mother, father, sister, brother, wife, son, daughter, uncles, aunts ... - there were relatives, and there are descendants. And wouldn't these descendants want to live in the place where their near and dear ones died. them a man was just a grave? No, not even a memorial, not a monument or a monument, but a grave with a Christian cross. So that at least once a year, once every five years, you can come, stand, think about the cursed dependence of ordinary people

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from the powers that be, throwing them into hell in the name of their selfish interests... cry, sigh, order, in the end, in the local church a memorial service for the innocently killed... Is the Wehrmacht soldier guilty that a great friend of Comrade Stalin, Adolf Hitler sent him to war? Politicians unleash wars, and Fritz and Ivan pay the price. Fritz and Ivan kill each other, and this resonates with pain in the relatives of Ivan and Fritz.

One of those who tried to establish justice was World War II sergeant Ivan [rigoryevich Kuzneiov. Along the entire perimeter of the battles in Sevastopol, he searched for and dug up the remains of soldiers with the aim of reburial: nameless Soviet soldiers in mass graves, and German soldiers in German cemeteries specially created for this (but this is his natural desire of the Man never came true) . If it was possible to find documents and establish addresses in the soldier's amulets of the buried, he sent letters to the relatives of the dead German soldiers. The dead German soldiers were interred after the battle by the soldiers of the funeral teams of the Wehrmacht; these teams did not fight, but their work in the war was unspeakably hard. A distinctive feature of the Soviet army was that there were NO special funeral teams there. After the war, all German cemeteries were blasphemously plowed up with tractors; in the Crimea

bread, corn, cereals were grown on this land... Letters written to various addresses in Germany, having reached Simferopol, settled in the bowels of the Crimean State Security Department. But those Soviet soldiers whose names (conscription data, etc.) Kuznetsov found in medallions were reburied in Duvankoy (now the village of Verkhne-Sadovoye) at the foot of the monument (stamped in countless quantities for small settlements). Above several graves, a Soviet soldier painted in silver-gray paint still towers today, holding a PPSH submachine gun (Shpagin submachine gun) in his raised hand. Thanks to the enthusiasm of Ivan Grigoryevich, the relatives and friends of the victims know behind which fence they lie (in accordance with the inscriptions on the graves): "Hero of the Soviet Union G.I. Gabriadze. Killed April 17, 1944"; "Corporal

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Demidov Semyon Mikhailovich Died May 9, 1944"; Krasnov Dmitry Andreevich. April 26, 1907 - May 1, 1944"; "Efreytor Drapots N.V."; "Private Vardovakidze D.A."; "Private Pashaev"; "Private Musyaev"; "Junior lieutenant pilot Danilov Roman Trifonovich. Killed April 18, 1944"; Frolov Pavel Ivanovich. Killed in 1944"; "Ivanov Vasily Ivanovich is a newcomer. Genus. 1908 - died April 18, 1944"; Gorin Alexey Alekseevich. Killed in 1942." Immediately - "The mass grave of the brave soldiers of the 88th regiment of the 33rd guards rifle division who died during the liberation of the village of Verkhne-Sadovoye in April 1944" and another "Common Grave" - a modest tomb of those whose names have not been established ...

And since I myself, in my distant adolescence, took a direct part in these excavations initiated - in the name of the memory of the dead - by a resident of the village of Verkhne-Sadovoye, now, after many decades, I believe that the ashes of the sergeant of the Second World War, Ivan Grigorievich Kuznetsov should be moved from the village cemetery and buried here, at the monument to the soldiers of the Great Patriotic War, among the fallen soldiers, to whom he returned the names ... I am deeply convinced that the burial place of another active participant in the war, who was seriously wounded already at the last stage of the fighting, and after the treatment of the one who arrived in the village. Duvanka, who headed the local collective farm named after L.M. Kaganovich and literally saved the inhabitants of the village, Belbek station and the nearby villages of Atarka and Zalanka from starvation in the postwar years. His military work at the front was crowned with military orders, and for peaceful work he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. There were legends about his virtue, and it was not an ostentatious commissar, but hard, but necessary work. But few residents of the village of Verkhne-Sadovoye know that not long before his death in 1954, he was almost expelled from the ranks of the CPSU for "failure to fulfill plans for the supply of collective farm products to the state"; but they did not have time - not having lived exactly two months to 50 years old, Ivan Andreevich Lenko-Seito died. I want to express my confidence that the current generation of people

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Lei village, as well as the remaining older generation, who knew these two soldiers of the last war, will support me.

... But what about the German soldiers?

No, not with the 300,000 Wehrmacht soldiers and officers invented by Soviet agitprop, who allegedly died only during the third assault on Sevastopol. Perhaps this is why this acute question did not arise before, and therefore there was no need to honor their memory, because this figure is fictitious, false ...

Let us recall by analogy: starting from Belarusian Brest and up to German Berlin itself, in places where the Red Army passed from 1941 to 1945, mass graves arose along its entire military path, where, wrapped in capes, lie the remains of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Georgians, Uzbeks, Tatars... And it seems blasphemous to all of us if someone suddenly abuses these graves, paints them with paint, rips off signs, knocks down letters... or if they turn out to be abandoned for years, Useless... We start talking about memory, feelings, remembering that they, who gave their lives for our future, also had and have relatives and relatives... Fair indignation.

So why don't we pay tribute to the memory - no, not to the "Hitler soldiers and officers", not to the "damned fascists", but to the soldiers of Germany? Simply - to the soldiers of Germany, the people who died on our soil? Romanian soldiers...

Why don't we erect, if not monuments, then modest signs, and, having put the burials in order, invite their descendants here?

For example, where there is a memorial to the pilots on Chersonesos, in Yukharina Balka or on the former Otradny farmstead, we will put up a sign - a granite boulder with a built-in sign that says in Russian and German that "here, during the storming of Sevastopol, Luftwaffe pilots died 8th Air Corps of General von Richthoffen.

And on Sapun Gora next to the monument to the "liberators of Sevastopol" we will erect a monument to the fallen Soviet soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Infantry Regiment and here we will also install a sign with an inscription in two languages: "Soldiers and officers fought here 30 th army

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corps of General Hans Salmuth, and then General Fret ter Pico. _

At the Communards cemetery - to the soldiers and officers of the 54th Army Corps of General Erich von Hansen.

Near the monument to the yati of the Black Sea people at a height of 105 above Verkhne-Sadov, a sign should be erected: "soldiers and officers of the 22nd Lower Saxon division under the command of Lieutenant General Wolf from the 54th ak, General Erich von Hansen fought here."

The same signs should have been installed on the Isthmus of Parpach near the Feodosia Gulf - to the commander of the corps, Count Lieutenant General von Sponeck, and his soldiers, who managed to resist three Soviet armies. Yes, it should be noted that the count was executed by the Nazi regime not for leaving the bridgehead in front of the superior forces of the Red Army, but for active participation in the plot to overthrow Hitler.

And the next one was in the Ishun region, pointing out that "as a result of high tactical skill and skillful development of the operation by the chief of staff of the 11th Army, Colonel (later General) Weller, the largest Soviet operational-tactical higher formation, the 9th Special Rifle Corps Lieutenant General P.I. Batov (later General of the Army, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Chief of the Joint Staff of the Warsaw Pact troops).

And so on ... And, of course, a special sign should have been placed on Mount Mithridates in Kerch, where it should be indicated that three Soviet armies were defeated and destroyed by two corps of the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht, Colonel General von Manstein. By this we will NOT humiliate the memory and dignity of Soviet soldiers! "After all, we still humiliate them with lies when we write about "many times superior enemy forces" and do not indicate that these untrained people were left by the command to their fate ...

Why don't we name, we don't inspect the graves of at least those about whom we know for sure that they died here, in battles with Soviet soldiers, sailors and officers on the Crimean

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earth? So, during the operation "Hunting for bustards" on May 8, 1942, the commander of a motorized brigade, Colonel Groddek, died on the North Side. The commander of the 16th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Gimer, also died. Even earlier, the commander of the 105th Infantry Regiment, Colonel von Geil, and the commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd Lower Saxon Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel von Boddin, died in Evpatoria (both were buried in the Evpatoria cemetery; but their graves must be established). In Yalta, the head of the Yalta port, captain of the 1st rank, Baron von Bredov, and the driver of Field Marshal von Manstein, a native of Karlsruhe, Fritz Nagel, died (both were buried in the city cemetery; but who will find their graves now?) ...

So why not at least make a mournful memorial to all the soldiers, officers and generals of the 11th Wehrmacht Army,

fallen on the Holy Crimean Land? On Mamashai, on the banks of the Kacha River, next to the graves of the 90th Infantry Regiment of the KA - to soldiers and officers of the 132nd Infantry Division of the 22nd Infantry Division. In the area of Topchika - st. Lilac - battalions of the 19th, 17th, 16th, etc. Soldiers of the 8th Marine Brigade, Major General Zhidilov and soldiers of the Wehrmacht Brigade, Major General Ziegler, as well as soldiers and officers of the 50th Infantry Division. In the Zalankoy area (now Frontovoe-Kholmovka) - to soldiers of the 287th Rifle Regiment, the 54th Rifle Regiment, the 25th Rifle Division; 2nd Marine Infantry Regiment, 7th Marine Brigade, 3rd Marine Regiment, 31st Rifle Regiment of the Red Army and Wehrmacht soldiers: 54th Ak, 132nd Infantry Division, 22nd Infantry Division, 50 th sq. In Zolotoy Balka - howl to us 2nd Rifle Division, 40th Rifle Division, 161st Rifle Division, 31st Rifle Division, 514th Rifle Division, 383rd Rifle Division, sailors of coastal batteries: 19th, 18th, 35th th Black Sea Fleet and - a soldier there of the Wehrmacht of the 30th ak General Fretter-Pico and his divisions of the pits: 72nd infantry division, 50th PA.

The dead need this, the living need it, as was sung in one Soviet song...
For the blood of the men of both armies is only scarlet, regardless of nationality and beliefs.

I would like my proposal to perpetuate the memory of the soldiers of the 11th Army, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who, at the behest of crazy politicians, came to the Crimean (and to the whole Russian) land, would be supported

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the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Russian Federation, Admiral V.V. Masorin, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral A.A. Tatarnikov (the book was written by the author in 2005-2006 - Note ed.). In my opinion, this would be an outstanding gesture of the Russian admirals, who in fact treat the Germans and the German nation in the same way as the President of the Russian Federation, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin treats them. I would also like this idea to be supported by the President of Ukraine, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Viktor Andreevich Yushchenko, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of Ukraine, Admiral I. Knyaz.

Good example. Belarus, where the remains of 250,000 Wehrmacht soldiers lie, has this: on October 1, 2005, the first prefabricated German cemetery was opened 10 km from the regional center of Bereza, located on 4 hectares of land allocated by the authorities. But before it came to this, the German side had to go through many tests, and first of all, the test of the opinion of the descendants of those who live or fought on Belarusian soil. It is understandable why, after the opening ceremony of the cemetery, the German Ambassador to Belarus, Martin Hecker, said: "The war in this country was especially terrible, so such questions about burials are solved with difficulty...". And it is not at all surprising that so far a considerable part of veterans categorically object to the restoration of the former enemy for the burial. Explaining that "okku-

antlers committed atrocities and outrages on Soviet soil"; However, here another question immediately arises: didn't respectable Soviet veterans commit atrocities in 1945 on German soil? If they have forgotten about it, then let them at least look into the book of the veteran of the Second World War, the private of the Red Army Viktor Petrovich Astafyev with the surprisingly accurate title "Cursed and Killed." Perhaps the writer showed the true face of a Red Army soldier brought up by false communist propaganda? And if so, what should we do so that we, the descendants of the Soviet people, are really respected both in Europe and in the same prosperous prosperous European country of Germany?

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Chapter 37

IN THE BATTLE FOR THE CAUCASUS

But, leading the narration of the book around the realities that interest us, we should return to the events of 1942 and, of course, to the Black Sea Fleet. With the capture of the Main Naval Base, the war in the Crimea and at sea did not end. However, the brightest, most exciting and tragic pages of the history of the Black Sea Fleet during World War II ended with the loss of Sevastopol and the flight to the Caucasus with

vet military leaders.

And then ... then the period marked by military historians as the "Battle for the Caucasus" will begin. And since this period is well known to readers interested in military topics, it only remains for me to state what happened and how, in the style of a brief, episodic retelling.

On the afternoon of July 2, 1942, a Luftwaffe group of 64 Junkers and 15 Messerschmitts attacked the Novorossiysk naval base. Bottom line: sunk - the leader "Tash kent", the destroyer "Vigilant", the transports "Proletary", "Ukraine", the tugboat "Chernomor"; damaged - the destroyers Nezamozhnik, Soobrazitelny, the L-24 submarine, the Comintern mine layer, the Shkval and Shtorm patrol ships, 2 transports, a torpedo boat and a floating dock.

On July 16, the Luftwaffe made another raid on Poti. New damage was received by the destroyer Bodry, the hundred-royed ship Shtorm, and the minelayer Komintern. Subsequently, the enemy sank the Azov transport, a boat and a tugboat.

On July 28, 1942, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla were subordinated to the North Caucasian Front by the decision of the Headquarters. The fleet and flotilla were supposed to assist the troops on the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea, to conduct defense

well, coastal cities and naval bases, to prevent landings

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enemy comrades to the eastern Azov and Black Sea coasts. But again, the fleet had to solve the main tasks in the land theater.

In July 1942, the Azov military flotilla (commander Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, member of the Military Council and Brigadier Commissar S.S. Prokofiev) included: Separate Don Detachment (commander - Captain 1st Rank I.A. Frolikov), Yeysk naval base (commander - Rear Admiral S.F. Belousov), main base (Primorsko-Akhtarskaya), Temryuk maneuver base, Separate Kuban detachment of patrol boats (commander - captain of the 3rd rank G.I. Ginzburg) and aviation group.

On July 28, the enemy captured Azov; the ships of the Separate Don Detachment were forced to withdraw to Yeysk.

From mid-August, the enemy reached the approaches to No Vorossiysk.

More. On August 1, the Military Council of the North Caucasian Front was forced to set the task of withdrawing all ships, vessels and watercraft from the Sea of Azov to the Black. The breakthrough was carried out at night by 15-30 pennants, escorted by minesweepers and boats of the Ministry of Defense under the cover of coastal batteries of the Kerch Naval Base and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla. From August 3 to 23, 122 civilian ships and 41 warships crossed the Kerch Strait. Part of the transport and watercraft had to be flooded.

On August 5-11, the Primorsko-Akhtar base of the Azov Flotilla is evacuated.

On August 9, the Temryuk naval base was formed (commander - Rear Admiral S.F. Belousov). Parts of the Temryuk garrison numbered more than 2,000 marines, 52 coastal and anti-aircraft artillery guns, they were supported by ships from the sea.

On August 17, 1942, according to the order of the commander of the North Caucasian Front, the Novorossiysk Defense Region (NOR) was created under the command of Major General G.P. Kotov. Rear Admiral S.G. was appointed Deputy Commander for the Naval Unit. Gorshkov. As part of the NOR of the troops of the 47th Army, the 56th Army, the 216th Rifle Division, which

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slaves and units of the Azov military flotilla, Novorossiysk, Kerch, Temryuk naval bases and a combined air group.

Saving the situation, the Headquarters once again corrected the forces, changing the composition and names. On September 1, 1942, by directive of the Headquarters, the troops of the North Caucasian Front were transformed into the Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front under the command of Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko, ace October 16 - Lieutenant General I.E. Petrov. The Black Sea Fleet was also operationally subordinate to the front. Command of the NOR and the Novorossiysk Naval Base. (commander - captain of the 1st rank G.N. Kholostyakov; later vice admiral, Hero of the Soviet Union; tragically died at the age of 82 with his wife at the hands of robbers who coveted his military awards) to help the ground forces formed new parts. So, in the period from 1 to 6 September, two battalions of marines of 1,500 people each were formed, which merged into the 83rd separate naval brigade. And the 15th, 16th and 17th marine battalions, 3,500 men each, that arrived from Poti and Tuapse became part of the 200th Marine Regiment. Those evacuated from Taman to Novorossiysk formed the 2nd Naval Infantry Brigade of four battalions.

On September 2, the enemy launched an operation called "Blucher-P" to land the 46th German and 19th Romanian infantry divisions on the Taman Peninsula. The defenders of the peninsula were supported by marines, gunboats "Rostov-Don", "October", floating batteries No. 4 and No. 40 of boats of various types.

On September 4, the evacuation of the forces of the Kerch Naval Base began. On the last September 5, the 305th separate battalion of the Marine Corps was evacuated (commander - lieutenant commander A.S. Sherman). Total removed: 5,500 people, 15,000 ammunition; all the material part of the artillery was blown up.

On September 6, the enemy fought already in Novorossiysk itself, while cutting off the main forces of the 47th Army (from September 8, Major General A.A. Grechko will command the army; later twice Hero of the Soviet Union, member of Polit

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Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union) 16th, 17th, 144th Marine Battalions (commander - Lieutenant Commander A.I. Vostrikov) and part of the forces of the 103rd Rifle Brigade, which fought downtown.

On September 6, an attempt was made to deliver the troops of the 137th Naval Regiment to Novorossiysk, about 2,500 people, on the leader Kharkiv and the destroyer Soobrazitelny. But due to the fact that neither at the point of formation, nor at the point of reception, i.e. in Novorossiysk, there were NO weapons for the fighters, the ships were ordered to go to Poti from half way.

On September 10, Soviet troops left Novorossiysk. But the Vorossiysk naval base was transferred to Gelendzhik.

On the night of September 11, 2,510 marines were evacuated by ships to the eastern shore of the Tsemess Bay.

On September 25, the troops of the 47th Army launched a counterattack, in which the 255th (commander - Colonel D.V. Gordeev; later - Colonel A.S. Potapov; 5500 personnel) and the 83rd (commander - Lieutenant Colonel M. P. Kravchenko, 6,000 personnel) Marine Brigade; 672nd Rifle Regiment (2000 personnel) and the 2nd Artillery Battalion of the 408th Rifle Division. They were supported by the gunboat "Red Georgia" (commander - captain of the 2nd rank G.V. Katuntsevsky) and fleet aviation. Bottom line: all these forces of 13,500 people, plus support forces, by September 27 were able to defeat the enemy - one 3rd Romanian mountain rifle division, numbering about 8,000 people. It is not a great feat, having superiority, to defeat the Romanian formation (this is not a German division for you).

From September 18 to October 31, Soviet ships fired eight times on enemy positions in the Novorossiysk and Anapa regions. The patrol ship Shtorm, base minesweepers Yakor, Tral, Mina, Shield, T-412, SKA No. 019, SKA No. 014, SKA No. 064 and SKA No. 074 took part in the operations.

From September 22 to October 22, aircraft of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet made 1,115 sorties, including 772 night ones.

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From September 15 to December 31, the NOR coastal artillery fired 720 rounds.

August 23 The Military Council of the North Caucasian Front decides to create the Tuapse Defensive Region (TOR). The commander of the Tuapse Naval Base, Rear Admiral G.V. Zhukov. The TOR was subordinate to the 18th Army (commander - Lieutenant General F.V. Kamkov, and from October 19 - Major General A.A. Grechko). From the sea, the defense of the TOR was provided by the ships of the OVR - the protection of the water area of the base (a total of 34 units).

The TOR included the 67th Mountain Rifle Regiment, the 143rd and 324th Separate Marine Battalions. The coastal artillery included the 16th separate railway battery, 3 coastal batteries, and a machine-gun battalion. Later, it included 6 more artillery batteries, which received 14 guns taken from the former cruiser Komintern, which became a mine layer. The cruiser, which was damaged by the Luftwaffe on July 2 in Novorossiysk and July 16 in Poti, was sunk on October 10, 1942 at the mouth of the Hopi River.

On September 25, the enemy went over to the offensive, penetrating the 18th Army's defenses to a depth of 5-10 km. Near Tuapse, since October 2, the 145th Marine Regiment has been actively fighting,

formed in Poti from the personnel of the ships of the Black Sea squadron.

On October 17, in Tuapse, the 8th, 9th, 10th -I guards rifle brigades, which became part of the 18th army. The Red Navy men took part in the battles: soldiers of the 83rd Separate Naval Rifle Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel F.M. Monastyrsky) and the 323rd Separate Marine Battalion (commander - Senior Lieutenant I.V. Kashirin).

In total, more than 10,000 sailors operated in the Tuapse direction. During the defense of Tuapse, from September 25 to December 20, the fleet ensured the delivery of more than 70,000 soldiers and

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officers, 80,000 tons of various cargoes, including ammunition. Naval aviation during this time completed more than 2000 departures.

On December 13, 1942, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the 83rd Separate Naval Rifle Brigade and the 255th Separate Marine Brigade were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the workers of the city of Tuapse presented the Red Banner to the 83rd Brigade.

However, in the summer-autumn of 1942, hostilities also took place in other parts of the Black Sea. For actions on sea lanes, ships of the squadron also came out.

On the night of August 3, 1942, the Molotov cruiser under the command of 2nd rank captain M.F. Romanov and the Kharkiv leader, led by 3rd rank captain P.I. Shevchenko - under the overall command of the brigade commander cruiser ditch Rear Admiral N.E. Basisto, raided Feodosia. At 17.30 they left Tuapse and in less than 30 minutes found a reconnaissance aircraft - the "frame" of the Luftwaffe. To mislead him, they changed course. But at 18.50 another reconnaissance aircraft appeared. Then the ships sharply turned around again and followed the course to Novorossiysk until dark. Nov 20.30 they again turned on the required course, but the enemy was not deceived. At midnight, the cruiser and the leader approached Feodosia, where the M-62 submarine was supposed to be waiting for them. But there was no boat in the assigned area. After clarifying their location at 0.53, the sailors of the cruiser discovered the boat, and two minutes later, fire was opened on the ships from the coastal battery: the shells of seven three-gun volleys fell with great accuracy and some of them covered the Molotov cruiser. 60 shells were fired from the leader "Kharkov" towards Dvuyakornaya Bay. The cruiser did not open fire due to the fact that

that the commander of the cruiser brigade, Rear Admiral N.E. The bassist was not sure of the exact location of his ship. In this situation, at 1.13, having not completed the combat mission, he decides to abandon the shelling of Feodosia

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and gives the order to lay down on the retreat course. On the way out, both ships were constantly attacked by the Luftwaffe and enemy torpedo boats. By 22 o'clock the mutilated cruiser "Molotov" and the leader of the "Kharkov" barely made it to Poti. As a result of the illiterate actions of the commanders of the ships, captain of the 2nd rank Romanov, captain of the 3rd rank Shevchenko and the commander of the campaign, Rear Admiral Basisty, the cruiser Molotov was put out of action for one year.

On October 1, the patrol ship "Storm" (commander - lieutenant commander A.I. Nesmeyanov) fired at the city and port of Anapa.

On October 3, the destroyers Boyky (commander - 3rd rank captain G.F. Godlevsky) and Soobrazitelny (3rd rank captain S.S. Vorkov, later Rear Admiral) fired at the port of Yalta, causing a fire in residential buildings civilians.

On October 14, the destroyer Nezamozhnik (commander - captain of the 3rd rank P.A. Bobrovnikov) and the Shkval patrol ship (commander - captain-lieutenant V. G. Bakardzhiev) shelled the port of Feodosia.

During the period from November to the end of December 1942, three raids were made from the Caucasian ports to the western shores of the Black Sea. They were attended by the cruiser "Voroshilov" (commander - captain 1st rank F.S. Markov), leader "Kharkov", destroyers "Merciless" (commander - captain 3rd rank V.A. Parkhomenko), "Boikiy" and "Savvy", as well as the basic minesweepers T-406, T-407, T-412.

The Black Sea submariners also did their combat work on enemy sea communications.

On August 1942, according to the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, all submarines (the 1st, 2nd brigades and the 10th separate division) were combined into one brigade of five divisions (commander - Rear Admiral P.I. Boltunov). During the defense of the Caucasus, the submarines made 133 military campaigns on communications along the southern coast of Crimea and along the western coast from the Bosphorus to Odessa. On October 1, the M-118 submarine (commander - Captain Lieutenant S.S. Savin) died. For the entire time, the submarines put up about 200 minutes.

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Pilots of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet from July to December

1942 made more than 6060 sorties. The 5th Guards Mine-Torpedo Regiment and the 40th Bomber Regiment operated on distant enemy communications; on the near ones - the 18th, 47th assault air regiments, as well as aircraft of the 40th bomber and 119th reconnaissance

air regiments.

During the period of the defense of the Caucasus, conventionally designated as the "Battle for the Caucasus", 1800 transports, 2700 small ships, barges and tugboats passed along the Caucasian coast. In total, more than 215,000 people and 260,000 tons of cargo were transported by warships and transports. To escort ships, ships and boats of the Black Sea Fleet made about 3,000 trips to the sea. Among the participants in sea voyages are boats of the 1st (commander - lieutenant commander D.A. Glukhov; later Hero of the Soviet Union) and 4th division (commander - lieutenant commander N.I. Sipyagin; later Hero of the Soviet Union) . In total, more than 40,000 marines from the Black Sea Fleet participated in the defense of the Caucasus, 150 coastal and 200 anti-aircraft guns, 250 ships and vessels, and more than 260 aircraft were used.

Chapter 38

AMONG THE OPPOSITORS - "TYULKIN FLEET"

On January 24, 1943, the Transcaucasian Front was renamed the North Caucasian Front, headed by the commander, Colonel General I.I. Maslennikov (from May 15, 1943 - Colonel-General nickname I.E. Petrov). |

On January 2-7, 1943, at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the main forces of the Black Sea Group of Forces, with the support of the Black Sea Fleet, launched an offensive operation to liberate Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula.

Acting in the interests of the ground forces, the Black Sea Fleet landed amphibious assault forces, used naval and

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coastal artillery, aviation and marines, ensured the regrouping and supply of troops.

To support the offensive of the 47th Army, the fleet allocated a fire assistance detachment, consisting of the cruiser Voroshilov, the destroyers Merciless, Boikiy, and Soobrazitelny. February 1 from 4:30 a.m. to up to 5 hours 10 minutes the detachment fired 642 shells in the Novorossiysk region. In the course of the offensive, a landing was also planned, and the area of Yuzhnaya Ozereyka-Stanichki was planned as the place for the landing of forces. It was also planned to land an airborne assault in the Vasilievka area.

The main landing force, led by a colonel

D.V. Gordeev, were: the 83rd Marine Brigade, the 255th Marine Brigade, the 165th Separate Rifle Brigade, a separate airborne regiment, the 29th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, machine gun and tank battalions. To ensure the landing of all these forces, a fire assistance detachment was formed under the command of Vice Admiral L.A. Vladimirsky as part of the cruisers "Krasny Krym", "Krasny Kavkaz", destroyers "Merciless" and "Savvy"; a detachment of ship support under the command of Rear Admiral N.E. Bassist in the composition of the destroyers Zheleznyakov (commander - captain of the 3rd rank V.S. Shishkanov), Nezamozhnik, 3 gunboats, 4 hundred horn boats and a minesweeper; detachment of transports; detachment of landing aids; detachment of guard ships. The auxiliary landing force consisted of an assault detachment of 250 marines (commander Major Ts.L. Kunikov).

In total, more than 70 ships and vessels, 167 aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet and the 5th Air Army were involved in this operation. The landing was to be carried out by ships of the Novorossiysk Naval Base under the leadership of Lieutenant Commander N.I. Sipyagin. General management of the operation to capture Novorossiysk was entrusted to the commander of the Black Sea Group of Forces, Lieutenant General I.E. Petrov, the landing was led by the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. October.

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The start date of the operation was determined by the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses by the Soviets. troops. However, the land forces failed to solve this problem. And then, contrary to the developed plan, the front commander I.E. Petrov ordered to start landing; instead of the deadline on the night of February 1 to 2, the date of the operation is moved to the night of February 3 to 4.

And, as expected, for a number of reasons, including the poor organization of interaction between ships and aircraft, the landing of the main landing force failed.

Artillery preparation according to a new, suddenly emerging plan began an hour and a half later; and the planes that arrived in the area for corrections adhered to the old plan - and therefore the shells fired by the ships rained down on the city square and nearby buildings, NOT causing any time to the enemy defense. 2,000 shells tore through the starless darkness of the night, causing the locals to tremble uncontrollably. Landing at 03:45 The Germans met with powerful artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire.

The commander of the detachment of gunboats, captain of the 1st rank G.A. Butakov, instead of the intended target, retreated to Mount Abruu, where he landed 2 companies of paratroopers, but did not tell anyone about the change in the landing site. So there was no one to keep in touch with the landed and doomed fighters (for the next three days they fought in encirclement, broke through

less than 200 people, more than 500 were captured, the rest were killed). In the meantime, already closer to dawn, the counter-hell miral N.E. Basisty, having agreed with the commander of the operation, Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky, ordered to stop the landing and gave a signal to withdraw. Result: 1427 men and 16 tanks were landed; lost - a patrol boat, 3 bolinders, 2 seiners, 3 longboats and a tugboat.

More or less successfully landed only forces in the Stanichka area. 250 people seized a bridgehead about 3 kilometers wide and up to 2.5 kilometers deep. The auxiliary landing force turned into the main one; the bridgehead captured and held beyond its strength and capabilities was called Malaya Zemlya. On the night of February 6, troops landed here

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255th Marine Rifle Brigade (commander - Colonel A.S. Potapov); later - more than 17,000 fighters, 95 guns and mortars, 86 machine guns, almost 500 tons of ammunition and food.

One of the most disastrous landing operations has turned into a permanently protracted massacre; small forces of the Red Navy fought on a narrow stretch of land for seven months, for which they were awarded orders and medals. In total, in February-August 1943, 6268 people from the "small land" received awards.

In total, until September 10, the fleet landed and transported 80,000 soldiers and officers, more than 600 guns and mortars, other equipment and ammunition to the so-called Malaya Zemlya.

The ships of the Black Sea Fleet continued to provide maritime transportation along the Caucasian coast; reinforcements, weapons, ammunition and food were delivered to the front along the 550-kilometer route. During April-December 1943, warships and transport ships transported about 100,000 soldiers, sailors and commanders, excluding the transportation of the Separate Primorsky Army to the Kerch Peninsula. As well as more than 220 tons of cargo, tanks, armored vehicles, cars, etc.

Torpedo boats operated on sea lanes, making more than 2,500 exits in 1943. The captain of the 1st rank A.M. commanded the boats of the 1st brigade. Filippov, 2nd brigade - captain of the 2nd rank V.T. Protsenko. At the same time, the boats of the 2nd brigade were armed with rocket launchers.

Ships of the Black Sea Squadron also raided the enemy's close communications.

In February and March, the cruiser Voroshilov, the leader of the Kharkiv, the destroyers Merciless, Nezamozhnik and Soobrazitelny, and the patrol ship Shkval conducted 12 night cruises in search of enemy ships.

On February 22, the Kharkiv leader and the Soobrazitelny destroyer, supported by the 18th Army's advance, fired 358 shells.

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On May 1, the destroyers "Merciless", "Zheleznyakov" and the watchman "Storm" fired at the Anapa airfield. On May 14, the leader Kharkiv and the destroyer Boyky fired at the same airfield, firing 235 shells. On August 21, strikes on the airfield were carried out by the Storm and Shkval patrol aircraft.

On the night of October 6, 1943, the leader "Kharkov" and the destroyers "Merciless" and "Free" raided Feodosia and Yalta. But they were discovered by Luftwaffe aircraft and, having illuminated from an illuminator aircraft, dropped several bombs. However, the commander of the group, captain of the 2nd rank G.P. Negoda, reported this to the command after ... almost two hours after the raid. Instead of leaving the area where they were found, hiding behind the darkness, the ships continued to go in the direction of Feodosia. So at 5.00 they were attacked by German boats. At 6:10 a.m., Captain 2nd Rank Negoda finally decided to withdraw. And the leader "Kharkov" at 6 o'clock approached Yalta and from a distance of 70 cables fired 104 shells of 130-mm caliber at the port. There were dead and wounded; but who are they if there were no Wehrmacht soldiers in the city? - Of course, local residents whose houses were hit by Soviet shells. The coastal battery, located near Livadia, fired 24 volleys at the leader; the battery itself did not suffer at all from the attack of the Black Sea. Apparently, not having received proper satisfaction, the commander of the "Kharkov" captain of the 3rd rank Shevchenko decided to recoup on Alushta and fired 30 shells in her direction. But the order was so stupid that these shells did not reach the city. And at 6.13 the leader went to the meeting point with the destroyers and after about an hour all of them in a single battle order, proudly, like winners, began a systematic withdrawal in Tuapse.

At 6:40 a.m. they were met by three fighters, who at 8:15 a.m. managed to shoot down a Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft. For about 20 minutes, the ships lay adrift while the destroyer Capable brought two German pilots on board from a downed reconnaissance aircraft. Before they had time to move away from the crash site, eight Yu-87s flew into the area, accompanied by four Messerschmitts. Two "Junkers" broke through to the leader and dropped bombs, after hitting the stern of "Khar

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kov" has lost its turn. The following hits destroyed the hull of the ship. Negoda ordered the commander of the destroyer "Sposobny" to take the damaged leader in tow, but the towing cable broke repeatedly ... More than once during the day, Soviet ships were attacked by self-

summers of the Luftwaffe. At 14.30, the destroyer "Merciless" was destroyed by an accurate strike, at 15.37 the leader of the "Kharkov" was killed, at 18.35 the waves of the Black Sea closed over the destroyer "Sposobny" and its crew. More than 700 people died, only 123 survived.

The Supreme Command was informed about the loss of three ships, and soon a directive from the Headquarters appeared, prohibiting the use of ships of the 1st and 2nd ranks until further notice. So they stood until the end of the war in the bases, waiting for Stalin's "special order", which Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis should have conveyed to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet in the event of a change in the situation. However, this has already been discussed; fortunately, the secret mission entrusted to the Black Sea Fleet did not take place - otherwise there would have been many times more deaths.

As for submarines, by the beginning of the 1943 campaign of the year, the Black Sea Fleet had 29 submarines: 18 were in service, 11 were under repair. The submarines were united in a brigade commanded by the captain of the 1st rank A.V. Krestovsky. Up to 15 submarines could be in the sea every month. The main campaigns were made between the ports of the Caucasus and Romania.

In 1943, a device was put into service, which was installed on torpedoes, which made it possible to switch to salvo torpedo firing, to "fan" firing. They also began to use torpedoes with a proximity fuse, which increased the effectiveness of combat activities. A manual on the joint use of submarines and the Air Force was also developed. For the first time, such use was carried out in April 1943: the M-35, S-33 and Shch-39 submarines entered the northwestern part of the sea, and reconnaissance aircraft searched for enemy convoys on the Sulina-Odessa-Sevasto route Paul. However, the proposed operation was not successful.

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Not so much because of weather conditions, but because of the imperfect relationship between pilots and sailors. Of the three submarines, only S-33 (commander 3rd rank captain B. A. Alekseev) sank the Suceava transport.

On July 6 of the same year, pilots in the Sulina region discovered an enemy convoy consisting of three transports and five escort ships. Located in the positions "Shch 201", "S-33" and "Shch-203" received an order to destroy the convoy. The crew of Shch-201 (commander lieutenant commander P. I. Para Moshkin)} torpedoed the transport with a torpedo salvo, but, despite the damage, he escaped pursuit.

During the 1943 campaign, the submarines made 102 exits, mainly for operations off the southern coast of Crimea and on the routes between the ports of Crimea and Odessa, Constanta and Sulina. During this time, the submarines made 87 torpedo attacks, it is believed that 43 of them were successful. But can you count

these attacks are successful if no documents confirm which ships were and whether they were destroyed. But there is information that two schooners were sunk and a self-propelled barge was damaged. That's a "huge" catch!

During the same time, the boats "L-4", "L-6" and "L-23" carried out six laying of mines on communications in the amount of 120 pieces (and from the summer to December 1942 - 200 mines). Against who? Against the Romanian fleet? Well...

"Your Excellency! I am happy, together with the Romanian troops, that we are taking part in the victorious battles on the other side of the Dnieper and in the cause of saving civilization, the rights and freedom of the peoples, "Romanian General Antonescu reported in a letter to Adolf Hitler as early as August 17, 1941. But this is about ground forces. And what Romanian naval forces took part in the cause of siaseniya and the civilization and freedom of peoples? We remind the thoughtful reader when the picture of what is happening is already completely clear to him; I will only clarify that we are now talking about forces for 1943.

The Romanian fleet on the Black Sea at that time consisted of 3 destroyers, 9 gunboats, 9 hunters and 18 minesweepers, more than 50 fast landing barges. The transport fleet included 5 tankers, 15 beech

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Sirs, more than 100 self-propelled barges. There was one submarine "Delfinul".

And this number of dozens of submarines of the Black Sea Fleet were not able to destroy!

While the Black Sea Fleet included 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, leaders, destroyers, patrol ships, base minesweepers, submarines and other forces. Yes, in a good scenario, the leader, accompanied by a destroyer and one submarine, could destroy ALL of the above enemy forces in a few hours.

What kind of "successes" of the Black Sea Fleet can we talk about then?!

All the time, the Black Sea Fleet fought not with the German fleet, but with a single Romanian boat, schooners, longboats and small boats - forces called on the Black Sea "Tyulka Fleet"!

This means that the question of what kind of successes of the Black Sea Fleet during the years of the Second World War is a rhetorical one.

But let's go further, because the operations (also not unsuccessful) were carried out.

From September 9 to October 9, the North Caucasian Front, in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet, carried out the Novorossiysk-Taman offensive operation. Within its framework, from September 9 to 16, the Novorossiysk operation was carried out.

The leadership of the landing operation was entrusted to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral L.A. Vladi Mirsky, who took office on April 24, 1943. Rear Admiral G.N., commander of the Novorossiysk Naval Base, was appointed commander of the landing. Bachelors. From the moment they landed on the shore, the ground forces, including the landing troops, were commanded by the commander of the 18th Army, Lieutenant General K.N. Leselidze. The general management of the operation was carried out by the commander of the North Caucasian Front, Colonel-General I.E. Petrov.

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The plan provided for the encirclement of enemy troops in the port of Novorossiysk by converging strikes by ground forces and the simultaneous landing of troops. Why the Marine Marine was divided into 3 detachments. The first in the 255th Marine Brigade was to be landed from the ships of the landing detachment under the command of Lieutenant Commander P.I. Derzhavin. The second detachment as part of the 393rd separate battalion of marines (commander - lieutenant commander V.A. Botylev; he is also entrusted with the overall command of the detachment) and the 290th rifle regiment of the NKVD (commander - lieutenant colonel N.I. . Piskarev) was landed by a detachment of ships under the command of Lieutenant Commander D.A. Deaf. The third detachment of the 1339th Rifle Division, according to the plan, was landed by a detachment of landing ships under the command of Captain 3rd Rank N.F. Masalkin. The landing support detachment united 32 torpedo boats, 2 KM-type boats and 2 more boats (detachment commander - Captain 2nd Rank V.T. Protsenko).

The landing was provided by guns in the amount of 410 units, 390 mortars, 225 rocket artillery installations, 150 aircraft of the 4th Air Army and the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet.

On September 9, the 18th Army and the Black Sea Fleet received an order to begin the operation, and on the night of September 10, the first-echelon landing units left Gelendzhik. At 2 h 44 min. coastal artillery opened fire, firing almost 12,000 shells during the landing. At 0300, torpedo boats under the command of Lieutenant Commander A.F. Afinogenov broke into the port of Novorossiysk.

In total, about 4,000 people were landed on the first night. On the night of September 11, a second echelon of 3,000 people landed. In battles, a group of marines of the 393rd battalion, led by Lieutenant Commander A.V. Raikunov, seized the station, after which the foreman of the 2nd article V.A. Smorzhevsky hoisted a naval flag over him.

The paratroopers were also assisted by pilots of the 8th Guards Aviation Regiment (commander - Major M.E. Efimov) of the 11th Assault Division (commander - Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Gu

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riy) and the 47th Aviation Regiment (commander - Lieutenant Colonel F.N. Turgenev; Hero of the Soviet Union; died near the village of Siren, the village of Turgenevka was named after him). They supplied the blockaded groups of paratroopers with ammunition and food, dropping them by parachute. Pilots of fighter aviation regiments also took part in the operation: the 9th (commander - Mayor D.D. Dzhaparidze), the 11th (lieutenant colonel I.S. Lyubimov; Hero of the Soviet Union) and the 25th (Major K.S. Alekseev).

During the battles for Novorossiysk, the coastal artillery of the fleet fired more than 14,000 shells.

As a result of the combined strike, by 10 am on September 16, Novorossiysk again became Soviet. Many years later, on September 14, 1973, the city was awarded the honorary title of Hero City with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

On September 11, the second stage of the Novorossiysk-Taman operation to liberate the Taman Peninsula began.

On September 21, Soviet troops entered Anapa.

On September 26, naval paratroopers with units of the 18th Army occupied the city of Blagoveshchensk.

On October 9, the troops of the 18th and 56th armies reached the Kerch Strait. With the liberation of Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula, the Black Sea Fleet's basing system expanded. By the end of October 1943, conditions were created for the landing of Soviet troops in the Crimea.

On October 12, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief issued a directive to the North Caucasian Front to prepare an operation to seize a bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula - to accumulate forces there and follow-up actions to liberate Crimea in cooperation with the forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

Since forcing the Kerch Strait on the move was excluded, and the Kerch-Eltigen operation was developed. Officers of the Black Sea Fleet also took part in its development: captain of the 3rd rank B. Petrov, K. Stolbov, M. Tomsy, A. Urgan, the group of which was headed by the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet Rear Admiral I.D. Eliseev.

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The general leadership of all forces was carried out by the commander of the troops of the North Caucasian Front, Colonel-General I. E. Petrov. His assistant in the naval unit was the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral L.A. Vladimirsky.

The landing was scheduled for November 1, 1943. However (for the umpteenth time they stepped on the same rake; as always, the weather is to blame ...) the simultaneous landing did NOT work out. The landing force north of Kerch was cancelled, and the ships returned to base halfway through. In total, 5,000 people landed in the Eltigen area on the night of November 1, and 18 guns, 15 mortars and 20 tons of ammunition were also delivered. The next night, another 3,270 fighters landed on this bridgehead, unloaded 20 tons of ammunition, mortars, guns and food. November 3 - about 1000 more people with 10 tons of ammunition. For example, motorboat No. 13 (commanded by foreman of the 2nd class A.D. Emelianenko) made 10 trips to Eltigen overnight, landing 260 paratroopers with weapons. For heroism, the foreman of the 2nd article was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

During the operation, an artillery boat AKA-116 (commander - Senior Lieutenant V.S. Kravtsov) died from a direct hit by an air bomb; an armored boat BKA-112 (commander - Lieutenant D.P. Levin) was blown up and sunk by a mine.

Sailors of the 376th from a separate battalion of marines (company commander - lieutenant G.M. Titov), sailors of the combined battalion of the 255th brigade of marines (commander - major S. Grigoriev) fought on the Eltigensky bridgehead. On November 17, 1943, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 13 Red Navy men, foremen and officers of the 386th Marine Battalion received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the troops of the 56th Army were transformed into the Separate Primorsky Army. By December 4, more than 75,000 people, 600 guns, 190 mortars, 130 tanks, 764 vehicles, more than 7,000 tons of ammunition, up to 3,000 tons of food and other cargoes were transported to the Yenikalsky Peninsula on ships and vessels of the Azov Flotilla alone.

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During the fighting, attempts were made to land troops on Mithridates. The 305th and 144th battalions of the 83rd Marine Brigade were landed, but the paratroopers were pushed back to the shore, and they had to be evacuated to Taman along with additional detached units of the 83rd Separate Marine Brigade. And with this, the Kerch-Eltigen operation was completed. The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army again went on the defensive.

It is believed that this operation was one of the largest during the Second World War, as it was carried out by the troops of an entire front with the participation of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla. For the formation of the Kerch Strait, the landing of

Santa and the capture of the bridgehead 129 soldiers, including 33 sailors of the Red Navy, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla failed to interrupt enemy communications even in 1943.

All amphibious operations to seize bridgeheads carried out during the war on the Black Sea were highly appreciated by military theoreticians, historians, and even opportunistic military leaders in the postwar years.

When he was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov was especially praised for the landing operation in the area of South Ozereyka - Stanichki, which was considered "an example of naval art." At the same time, the role and participation in it of S.G. Gorshkova. However, most of the landing operations carried out in the Second World War turned out to be a "model" of the senseless killing of their own sailors, soldiers and officers.

For objectivity, it should be noted that the Black Sea Fleet did not have infantry landing ships, tank landing ships, assault landing boats and barges, landing boats for transporting military equipment, mortar tank landing ships, infantry landing ships. But besides this, there were significant miscalculations in the conduct of landing operations, consisting in the fact that:

- the plan of these operations was not developed effectively enough;

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- reconnaissance of the coast and enemy forces was practically reduced to nothing;

- the calculation of the forces participating in the operation was not carried out. In other words, manpower. The landing participants were not trained, they were not even given special training. And the "effect", as it seemed to the command of the Black Sea Fleet, could be achieved by the people's commissar's "one hundred grams" plus an additional portion of these people's commissariats from the fighters and the Red Navy who had died earlier in the battles. "Patriotism" was often achieved through drunken people suppressing their fear with vodka, turning off their consciousness. But in the summaries and battle sheets, and later in archival documents, only the appeals of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet remained, testifying to "mass patriotism", about "love for the great leader Stalin and the Communist Party";

- disinformation of the enemy and measures to maintain secrecy were not carried out;

- special mine-protecting operations were not carried out, as well as trawling of the coastal zone, not

underwater acoustic buoys were installed;

- the issues of loading troops and concentration have not been worked out, and the second echelon of the landing force is not provided;

- there was no base for the repair organization and management of towing operations;

- strikes against the enemy's transport system were not practiced;

- on the eve of the operation, the transition to combat command posts was not worked out;

- the state of sea roughness and the expected weather were completely neglected, everything was done according to the principle: the Soviet sailor will withstand everything. When reading sources telling about landing operations, you always pay attention to the fact that among the first causes of failures is "bad weather" or that during the "heroically carried out successful landing operation" the elements raged, there was a storm, etc.;

— possible delays of operations were not taken into account.

And as a result of the criminal release of Soviet sailors on the coast - mass death of people and the loss of these same bridgeheads in the near future.

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Among other things, for landing operations, Gorshkov, Oktyabrsky, Eliseev, Azarov and Kulakov received naval awards - the orders of Ushakov and Nakhimov ... Thus, the names of these two great Russian naval commanders were devalued. Yes, Gorshkov was also awarded the highest military award - the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree.

Chapter 39

1944: Black
Sea Fleet OUTSIDE OF THE OPERATING FLEETS

After 1943 came 1944; what successes did he have?

In the period from March 26 to April 14, 1944, the Odessa offensive operation was carried out by the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. As a result, Romanians and Germans were expelled from Odessa. And with that, the operation to expel the enemy from this region ended. It is to the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts that this region owes its liberation from the enemy, and not to the Black Sea Fleet. Crimea was also liberated from the enemy by the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front in accordance with the plan approved by the Stavka.

However, the Black Sea Fleet was also not idle.

On March 28, Soviet troops captured the city and port of Nikolaev. In the battles for the city, the fighters of the 384th separate battalion of the Marine Corps distinguished themselves (commander - Major F.E. Kotanov). The paratroopers from this battalion are 55 sailors, 10 sappers and 2 signalmen, led by senior lieutenant K.F. Ol Shansky - on the night of March 26 they landed in the port of Nikolaev. All participants in this landing were awarded the titles of Heroes of the Soviet Union.

When the Odessa operation began, in order to strengthen assistance to the ground forces, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, most of the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet was relocated to airfields in Skadovsk, Soko

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loghornoe, Iskrovka. 15 torpedo boats of the 2nd Novorossiysk brigade also arrived in Skadovsk (commanders - 2nd rank captain V.T. Protsenko and 3rd rank captain A.L. Pitsul).

On April 8, 1944, the operation to liberate the Crimea officially began.

From June 1, 1943, the 17th Wehrmacht Army, which was then fighting in the Crimea, was led by General E. Enecke. The 17th Army included two 5th Army Corps and the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps, bled in battles on the Taman Peninsula and in the Caucasus.

According to the plan of the Supreme High Command, the Crimean operation was attended by: troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander - General of the Army F.I. Tolbukhin; later - Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union (1965), holder of the Order of Victory), Separate Primorsky Army (commander - General of the Army A.I. Eremenko; later Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union), the Black Sea Fleet (commander - Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky) and the Azov Flotilla (commander - counter-admiral S.G. Gorshkov). The headquarters of the Supreme High Command established a new order of subordination: the Black Sea Fleet was directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, and the Azov Flotilla - to the commander of the Separate Primorsky Army. The activities of the fronts and the fleet were coordinated by Marshal of the Soviet Union (twice Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of two Orders of Victory, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of War of the USSR) A.M. Vasilevsky (and in 1943 - Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (CPSU), chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor).

The task of the Black Sea Fleet was to assist the ground forces by disrupting enemy sea communications and preventing the evacuation of enemy troops from the Crimea. |

In 1944, the Black Sea Fleet, together with the Azov Flotilla, included:
1 battleship, 4 sulfur cruisers, 6 destroyers, 18 patrol ships, 3 gunboats, 1
monitor, 113 "small hunters", 27 minesweepers, 47 torpedo boats, 27 armored
boats, 29 submarines, 500 sa

moletov.

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By the beginning of the Crimean operation, the Soviet troops had:
500,000 people, 6,000 guns and mortars, 772 anti-aircraft artillery guns, 600
tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,250 aircraft.

On April 18, Soviet troops took Balaklava and approached Sevastopol. On
the same day, the Separate Primorskaya Army was renamed the Primorsky
Army and included in the 4th Ukrainian Front.

On May 5, the operation to liberate Sevastopol began. The main blow
was to be delivered by the forces of the Primorsky Army under the command
of Lieutenant General K.S. Melnik and partly the forces of the 51st Army. The
2nd Guards Army (commander - Lieutenant General G.F. Zakharov) was to
advance in the auxiliary direction. On May 9, the enemy withdrew to Cape
Khersones; the city and the Main Naval Base were finally liberated.

58 units, ships and formations participating in the liberation of Sevastopol
were awarded orders and medals. Orders and medals were also awarded
to 400 sailors of the Black Sea Fleet. 126 people, including the Black Sea,
will become Heroes of the Soviet Union. 118 units and formations of the army
and navy will receive the honorary name - Sevastopol.

From the beginning of the Crimean operation, torpedo boats of the
Black Sea Fleet were relocated from Anapa and Skadovsk to Yalta and
Evpatoria. Armed with rocket launchers BM-13 ("Katyusha"), they attacked
enemy convoys.

In total, from April to May 1944, torpedo boats made 270 exits to the sea,
more often at night.

Of course, submarines also took part in the liberation of the Crimea,
operating by the method of independent search within the allotted positions.

`During the operation, submarines were transferred from position to
position, to where a more intensive movement of enemy convoys was expected.
This method of using submarines was called the method of maneuvering
with predetermined positions.

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Due to the fact that the submariners of the Black Sea Fleet did not cope with the task of destroying the forces and means of the Romanian ports of Constanta and Sulina, the fulfillment of this task was entrusted to the aviation of the fleet. To carry out the operation, 325 combat aircraft of bombers and fighters were allocated.

The air operation to defeat the enemy forces began on the morning of August 9, 1944, by attack aircraft of the 23rd air regiment under the cover of fighters, which attacked the port of Sulina. As a result, a number of ships in the port were damaged and fires were caused. Soon, a destroyer and three auxiliary ships were destroyed during a second strike. Fires broke out in the area of oil tanks, railway workshops and the railway station. |

On August 20, a regiment of Il-2 attack aircraft, under the cover of fighters, launched a new attack on Sulina in order to suppress anti-aircraft artillery batteries. At the same time, batteries were also attacked in the area of Constanta, which were attacked by dive bombers under cover of 77 fighters. As a result of this massive air strike, several combat and auxiliary ships were destroyed, and moorings and oil terminals were destroyed. True, some authors assure the naive reader that at the same time in Constanta, along with many other ships, destroyers and steamboats, the submarine U-9 (!) was sunk (see Black Sea Fleet of Russia, p. 298). `

11 aviation regiments and one squadron (325 combat aircraft) took part in these strikes. In total, in the period from August 19 to August 25, 1944, naval aviation carried out 687 sorties (according to other sources - 1880) and dropped 175 tons of bombs.

It is generally accepted that the air operation to destroy the ports of Constanta and Sulina is the most effective operation of the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet and the fleet as a whole.

Thanks to the advance of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, as well as the strikes of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet, operational conditions were created for the capture by ground forces of enemy ports on the coast of Romania and Bulgaria.

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At that time, in front of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (commander - General of the Army R.Ya. Malinovsky; later Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of the Order of Victory, Minister of Defense of the USSR, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU) and 3rd Ukrainian Front (commander - General of the Army F.I. Tolbukhin) was tasked with liberating Moldova, as well as neutralizing, withdrawing Romania and Bulgaria from the war. As part of these fronts, there were: over 950,000 people, more than 16,000 guns and mi-

nomets, 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1759 aircraft. While the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube military flotilla, which was part of it (commander - Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov), created in April on the basis of the disbanded Azov military flotilla, received the task of disrupting sea communications, ensuring the forcing of water lines and the crossing of troops across the Dniester Estuary and the Danube, to land troops behind enemy lines, to seize its ports and bases from the sea. For the duration of the Iasi-Kishinev operation, both the fleet and the flotilla were operationally subordinate to the commander of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

Torpedo boats also made raids on the coast and ports of the enemy. On August 22, a detachment of torpedo boats under the command of Lieutenant Commander Kochiev raided the Constanta raid.

On August 24, the Black Sea Fleet landed an assault force from armored boats under the command of Captain 3rd Rank P.I. Derzhavin. About 300 marines, led by Major F.E. Kotanov, captured the port of Zhebriany, crossed the Danube and moved further up the Kiliya gorge. On August 25, 5 armored boats (brigade commander - captain of the 3rd rank P.I. Derzhavin), having received the 613th company of the Marine Corps, went to Kilia Staraya and occupied Izmail. On August 27, the 384th marine battalion (commander - Major F.E. Kotanov) on armored boats of the 4th separate brigade of river ships (commander - captain of the 2nd rank P.P. Davydov), with the support of the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, took the port Sulina; capturing about 1000 people of the garrison.

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By August 27, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the Danube Flotilla occupied all coastal points from the mouth of the Danube to Galati. The Danube flotilla took possession of the lower reaches of the Danube. From August 24 to September 8, she ensured the crossing of the Danube by 180,000 people and a large amount of equipment.

On August 28, the Romanian forces of the fleet, as a result of the ultimatum presented, capitulated.

To capture the port of Constanta, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky decides to land troops there. On August 29, 30 torpedo boats (brigade commander - captain of the 2nd rank V.G. Protsenko) and 6 patrol boats received troops in Sulina as part of the 143rd (commander - captain V.S. Makarov) and 384th (commander - Major F.E. Kotanov) of separate battalions of marines in the amount of more than 700 people and headed for Constanta. At the same time, units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front entered the city. After that, in the evening, a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, vice-admiral I.I. Azarov and the flagship navigator of the fleet, captain of the 2nd rank Yu.P. Kovel from the commander of the Romanian fleet accepted the surrender of the Konstanz garrison.

On September 12, 1944, Romania signed an armistice agreement with the USSR, the USA and Great Britain.

In early September, Soviet troops approached the Bulgarian borders, and on September 8 they crossed the Romanian-Bulgarian border.

On September 9, 1944, a "democratic" coup took place in Bulgaria.

At 22:00 on September 9, hostilities in Bulgaria ceased, and on September 16, 1944, hostilities in the Black Sea were completely completed. As a result, the Black Sea Fleet was excluded from the active fleets.

Now, as historians write, the efforts of the fleet were directed to a humane mission: the restoration of destroyed ports, bases, the repair of ships, the elimination of the mine threat and the provision of maritime transport.

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Chapter 40

SOME MYSTERIOUS NUANCES...

And in order to completely separate from the opinion of Soviet and post-Soviet authors, who consider themselves connoisseurs of military art, supposedly possessing the only truthful conclusions, I will quote: "The German naval forces by the beginning of 1944 were: 1 auxiliary cruiser, 4 destroyers, 3 destroyers, 3 patrol ships, 3 gunboats, 14 submarines, 28 torpedo boats, 34 "hunters" for submarines, 4 minelayers. ... Vice-Admiral Brinkman commanded the German Navy on the Black Sea ... Fascist troops fled from the territory of Bulgaria. They sank their surface ships and part of the submarines in the roadstead, three submarines off the coast of Turkey. The fascist fleet on the Black Sea has ceased to exist" (See the 2002 collection from the Danish: "The Black Sea Fleet of Russia", pp. 290, 304.). Yes, given that there were no such forces, neither the "fascist" nor the German fleet on the Black Sea! That's what I tried to impartially, avoiding any ideology, to show.

In a number of sources, including the author of the most reliable books about the fleet, Professor V. Dotsenko, it is indicated that during the occupation of the Crimea by the Wehrmacht, Vice Admiral Helmut Brinkman was the "Admiral of the Black Sea" (the correct spelling of the name of the German Vice Admiral is: Brinkmann, while Brinkman in German testifies that its bearer is a German Jew), who was with his headquarters in Simferopol. The general management of the "German ships on the Black Sea" was carried out by the commander

Navy Group "South" Admiral Kurt Fricke, the head of the naval area in Feodosia and Yalta was Rear Admiral Schultz. Well, let's make it clear so that the opponents have no arguments in favor of the presence of the formidable forces of the German fleet in the Black Sea...

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Despite the fact that the above-named names appear in a number of sources, the only naval commander in the Crimea for a short time before his death was Captain 1st Rank von Bredov, the head of the Yalta seaport. In order not to be unfounded in describing the situation and the alignment of forces, I will refer to a very informed source - the famous historian M.S. Maslov and his book "The German Navy from Versailles to Nuremberg": "On June 22, 1941, the Third Reich attacked the Union of Soviet Socialist republics, starting his last adventure. Hitler initially wanted to win without using the fleet. The participation of the Kriegsmarine was to be limited to the protection of communications in the Baltic and the North Sea and the laying of mines. At the end of September, a squadron consisting of Gierpitz, Admiral Scheer, Nuremberg and Cologne approached the Abo-Aland skerries in order to prevent the release of the Baltic Fleet from Kronstadt and prevent it from being interned in Sweden. But the RKKF did not intend to do this (See: N. Kuznetsov. "Kursom k pobede", M., 2003, pp. 27-28). ... In the war against the USSR, the significance of the Arctic theater increased significantly. Anglo-American convoys began delivering strategic materials and military equipment to Russia. The bridgehead captured in Norway now allowed the German fleet to operate in the basins of the Barents and Kara seas. The Petsamo base, transferred by the Finns, also played an important role in the fight on the northern communications. In the summer of 1941, the Kriegsmarine began to actively build bases in Northern Norway. At the same time, the British did their best to prevent this. Several sabotage and landing actions of the British "commandos" were carried out. In March, an English detachment landed on the La Fontaine Islands, and in July on Svalbard. Several other ports were also attacked, but they did not have a significant impact on the course of hostilities. ... In the Black Sea theater of operations, the Soviet fleet had complete superiority over the enemy. The Romanian fleet was weak, both in terms of the ship's composition and in terms of the combat training of the crews. To strengthen the Romanian fleet in the Black Sea along the Danube from the Elbe, a small

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submarines (what kind of boats will be discussed below. - Auth.), torpedo boats, minesweepers, as well as a significant number of small tugboats converted into patrol and anti-submarine ships. In addition, Bulgarian and Romanian shipyards were ordered to build self-propelled ferry barges, which by that time were well

have proven themselves. ... During the whole of 1941 and several months of 1942, the naval forces of the "Axis" countries in the Black Sea could operate actively, in fact, only due to the fact that the Russians did not show much initiative. The Soviet fleet had much more important tasks ahead of it - the defense and evacuation of bases and troops, the support of Seva Stopol and Odessa "(M., 2004, pp. 338-339).

The author emphasizes that until the end of 1941 the situation in the Mediterranean did not undergo any fundamental changes. At the same time, the post of commander of the naval forces of the Third Reich in the Mediterranean Sea was introduced at the main headquarters of the Italian Navy. Vice-Admiral Weyhold, who took this post, developed a stormy activity; as a result, in November, German boats sank the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and the battleship Bornham, 2 cray sulfurs were destroyed, 2 battleships and a cruiser were seriously damaged. At the headquarters of the Italian command of the Navy, the interests of Germany until the end of 1944 were performed by Rear Admiral Kurt Fricke, who, starting from 1939, simultaneously acted as head of the Operations Department of the Kriegsmarine of the Third Reich. In accordance with Hitler's order and the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder to strengthen the Kriegsmarine forces on the communications of the USA and Great Britain, the German Navy was strengthened in the north of the European continent. So, in March-April 1941, most of the forces of the Danube Flotilla under the command of Captain 1st Rank von Byutov were transferred to Kiel and Wilhelmshafen. The flotilla consisted of 46 submarines, subdivided into 7 divisions. (The author Maslov erroneously states that the Danube flotilla had 7 flotillas; the flotilla can only have brigades, units, divisions, detachments of ships; perhaps this is a mistake

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daktor.) Of these, 11 small submarines were the training base of the flotilla and were serviced by 2 training units that trained torpedo electricians and specialists in other specialties (electricians, navigational electricians, radiometers, hydroacoustics, shunting machinists, minders, gunners, etc.) for servicing submarines. Of these 11 boats, 8 were so outdated that they were at the berths in a semi-submerged state, their crews did not even risk being in the compartments. Only 3 submarines from the First World War were in service. And it was these 3 submarines that were tolerably floating on the water and were redeployed along the Danube to Constanta. Where they stood at the pier until the landing of the Soviet troops in the port - when they were sunk.

But can it be considered a feat or a military trophy that is unsuitable for combat ?!

Is it possible to write down these boats as a "formidable" force, turning from fear into 4 or 14 newest boats in

memoirs of Soviet military leaders and books of post-Soviet

Veteran authors?! Even talking about them is at least not serious...

In order to turn the enemy forces into "terrible" or at least really existing ones, it was necessary to "create" (invent) entire services. For example, in order to tie Admiral Kriegsmarine Frikke to these events, Soviet historians thought of a position for him: Commander of the Naval Forces "South", which "coordinates the naval operations of the Aegean, Adriatic Seas", and at the same time tie - "and the Black Sea", where, in addition to the Romanian submarine "Delfinul", there are 3 submarines of the German Reich ... lying half-submerged ... And for complete credibility, tie Rear Admiral Schulz to Feodosia and Yalta. Yes, indeed, the German Admiral Schultz, like Admiral Brinkmann, was in the Crimea for a short time in 1943, but not in Simferopol and not in Feodosia, but in Evpatoria, since one of the transition routes ran between Evpatoria and Sulina ships and tankers with Romanian oil for the 17th Army of the Wehrmacht, located in the Crimea and Taman. Exactly

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these admirals at the same time gave a negative assessment of this method of delivering oil to the peninsula, and they had every reason to do so. In their opinion, the task of the 17th Army was not strategic for Germany and it was not advisable to deploy the fleet in the Black Sea ports, since all the goals and tasks of the Kriegsmarine were reduced to military operations in the Atlantic and in the north. German admirals visited the Crimea with an inspection! What does it say about the punctuality and pedantry of the headquarters of the Kriegsmarine and the senior officers of Grand Admiral Raeder: to thoroughly and competently figure out on the spot what's what and what needs to be done next ...

But inspectors with high ranks were listed by Soviet historians as commanders of the terrible "fascist" naval forces that did not exist on the Black Sea.

Such information is copied from source to source, hammered into the heads of our fathers and grandfathers, they are already being imposed on our contemporaries - 60 years after that war. To brighten the perception and awareness of the programmed lies, or, as the youth say, "bullshit", let's give a curious but brief analysis of the materials, for example, the same compilers of the collection "The Black Sea Fleet of Russia", who proudly noted their ranks and regalia: admiral, rear admiral, captains of the 1st rank, candidates of naval and historical sciences. "In July 1942, the Nazis had an auxiliary cruiser, 4 destroyers, 3 destroyers, 4 patrol ships, 4 gunboats and 7 submarines, 13 minesweepers, 16 torpedo and 30 patrol boats, about 100 self-propelled barges and over 300 aircraft" (p. 255). Compare with the 1944 data above. "Force" has not decreased, although the valiant victories at sea, as they are described, suggest numerous losses of enemy forces and means ...

So, the year is 1942, the fighting is going on. "During the defense of the Azov military flotilla of the east coast during the hostilities, the enemy lost 21.5 thousand soldiers and officers, 26 aircraft, 4 ships, 5 pontoon boats, 7 tanks and tankettes, and many other equipment" (p. 357) ; "Only in August-September 1942, the boatmen of the 1st and 2nd brigades made 14 exits in

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the Anapa region ... as a result of which 11 enemy ships and warships were sunk and damaged" (p. 265); "for the period from April 17 to June 7, front-line aviation and the Black Sea Fleet Air Force, having made 35 thousand sorties, destroyed 1100 enemy aircraft (well, at one time they destroyed almost EVERYTHING that was on the Soviet-German front at the Luftwaffe during the entire war ! - Avi.), including 800 - in air battles "(pp. 270-271).

In 1943 - "submarines of the fleet sank 26 and damaged 3 enemy ships" (p. 272); "the Black Sea and Azov people sank 96 enemy ships and vessels" (p. 278); The Kerch-Eltigen operation inflicted great damage on the enemy. In the battles from October 31 to December 11, 1943, the enemy lost thousands of soldiers, more than 100 aircraft, and up to 50 tanks" (p. 286); "crews of torpedo boats ... sank 4 enemy ships and a landing barge" (p. 294); "during the entire period from April to May 1944, torpedo boats made 268 exits to the sea ... sank 10 enemy transports and 11 fast landing barges" (p. 295); "submarine A-5 sank the German transport "Durostor" and the schooner "Seyferd", and the submarine Shch-201 sank the transport "Geyseriks", a minesweeper and damaged a landing barge" (p. 295); "during the Crimean operation, submarines destroyed 8 transport vessels, 5 escort ships, damaged 2 transports and 1 ship" (p. 295); "In total, during the Crimean operation, aviation of the Black Sea Fleet destroyed 65 and damaged 55 enemy transports, ships and boats and 81 aircraft" (p. 296); "On August 20, the destroyer Naluka was sunk in Constanta, under the submarine U-9 (isn't it the one that safely lay there half-flooded throughout the war ?! - Avia.), 5 torpedo and 6 hundred-horse boats, a minesweeper, 5 landing barges, the tanker "Dries", the steamer "Rosita", a floating dock and a number of other ships and watercraft. In total... 37 enemy ships were destroyed and 10 damaged" (p. 298); "as a result of the actions of the Danube flotilla... the fascists were forced in early September to sink about 200 ships in Prakhov" (p. 302); in August 1944 "a destroyer, 2 monitors, 32 transports,

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5 torpedo boats, 2 boat minesweepers, 14 barges - a total of 64 units" (pp. 303-304).

In one year, ships, submarines and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet destroyed more enemy ships than he had in the ENTIRE war from 1941 to 1945!

But... from year to year, from book to book, neatly and meaninglessly - no! with exceptionally great meaning! - such figures, brought to the point of absurdity, are being copied, investing in our subconsciousness, first of all, pathological hatred for the Germans, fueled by unwillingness to critically analyze what happened ... If

take all the fabrications of the Soviet military leaders and research

and sum up the destroyed amount of military equipment and weapons of the Wehrmacht, it will turn out that even the economic potential of the richest regions of the planet - the Urals and Siberia - will NOT BE ENOUGH to arm such a super-giant, as it is presented to us, an army destroyed by Soviet troops! Soviet historians claim that the whole of Europe worked for the Third Reich, which is NOT true, and besides, Europe has never had such a powerful economic base as it existed (and exists) in Russia.

Such fabrications in favor of certain market forces appeared for the most part after the death of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, who brilliantly knew the state of affairs in the Kriegsmarine and perfectly analyzed the development of events in one or another naval theater of operations. Because he was one of the few who held back the growing ninth wave of lies...

Chapter 41

REAR IS MORE THAN HALF OF THE VICTORY!

And what about the life and the "secret", still hidden nuances of that war. Let us give only food for thought, first trying to answer the question: why

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the figures presented in official sources, cited in numerous books, cannot correspond to the Truth, cannot completely reveal the picture of what happened in the war of 1941-1945? Figures flashing, including in the tragic events on the Black Sea theater of operations.

During the decades following the end of the Second World War, there were things that were especially carefully closed from the public, both Soviet and world. First of all, this is the quantity of ammunition, weapons and armaments produced and delivered to the front. Behind this simple phrase lies a unique, unsurpassed power, and also - "severe trials", "military labor", "feat" and "victory" - real, without the slightest exaggeration

concepts. Comrade Stalin and the chiefs of the General Staff of the Red Army Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, Antonov, of course, had all the information on this issue, and in the Navy, the admirals Kuznetsov and Isakov. That's the whole list.

We, speaking briefly about the numbers and capabilities of the country, will compile a different list - a list of real winners worthy of standing much higher than individual military leaders who acted on the fronts, including those wearing epaulettes of the navy.

A very difficult victory in the war of 1941-1945. was possible primarily thanks to the gigantic work carried out from 1941 to 1945 to restructure the national economy for the needs of warfare under the general guidance of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and at the same time Chairman of the Council for the Evacuation of Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin (1904 -1980), who in the shortest possible time managed to organize the transfer of the population, industrial enterprises and material resources from the frontline regions of the country, restored the evacuated factories and factories in new places. Of the 1,523 enterprises of the national economy of the USSR during the second half of the year (more precisely, within 2-3 months) of 1941, 78 enterprises were relocated to the eastern regions of the country, 244 to the Krasnoyarsk Territory, 244 to the Novosibirsk Region, 667 to the Chelyabinsk Region, and 667 to Kui Byshev region - 226, to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan - 308.

12 Stalin could strike first No.) 9 7

A.N. Kosygin - Doctor of Economics, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, awarded 6 Orders of Lenin, the Order of Suvorov 1st class, the Order of the October Revolution, the Order of the Red Banner.

During the war years, he relied on the people's commissars, among them:

- D. F. Ustinov (1908-1984), People's Commissar of Armaments of the USSR, later - member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Defense of the USSR, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR Hero of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, the only holder of 10 Orders of Lenin, awarded the Order of Suvorov 1st class, the Order of Kutuzov 1st class.

- A. I. Shakhurin (1904-1975). From 1940 to 1945 - People's Commissar for the Aviation Industry of the USSR; professionally carried out the organization of the evacuation of the country's enterprises to ensure the mass production of military aircraft. He was awarded the Hero of Socialist Labor in the autumn of 1941 (!), Colonel-General-engineer since 1944; was awarded two Orders of Lenin. During the war, he was arrested twice and was in prison, but again, on Stalin's orders, he returned to the post of people's commissar (!).

- P. V. Dementiev (1907-1977), First Deputy Commissar of the Aviation Industry; awarded 8 orders of Lenin and 6 other orders.

- V. V. Vakhrushev (1902-1947); people's commissar of the coal industry; Hero of Socialist Labor, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

- I. I. Nosenko (1902-1956); People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and at the same time was the First Deputy People's Commissar of the Tank Industry. Candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). During the war years, the USSR Navy received the largest number of warships and auxiliary vessels in the world. Under his direct supervision, the best landing ship systems in the world were designed, but the projects were rejected by the USSR government under the standard explanation that "there is not enough money." After the war, these projects were ... carried out in the US Navy. And Nosenko, like Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, ended up on the lists of those who "sold" the secrets of the Soviet country. In 1955 after gi

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While on the battleship Novorossiysk in Sevastopol, Nosenko fell seriously ill and never recovered. And six months before the tragedy, he and Nikolai Gerasimovich were charged, already by Khrushchev's entourage, with selling these secrets. Kuznetsov collapsed with a heart attack as a result. And then the death of Novorossiysk arrived in time ...

During the war years, thanks to the talent of I.I. The Nosenko fleet was also provided with some of the best ships in the world in terms of combat qualities, equipped with hydroacoustics, radar, etc. He was awarded the rank of engineer-rear admiral. Awarded with 3 Orders of Lenin, Order of Nakhimov 1st class, 3 Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, Orders of the Red Star and the Badge of Honor.

- A. P. Zavenyagin (1901-1956); Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Medium Machine Building of the USSR, Colonel General of the Internal Service. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. Awarded 6 Orders of Lenin. From 1938, he supervised the construction of the Norilsk plant, where, in the extremely difficult conditions of the Far North, he quickly managed to organize the largest metallurgical base with the help of prisoners, which made an immeasurable contribution to strengthening the power of the Red Army. At the same time, during the war years, he served as deputy people's commissars for heavy industry, internal affairs, and medium machine building; supervised the construction of the largest industrial and hydraulic structures, enterprises of the mining industry.

- V. A. Malyshev (1902-1957); member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and at the same time - people's commissar of the tank industry of the USSR. Under his leadership, a production base was created in the east of the country in a short time and the production of first-class military equipment was launched. It was under his leadership that tank builders showed high skill and examples of labor heroism. From the second

the first half of 1941 and by the spring of 1942, the tank potential of the Red Army was literally restored; the front received more than 22,000 tanks. We remind the reader that on June 22, 1941, there were more than 21 tanks in the Red Army

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kov, the production of which took about 5 years. In total, during the war years, under his leadership, about 100,000 (!) Tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS) were produced. This is for 3 war years !!! It was a titanic work and an unfading feat of the workers of the tank industry, no less important than the combat work of Soviet soldiers at the front. And this is what kind of "talent" the military leaders needed to have in order to successfully destroy such power For his organizational activities, Malyshev was awarded the title of Colonel General of the Engineering and Technical Service, the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, was awarded 4 Orders of Lenin, the Order of Su thieves 1st class, the Order of Kutuzov 1st class.

- I. F. Tevosyan (1902-1958); member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), Hero of Socialist Labor. During the war years, the German newspaper Völkischer Beobachter wrote during the Battle of Kursk that this battle was a "grand battle of materials", where Russian and Krupp steel fought. And the head of "Russian steel" was the People's Commissar of the black industry of the USSR Tevosyan, who "for special merits in the field of organizing the production of high-quality and high-quality metal for all types of weapons, tanks, aviation and ammunition in difficult wartime conditions" was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. He was awarded 5 Orders of Lenin and 3 Orders of the Red Banner of Labor.

- M. V. Khrunichev (1901-1961). During the war years - First Deputy People's Commissar of the aviation industry. Member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, later - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; Hero of Socialist Labor, awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, the Order of Suvorov 1st class, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. From 1941 to 1945, under his leadership, more than 110,000 aircraft (!); this figure vividly characterizes the exceptional labor feat of aircraft builders during the war years. Hundreds of thousands of machine tools were taken to the deep rear from the European part of the USSR, and gigantic factories were built in Siberia and the Far East in the shortest possible time in severe frosts The production of the latest bombers, fighters, and attack aircraft has been launched. Lieutenant General of the Engineering and Technical Service Khrunichev made a worthy contribution along with Shakhurin, People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR.

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- B. L. Vannikov (1897-1962), Colonel General of the Engineering and Artillery Service, three times Hero of Socialist Labor. From 1939 until the end of the war, he headed the People's Commissariat for Armaments of the USSR. During the war years, the Red Army spent 6bo0-

more than 10 million (!) tons of ammunition. "With this amount of ammunition and that amount of tanks, aircraft, the Red Army could plow up and down not only Germany," he said and added bitterly after drinking a glass of cognac: "If it weren't for the bungling of our marshals and generals ... » In the postwar years, Vannikov, together with Kurchatov, under the leadership of Marshal of the Soviet Union L.P. Beria worked intensively on the creation of atomic weapons. He was awarded 6 orders of Lenin, the Order of Suvorov 1st class, the Order of Kutuzov 1st class.

- A. V. Khrulev, army general (1892-1962). During the war years, he served as chief of the rear of the Red Army, and from February 1942 he was appointed People's Commissar of Railways of the USSR. This fact is known. Army General G.K. Zhukov complained to Stalin that the rear was not adequately providing for the front. The Supreme Commander immediately demanded to call the chiefs of the rear. Andrei Vasilyevich, after listening and without batting an eyelid, reported to the Supreme: "Comrade Stalin! The rear is not guilty! It all depends on the work of the railway transport. I ask you, Comrade Stalin, to subordinate him to me, and the problem will be solved once and for all!" "And you are brave. What rank? - looking at his buttonholes, the Secretary General asked and immediately added: - You can attach the fourth star of the colonel general. The scale of military transportation, which General Khrulev led, is evidenced by the figures: in 1943, 3,572 echelons (171,789 wagons) were brought to the Kursk Bulge, including 1,410 echelons with artillery, tanks, units of the RVGK and about 150,000 wagons with material means, which ensured the success of the battle and the further decisive offensive of the Soviet troops. On this occasion, almost 30 years after the war, the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for Logistics - Head of Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan said: "The rear is half the victory, no, it's a little more than half the victory !"

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And this is the absolute truth. For this truth in the war, called the Great Patriotic War, was verified by all those involved and the above-mentioned commanders - marshals of industry and military leaders of the national economy.

All of them were real front commanders! They, whose names and labor exploits were overwritten in every possible way.

And, as a characteristic nuance, they all could not stand Zhukov and his henchmen, who shouted about the "great victory."

The people could not work heroically if they did not have such economic commanders. Many of them, who survived until the 60s of the twentieth century, had a complete breakdown of the nervous system, were bedridden. They were hurting their health because they did not abandon their front and did not run.

In accordance with the idea "the rear is political meals, no, this is a little more than half of the victory!", the combat activity of all front-line formations, including the Black Sea Fleet, depended on the work of the rear of the fronts. In the Black Sea Fleet at the beginning of the war, it was headed by a unique business executive counter-admiral N.F. Hare, and since 1943 - lieutenant general of the coastal service M.F. Kumanin. In the historical literature about those events, you will not find anything about these people. Literally in the first months after the end of the war, information came to the desk of the head of the Department of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense that both business executives - Zayats and Kumanin - were guilty of ... the loss of material assets necessary for the combat activities of the Black Sea Fleet. For everything that the Soviet commanders of the Crimean Front and the naval commanders of the Black Sea Fleet missed, the business executives had to answer! It is clear how such an absurd accusation could have ended if it were not for the accidental intervention of the People's Commissar for Shipbuilding Nosenko. Who personally, together with Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, turned to Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, proving the absurdity of the accusations.

In order NOT to make it clear at what labor cost that Victory was achieved, NOT to make it clear who is truly involved in exploits and glory - former people's commissars (of the survivors)

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was not invited to the military history conferences held on December 18, 1958 and May 19, 1961. These closed events did not imply any belittling of the role of the "great" Soviet military leaders. And it was these conferences that Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was so eager to get to, who sent letters and statements to various Soviet authorities.

But who needed the truth about the events in Crimea? - first of all, the truth about 1941-1942, which makes one recognize the mediocrity and complete failure of the Soviet command of the Crimean Front and the Black Sea Fleet.

On the other hand, everything went according to the spirit of the time according to the scenario "approved by the party and the government". Members of the Military Scientific Society and veterans wrote reports. Filipp Sergeevich Oktyabrsky prepared his report on the defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942, which, he believed, should become the basis, the main source of information for everyone who writes about the history of the fleet in the Second World War, about the history of the defense of the hero city of Sevastopol and the Main Naval Base of the Black Sea Fleet.

Those present at the 1961 conference were divided into two parts, two camps: on the right side of the hall were those who managed to escape, no! - "evacuate", and on the left - those whom the evacuees did not take with them, i.e. those who were captured and then, later, endured constant humiliation from the authorities. Uniforms of the "right" - warriors covered with glory

The winners were adorned with diamond, platinum, gold, silver and bronze awards. The "leftists" who had been captured had no awards. And this brief description shows the ENTIRE Soviet system!

Chapter 42

THE DEAD DON'T WANT WE TO JOY...

The Russian writer Viktor Petrovich Astafiev said not long before his death: "We somehow managed, not without the help of historical science, to compose a "different war ". How

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this talented person is right, in one wise phrase he assessed both Soviet historical science and the monstrous howl, not of 1941-1945, as it is presented to us ...

And now let's talk about that necessary component of our narrative, which we have so far deliberately avoided. And this will give us a certain touch to understanding the secret mission of the Black Sea Fleet in those terrible years, scorched by millions of deaths of people of different nationalities.

The Chekist front, fully mobilized to the Caucasus, could at any moment receive an order to suppress the Muslim uprising. But this did not happen. And when the German Wehrmacht was outside the Soviet Union in 1944, the deportation of the Muslim peoples of the Crimea and the Caucasus began.

One of the good reasons why the uprising in the Caucasus did not gain real strength was that in the bowels of the General Staff of the Red Army, on Stalin's instructions, a solution was found to defeat the main forces of the Wehrmacht in the southern direction.

In the summer of 1942, a senior officer of the Main Operational Directorate (GOU) of the General Staff of the Red Army, Colonel Potapov (later Lieutenant General), together with his colleagues, developed a plan, which the Chief of the General Staff, General Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky, reported to Stalin on July 30 after careful consideration.

And on September 12, 1942, Stalin ordered Vasilevsky to dedicate General Zhukov to the plan to defeat the Germans; or rather, the defeat of the advanced army of the Wehrmacht - the 6th Army of Colonel General (later Field Marshal) Friedrich Paulus, which entered the operational space, with the ultimate goal of the same capture of the Caucasus and, as a result, the uprising of the Muslims.

On October 15, Stalin appoints Colonel General Vasilevsky as his deputy, as People's Commissar for Defense. And in November he sends him to Stalingrad to coordinate the actions of the fronts, which, in accordance with his plan, began an opera

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mission to block the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. Plan Uranus is in action. Vasilevsky not only justified the confidence of the leader, but also crushed the power of the Wehrmacht in the southern direction with the victorious defeat of the army of Paulus. After this catastrophe, Hitler had a monstrous shortage of manpower and technical reserves, which led to a critical pause in the fighting and the further impossibility of taking strategic initiative into his own hands. While Stalin had huge human resources, and the power of the economy made it possible to build up military potential - all this together led to the fact that the victorious countdown of the Red Army on the way to Berlin finally began. On January 18, 1943, Stalin awarded Vasilevsky the military rank of Army General, and on February 16, he awarded Alexander Mikhailovich the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. After the victory at Stalingrad, Stalin could finally breathe confidently and calmly: the Muslims of the Caucasus had lost hope of Germany's help in destroying the Soviet-Bolshevik regime; if this happened, then the Muslims would undoubtedly be supported by the population of the Don and Kuban. Payback for the fatal fear of Stalin, as indicated above, will come in 1944, when mass deportation begins. After 1942, the life of Lu Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis became much calmer, who, remaining in his posts, would become a lieutenant general, then a colonel general and would go to the fronts as a representative of the Headquarters at first, then he would become a member of the Military Council, and more precisely, the chief military investigator and chief military executioner in the army. But this was already carried out by him without the tension that Lev Zakharovich, under the powerful pressure of Stalin, felt in the Crimea and the Caucasus in 1941-1942. And the coordinator of his will at the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Ivan Stepanovich Isakov, returned after the hospital to his affairs as the head of the GMI, but soon he will be replaced by a recent one. Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral Stepan Grigorievich Kucharov (03/07/1943), with whom N. G. Kuznetsov will complete the fleet's combat path in 1945. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky, at the suggestion of Mekhlis, will be relieved of his post in June 1943.

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And until March 1944 he would head the Amur military flotilla. And at that moment Vice-Admiral Lev Anatolyevich Vladimirovsky (04/23/1943 - 03/10/1944) will deal with the affairs of the fleet. According to some naval commanders, Oktyabrsky was punished by a demotion. But from the point of view of Mekhlis, he was on vacation on the banks

distant safe Amur, replacing palm trees with the no less exotic nature of the Far East. After the nervous stresses and experiences associated with leaving Odessa, fleeing from the besieged Sevastopol, and the tedious waiting for Isakov's order to give, in turn, the order to the squadron to shell the passes and settlements of the Caucasus, Philip Sergeevich could reasonably believe that The Far East is useful to him for strengthening his nerves and restoring health. Already in 1944 he returned to the Black Sea Fleet as a commander. It is known that during the Crimean Conference in Livadia, he was being treated at the Black Sea Fleet sanatorium in Yalta and was constantly lamenting that he had given so much strength to the fleet! - the Supreme Commander of the USSR Armed Forces I.V. Stalin did not visit, who was only a few minutes drive from the sanatorium. But Filipp Sergeevich also had enough of the attention given by Ivan Stepanovich Isakov, thanks to which from 1948 to 1952 he would act as the 1st Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy. Ivan Stepanovich himself, after the Battle of Stalingrad and a year of treatment after losing his leg near Tuapse in 1942, began to "substantiate" the heroic path of the Black Sea and other fleets of the Soviet Union. In the quiet of the cabinets, with abundant food and excellent medical care, with a huge retinue of obsequious performers of his "scientific plans", the hours of the life of this "indefatigable genius of the Soviet fleet" passed.

And in the meantime, while the war was still going on, the Black Sea Fleet, first under the command of L.A. Vladimirov, and then F.S. Oktyabrsky, burned fuel again and again, consumed motor resources and launched torpedoes into the space empty of enemy ships ... however, all this is described in sufficient detail in the book.

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But Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis took care of the Black Sea people ... For don't give them awards or reward them at a minimum - who will believe how heroically they fought, no, not ordinary Black Sea sailors (there is no doubt in their forced outstanding heroism), namely mehlis, October, fist you, etc. Etc. 7!

However, even here there were criteria.

If, for example, we take the troops of the Marshal of the Soviet Union for G. K. Zhukov and the fleet under the command of Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, then, undoubtedly, the distribution list for orders and medals, as well as the titles of Heroes of the Soviet Union, will be much larger there, where G.K. Zhukov leads the troops. Thus, the first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army (later the chief of the General Staff, the only one of the generals of the army who was awarded the Order of Victory), General of the Army Alexei Innokentievich Antonov, based on these nuances, suggested to the Supreme Commander how many orders and medals, as well as heroic ranks to "lower" into the active army (navy).

This is the figure known to historians - 228 Heroes of the Soviet Union - and was "lowered" to the Black Sea Fleet. And then the most interesting thing began (forgive me, front-line soldiers, sailors and soldiers of the war who remained alive, who never knew about it): the division of orders, medals and heroic stars. The list of Black Sea residents awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union is quite large, it will take at least four pages of text to contain all the names. With rare exceptions, the heroic title was awarded to ordinary soldiers, and, as a rule, posthumously, because the Order of Lenin and the Golden Star medal were not awarded to the deceased (family) (!), but only the Diploma of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR signed by the Chairman was awarded to relatives. Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Kalinin and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Gorkin (later Pegova). How petty and sad it is: rejoice, relatives, that in a beautifully designed red folder with gold embossing there are murals of the "all-Union headman" and the secretary of the formal legislative body for the Countries of the Soviets ...

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Many of those honored with the Immortal are truly Heroes: Senior Lieutenant Ivan Semyonovich Pyanzin, battery commander, who died with the batteries defending Sevastopol; Lieutenant Colonel Fyodor Nikolaevich Turgenev, fighter pilot, who died in July 1942; Major Tsezar Lvovich Kunikov, commander of the marine battalion; junior sergeant Mikhail Mikhailovich Kornitsky, Marine; Chief Sergeant Galina Konstantinovna Petrova, Medical Officer of the Marine Corps Battalion; Aviation Major General Nikolai Alekseevich Ostryakov, 29-year-old commander of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force; captain of the 3rd rank Nikolai Ivanovich Sipyagin; machine gunner Nina Onilova; foreman Vasily Dmitrievich Revyakin, head of the economic unit of the 51st Army, and others.

Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union are midshipman Ivan Stepanovich Perov, boatswain of a submarine; former commander of the PA, captain of the 3rd rank Mikhail Vasilyevich Greshilov (awarded on May 16, 1944); Captain 3rd rank Yaroslav Konstantinovich Iosseliani (May 16, 1944); Major Fedor Evgenyevich Kotanov (April 20, 1945); Major Alexander Pekhuwich Tsur tsumiya (February 22, 1944); Captain Evgraf Mikhailovich Ryzhov (October 23, 1942); foreman of the 1st article Noi Petrovich Adamia (July 24, 1942); sailor Kafur Nasyrovich Mamedov (March 31, 1943); sailor Ali Aga-ogly Kafarovich Mamedov (April 20, 1945); sailor Islam Rakhimovich Khalikov (April 20, 1945), others.

... But how to understand that the titles of Heroes of the Soviet Union for the same events, but many years after the war (!) were awarded to Admiral Filipp Sergeevich Oktyabrsky - February 20, 1958, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union (since 1955) Ivan Stepanovich Isakov and Vice Admiral Nikolai Mikhailovich Kulakov, both - May 7, 1965?

By the will of Stalin and Mekhlis, the Black Sea Fleet was to play an important role, but not in the fight against the Wehrmacht, but - together with the Chekist front, operating in the rear of the penal battalions of the fronts of the South-Western direction, which was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny, - play their secret role in the destruction

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Muslims of the Caucasus in the event of their uprising. A. 3. Mekhlis during the war will be awarded four Orders of Lenin, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st class. But these are only official awards! And for the fulfillment of such a responsible task on the Southern Front ... Stalin established an unspoken rule about awarding people (regardless of citizenship!) Orders without a number and a decree! Such awards were presented to some Soviet leaders, and they were dressed only in exceptional cases in a certain narrow circle of the "chosen ones". So, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union three times! He received his first Star without a number "for restoring order in the Soviet troops in the Soviet-Finnish war in 1940"; the second Star - for organizing the forces of the KGB front in the Caucasus and preparing this front for the possible suppression of the Muslim uprising; the third - during the operation "Bagrati on". As a result of the Soviet troops reaching the state border of the USSR, he was awarded the Order of Victory No. 000. And following the end of the war, he was awarded another Order of Victory ... No. October; Well, Stalin was very fond of such "jokes"; Well, this is how the leader swaggered both over his comrades-in-arms and over his descendants ...

Many, including this information, in this book I learn about for the first time. Let it remain a mystery to my readers for the time being how, for what and when - but I also received high government awards on closed lists, awards that CANNOT be worn and that CANNOT be presented ...

1953 marked the end of not only his career, but also the life of Mekhlis. The only official, but still indirect, confirmation of my words can be shots from the film series "The Moscow Saga" based on the novel of the same name by Vasily Aksenov, where the Major General of State Security (performed by People's Artist of the USSR Vyacheslav Shalevich), intercepting an admiring glance towards his order bars, says to his interlocutor, the son of the Marshal of the Soviet Union: "Oh, that's not all. If you saw my real awards, you would be surprised ... "(And how many spectators turned

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attention to THIS phrase?!). And one more circumstantial evidence. In August 1966, on the banks of the Kuban River in Armavir in

In the presence of us, students of the Military Diplomatic Academy, a conversation took place between the head of the Armavir VVAUL Air Defense of the country, Major General of Aviation F. Smetanin and the chief of staff, Colonel N. Bogoslov, who were fighter pilots during the war years. Smetanin and Theologian were talking about awards to Air Marshals Sudts and Savitsky, two commanders-in-chief of the country's air defense forces, who successively held this position; finding out which of them has more awards. The general emphasized in the conversation: "Savitsky deservedly deserved his two Gold Stars, but his opponent is not known for what deeds he was awarded military awards. Personally, I have not read anywhere in official decrees about his awarding ... ". About the "unofficial" awards Meh fox personally told me, in addition to some other witnesses, and the former commander of the mixed air division near Stalingrad in 1942, Hero of the Soviet Union (Gold Star for No. 10), Major General of Aviation F. Shevchenko, who lived after war years in the village of Panfilovo, Novoanninsky district, Volgograd region.

However, those who have ears, let them hear, those who have eyes, let them see; is not it?

After Stalin's death, a new ruler came to power, who, in order to wash himself off from participation in the mass executions of Soviet-Bolshevik figures from the Trotskyist-Leninist "guard", began to pour mud on his bloody cradle: the Stalinist regime. Fearing that they would be thrown out of their habitual orbit of life and excommunicated from the hearty Kremlin feeder, many, sycophantically, joined the ranks of the "supporters" of the new ruler. Then Admiral Oktyabrsky was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. And seven years later, the same Golden Stars adorned the "mighty breasts" of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Isakov and the "brave Commissar of the Great Patriotic War" Vice Admiral Nikolai Mikhailovich Kulakov. Then they awarded three Gold Stars to the Hero of the Soviet Union Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny: February 1, 1958, April 24, 1963, February 22, 1968.

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The price of Soviet awards - individual and collective - speaks for itself.

As well as the assignment of guards ranks to ships, units, formations. The title of guards began to be given after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow. In general, the Soviet "guard" was born on the orders of Stalin, when the proud name was given in advance - whole guard divisions, corps, armies were created, which were thereby supposed to prove that they were the most devoted to the Soviet-Bolshevik power. Thus, the guards rank, which existed in the Russian regiments until 1917, was discredited, because then there were no guards formations and associations, but there were "his majesty the guards Cossack regiment", "Grand Duke Konstantin Mikhailovich guards

page"; there were units (regiments, crews), but not divisions and corps, and even more so - armies. And this honorary title first had to be earned in battles for the glory of the Fatherland and devotion to God and the Sovereign Emperor, as the anointed of God.

And yet another thing is perceived as inexplicable: why did Stalin scoff at the names of outstanding Russian naval commanders and commanders, calling them the names of "naval and commander orders of the USSR", enclosing their images in a pentagram of precious metals (platinum, gold, silver) and rewarding their marshals, generals and admirals? For example, the same F.S. Oktyabrsky received the orders of Ushakov 1st class, Nakhimov 1st class. and Suvorov 2nd Art. Having given the Soviet orders the holy names of Russian commanders and naval commanders, and handing them to the members of his Red Legion, Stalin thereby lowered the names of Suvorov, Kutuzov, Ushakov, Nakhimov, Bogdan Khmel'nitsky and Alexander Nevsky to the level of "Sovietism", "Sharikovism", boundless degradation of the sacred concepts of Military Honor and Dignity ...

For the failure of landing operations, for the unprecedented mediocrity in organizing the defense of naval bases - Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Kerch, Odessa - as if in mockery they were awarded the title of Hero with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to these cities. And with the same sign,

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a tigonol star, as well as an order bearing the name of Blank Lenin, were awarded to the commanders of the fleet and army, who drove thousands of people to death in Odessa, in Sevastopol, in Novorossiysk, in Kerch ...

However, Soviet military leaders are given Soviet awards... So one should not see something special, sacred, sacred in the invented names "Hero City" assigned to the beautiful Russian and Ukrainian cities of the Black Sea. And you shouldn't hold loud celebrations on May 10 on the occasion of the next date of the expulsion of Wehrmacht soldiers from Sevastopol in 1944 or on the occasion of May 9, 1945, which is called Victory Day ... After all, as the surviving veterans of the famous landing say paratroopers) of the landing of the allied forces of the USA and Great Britain in Normandy: "The dead would not want us to rejoice too much ...", especially SO MANY dead, rest in peace

in our lands...

APPLICATION

About the Black Sea Fleet, as they say, day after day, event after event.

1. The composition of the Black Sea Fleet on 06/22/1941 (according to official sources)

nikam);

- battleships - 1,
- cruisers - 6 (1 died),
- leaders and destroyers - 17,
- patrol ships - 2,
- minelayers - 2,
- minesweepers - 12,
- torpedo boats - 78,
- submarine hunters - 24,
- PL - 44,
- naval aviation - 625.

All these data on the composition of the Black Sea Fleet do not correspond to reality, since warships on the Black Sea were in service not only with the Black Sea Fleet, but also with the NKVD and in the border troops.

2. Personnel of the Black Sea Fleet transferred to the Red Army for operations on the land fronts, with the exception of units and formations of the Marine Corps: in 1941 - about 58,000 people; in 1942 - just over 15,000 people; in 1943 - about 8,000 people. The Black Sea Fleet of the Marine Corps had an average of about 50,000 people. This is not counting the troops of the Third Strategic Echelon - armies, divisions, units and barrage detachments of the NKVD, as well as "black" troops - prisoners released from camps; penal battalions and penal companies.

3. Strategic operations of 1941-1945, in which the Black Sea Fleet participated:

- North Caucasian defensive operation 07.25 - 12.31.1942. Southern formations participate (until 07.28.1942),

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North Caucasian fronts, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov military flotilla.

- North Caucasian offensive operation 01.01 - 02.04.1943. Transcaucasian, North Caucasian fronts, part of the forces of the Southern Front, Black Sea Fleet participate.

- Novorossiysk-Taman offensive operation 10.09-09.10.1943. The North Caucasian Front, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov military flotilla are participating.

- Crimean offensive operation 08.04-12.05.1944. The 4th Ukrainian Front, the Separate Primorsky Army, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov military flotilla are participating.

- Iasi-Chisinau offensive operation 20.08-29.08.1944. The 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, the Black Sea Fleet, the Danube military flotilla are participating.

4. Troopers landed by the Black Sea Fleet from 1941 to 1945:

- 1941 - 2; - 1942 - 3;
- 1943 - 5; - 1944 - 5.

In total - 15.

The largest naval landings of the Black Sea Fleet:

- Kerch-Feodosia landing operation 12/25/1941 -01/02/1942. About 60,000 people participated. Landing and landing support detachment: 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 3 gunboats, 24 patrol boats, 5 minesweepers, 2 ships, 14 transports. Azov flotilla - 3 gunboats, 20 minesweepers, 8 patrol boats, 5 minesweepers, 2 minesweeper boats, 3 transports, 162 various auxiliary vessels and watercraft (excluding improvised watercraft).

- Novorossiysk landing operation 09.09-16.09.1943. 7000 people participated. Over 180 combat boats, auxiliary vessels, longboats and improvised means.

- Kerch-Eltigen landing operation October 30 - December 11, 1943. 50,000 people participated. Over 180 combat boats, auxiliary vessels and watercraft.

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All three of the largest landing operations did not fulfill their assigned tasks, and the personnel participating in the landing were almost completely destroyed by Wehrmacht units. The same fate befell small landings: in Evpatoria, South Ozereyka and Stanichka. The complete inconsistency of the theory of landing operations of Admiral I. S. Isakov made itself felt; hence the unpreparedness of these operations by the command of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla. Both Isakov and the leadership of the fleet and flotilla should have learned this from the Americans when conducting landing operations in the Pacific Ocean in World War II - at least those that took place in 1941-1942.

5. The evacuation (flight) of the Black Sea Fleet command and the transfer of personnel, as well as military equipment and weapons from the coastal bridges in 1941-1945:

- from Odessa to Sevastopol: 01-16.10.1941. Separate Primorsky army and parts of the naval base. The main forces of the fleet participated: about 200 ships and transports; at the end: 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 13 shopping malls, 2 gunboats, 1 patrol ship, 34 patrol boats, 2 mines, 6 minesweepers, transports and ships. About 110,000 servicemen were evacuated to the Crimea. And about 25,000 personnel of detachments and bodies of special departments of SMERI, as well as military tribunals and the military prosecutor's office. Data on military equipment: guns, tanks, armored vehicles, cars, tractors, as well as horses and a huge number of various cargoes cannot correspond to reality, since all of this was partly destroyed by the enemy, partly plundered, and partly blown up by fugitives. parts of the army and navy.

- From the Kerch Peninsula to Taman;: 14-28.11. 1941, parts of the 51st and Separate Primorsky Army. The Azov flotilla, the Kerch naval base - more than 60% of the personnel of the two formations were destroyed, the rest were captured by the enemy. Only the command and part of the officers of the headquarters of the three defeated armies managed to leave the Kerch bridgehead; the command of the Crimean Front fled with them. At the same time, the command, headquarters and

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the military department of the completely destroyed heavy-duty 9th Special Rifle Corps. Also, detachments and bodies of special departments of SMERSH were redeployed to Taman to continue the tasks of forming penal battalions as part of the Caucasian fronts.

There is no information about equipment and weapons due to the fact that all military equipment, weapons and ammunition of the forces of the fleet and associations of the Crimean Front in the area of \u200b\u200bPerekop and the Kerch bridgehead were mostly destroyed by the forces of the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht, and partially captured .

- From the Kerch Peninsula to Taman: 16-20.05. 1942, troops of the Crimean Front, Azov Flotilla, Kerch Naval Base. Of the more than half a million grouping of the Crimean Front, practically no one, except for the Military Councils, the headquarters of the associations, managed to escape to Taman.

6. Defense of the naval base of the Black Sea Fleet in 1941-1942:

- Odessa: 08/05-10/16/1941; the duration of the battles was 73 days. The enemy is the 4th Romanian Army (RA), which is significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht armies in terms of power, mobility and professional skills of officers and generals. As part of the army since the beginning of aggression on the territory of the USSR

there were 17 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions. The actions of the 4th RA were supported by Luftwaffe aviation.

The defense was carried out by the Special Maritime Army; 51 coastal defense guns, 24 anti-aircraft guns, 6 ships, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 3 gunboats. And one air regiment.

- Sevastopol: 10/30/1941 - 07/04/1942: duration of battles - 250 days. The enemy was the 54th Corps of the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht, it included 2 divisions that suffered significant losses in offensive battles with the troops of the Crimean Front; the brigade of General Ziegler, operating in parallel with the 22nd Infantry Division in the Belbek Valley; as well as the 132nd Infantry Division. Later, from the side of Ai-Todor, the forces of the 30th Corps arrived in time, also consisting of two divisions: the 50th Pdi and the 72nd Infantry Division.

In terms of numbers, the defending forces of the Soviet army and the Black Sea Fleet significantly outnumbered the forces of the 54th and 30th army corps of the 11th Wehrmacht army.

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7. Losses of warships of the main classes of the Black Sea Fleet;

- cruisers - 1,
- destroyers and leaders — 14,
- submarines - 28,
- patrol ships - 2,
- minesweepers - 20,
- submarine hunters - 54 died, and not even during the hunt for a single Romanian boat,
- torpedo boats - 60,
- patrol boats - 453.

8. About the irretrievable human losses of the Black Sea Fleet:

- information is contradictory; the figures fluctuate in some cases - 82,000 (this minimum figure is unrealistic), in others - 123,000 and even 170,000. never published and never published. Most likely, they exist, these real figures, but they are far beyond the archives known to us, like many other information that has become inaccessible to fellow citizens of the country.

9. Formations, ships and units of the Black Sea Fleet, awarded the right

official awards:

- submarines - 14,
- surface boats - 31,
- naval aviation - 17,
- marines - 8,
- artillery units - 7,
- coastal parts - 6,

In total - 83.

10. Formations and units of the Black Sea Fleet, awarded naval orders:

- Order of Ushakov - 47th Assault Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet (05/24/1945); 2nd brigade of the submarine of the Black Sea Fleet (07/08/1945); 1st trawling brigade (07/08/1945);
- Order of Nakhimov - 1st brigade of shopping mall Black Sea Fleet (07/08/1945).

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11. Gzardei surface ships and submarines of the Black Sea Fleet:

- the cruiser "Red Caucasus", the title was awarded on 04/03/1942
- the cruiser "Red Crimea", 06/18/1942
- the destroyer "Savvy", 03/01/1943
- minesweeper "Defender", 03/01/1943
- Submarine "M-35", 05/31/1943
- patrol boat SKA-065, 07/25/1943
- Submarine "S-33", 07/22/1944; "Sch-215", 07/22/1944; "M 62", 07/22/1944

12. Red Banner surface ships and PA Black Sea Fleet: - the destroyer "Merciless", 04/03/1942 |

- Submarine "L-4", 10/23/1942
- the destroyer "Boyky", 02/27/1943
- ambulance transport "Lviv", 05/31/1944
- Submarine "M-111", 07/22/1944. G.; "M-117", 07/22/1944

- gunboat "Red Abkhazia", 22. 07.1944. G.
- minesweeper "Arseny Rasskin", 07/22/1944
- minesweeper "Mina", 07/22/1944
- minesweeper "Tral", 07/22/1944
- Submarine "S-31b", 11/05/1944; "Shch-201", 11/05/1944 - submarine "Shch-209", 03/06/1945; "A-5", 03/06/1945 - minesweeper "Shield" 03/06/1945
- the battleship "Sevastopol", 07/08/1945 - the cruiser "Voroshilov", 07/08/1945
- destroyer "Zheleznyakov", 07/08/1945
- destroyer Nezamozhnik, 07/08/1945

13. Military honors in memorable places of glorious victories and the heroic death of ships of the Russian and Soviet fleet
tov:

- In honor of the defenders of Novorossiysk, traverse of Cape Doob.
- In honor of the defenders and liberators of Kerch - paratroopers, traverse Mount Mithridates in Kerch.
- In honor of the paratroopers of 1941 in Feodosia and Sudak, 100 kb from the port of Feodosia.

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- In honor of the deceased leader "Kharkov", the destroyers "Merciless" and "Able", 44 degrees 5 minutes from. latitude, 36 degrees 25 minutes E
- In honor of the fallen submarines "S-32", "Shch-214", the destroyer "Bezu Prechny", ambulances "Bialystok" and "Svanetia" (1941-1942), 44 degrees 15 minutes N, 36 degrees 00 minutes east
- In honor of the defenders and liberators of Sevastopol during the Crimean War and the Second World War, traverse of Cape Fiolent.

But is it possible to unite the defenders of Seva Stopol in the Crimean War of 1854-1855 into a single unit? and WWII 1941-1945?! Russian sailors and soldiers of the Empire of the 20th century defended the southern outpost of Russia, and they were led by admirals and generals appointed by the Russian Emperor. Whereas during the defense of 1941-1942. and during the liberation of Sevastopol in 1944, the Black Sea Fleet and army formations were driven into battle by an organization consisting of Chekists and political commissars, who, at a crucial moment (the moment of the catastrophe), easily abandoned Russian, Ukrainian and other sailors and soldiers who fought -

against the soldiers of the Wehrmacht.

- In memory of the heroic landing in Evpatoria in 1942, 50 kb from the lighthouse Evpatoria. There was no heroism in this landing. All sailors of the landing were killed.

- In memory of the victory of the Russian squadron over the Turkish Navy in 1790, in memory of the uprising on the squadron armored ship "Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky" in 1905, in honor of the cannon boat "Red Armenia", the destroyer "Frunze" and tugboat OP-8, which died in 1941, traverse north-west. extremities of the Tendrovskaya Spit.

An unthinkable combination of "yamyati"! Moreover, it is blasphemous to tie to the victory of the Russian squadron in 1790 the memory of the uprising on the battleship, raised by the psychopath Feldman and led to the death of several sailors and civilians. Just as it is incompatible with the feat of Russian sailors to put the feats of Soviet ships on a par.

- In memory of the leaders of the Sevastopol uprising P. P. Schmidt, A. I. Gladkov, N. G. Antonenko, S. P. Cha

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stnik, shot on the island of Berezan in 1906, traverse of the Berezan lighthouse.

This is the same honor as in memory of the so-called "revolutionary" uprising on the battleship Potemkin.

- In honor of the victory of the Russian squadron over the Turkish fleet in 1788, traverse of Snake Island (Fidonisi). This holiday you thought the Soviets after the war, and this is another blasphemy of the Soviet regime, like everything that was done by him and Agitprop regarding the history of the Russian fleet on the Black Sea until 1917. The regime has no right to mock those who fought not for Bolshevik power, but for the Russian country and the honor of the Russian people. It is impossible to unite two heterogeneous societies: Russia of the previous centuries and the USSR of the XX century.

- In honor of the defenders and liberators of Odessa, in memory of the dead submarines "M-33", "M-60", traverse of the Bolshoi Fountain lighthouse.

- In honor of the deceased leader "Moskva", in 50 kb from May ka Constanta.

- In honor of the victory of the Russian squadron over the Turkish fleet in 1791, traverse of Cape Kaliakra (Kaliakria).

And again "victory over the Turkish fleet"; moreover, wikis have nothing to do with these events. But... the authors of these events of "memory", being sophisticated psychologists of the ideological department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, thought very carefully about what dates to celebrate and what honors

conduct. And it was not in vain that they focused their attention, linking it to the Soviet-Bolshevik reality, on two battles between Russian sailors and the Turkish fleet on the Black Sea. With this, the Soviet-Bolshevik regime foresaw a wedge between Russians (Orthodox Christians) and Turks (Muslims). Pulling out of history the confrontation between Russia and Turkey is deliberately laying a time bomb in relations between Christians and Muslims.

- In honor of the submarines who died during operations on enemy communications in the western part of the Black Sea, 42 degrees 53.8 minutes from. latitude, 28 degrees 03.06 minutes E. d.

And this sign is a desecration of the sailors and officers who died during the raids on the Romanian coast from

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their own mines, due to the carelessness and mediocrity of the commanders and political workers of surface ships and submarines. How, for example, to call it when a submarine commander, without receiving information from the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, launches a torpedo attack on a water ship of his own Black Sea Fleet, and that, in turn, destroys it with depth charges (as it was when the leader " Moskva" was torpedoed by a Soviet submarine, destroying it with a bomb attack). I wonder what expressions on their faces looked at this blasphemy, knowing how everything happened, Admirals Isakov, Oktyabrsky, Azarov, Kulakov and some others ?! If we talk about memory, then the descendants of all those dead, all those cruelly ruined sailors, knowing the reality, should have cursed the "great" Soviet-Bolshevik military leaders. But ... as the propaganda kept saying, it was thanks to the military leaders and prominent political workers that everyone - both the dead and the survivors - "showed mass heroism and demonstrated the highest morale and devotion to the cause of communism", for which they were appreciated by the Soviet government . Propaganda convinced the Soviet people of this. What do descendants think?

14. Transportations carried out by the Black Sea Fleet during the war years:

- Provided transportation of 2,632,267 tons of military cargo, 1,720 tanks, over 7,500 guns, 40,000 vehicles, 320,000 tons of ammunition, 77,000 head of livestock, 1 million tons of oil products and about 2 million people. |

Let me just say that the figure of 2 million people, appearing in official sources, reflects the delivery of these 2 million to the front and back: there - soldiers and officers, back - the civilian population from the front line. Even these data show that with such a quantity of men, armaments, ammunition and supplies it was possible to crush more than one von Manstein's army.

15. General assessment of the merits of the Black Sea Fleet by the government during the war of 1941-1945:

- awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union - 228 Chernomorians,

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- awarded orders and medals - 54,766 people,

- ships, units and formations that have become order-bearing mi - 55,

- ships and units awarded the title of guards - 18.

Many of them were given honorary titles: Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Kerch, Nikolaev, etc.

— awarded the honorary title of "Hero City" with the award of the medal "Gold Star" to the Black Sea cities: Sevastopol, Odessa, Novorossiysk and Kerch.

And, as official sources say, "taking into account the great merits of the Black Sea people to the Motherland during the Second World War, the Black Sea Fleet was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1965."

The main dates of events in the Black Sea Fleet during the Second World War:

1940:

- May 7 - The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the highest officer (general and admiral) ranks. Since June 4, the USSR Navy has 3 admirals, 8 vice admirals, 46 rear admirals, 17 engineer rear admirals.

- May 25 - The Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on strengthening the Black Sea Fleet. |

- June 28 - the formation of the Danube military flotilla as part of the Black Sea Fleet began, as an integral part of the fleet to capture the oil fields of Romania.

1941:

- May 7 - People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov ordered the commanders of the fleets to increase the composition of the combat core, to strengthen naval reconnaissance and ship patrol service.

- June 14-18 - the last joint exercise of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, troops of the Odessa Military Okrug took place

friend and the strongest in the Red Army - the 9th Special Army

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(the number of personnel and weapons was several times greater than the strength of any of the Soviet military districts), as well as the most powerful in the Red Army - the 9th Special Rifle Corps (the number of personnel and weapons was several times higher than the number of personnel and weapons of any of armies - the highest operational-strategic association of the Red Army).

- June 19 - People's Commissar of the Navy ordered all fleets to switch to combat (operational) readiness No. 2. It was installed at the Black Sea Fleet on June 14 and was fully preserved.

- June 21 - People's Commissar of the Navy at 21 h. 50 min. ordered all fleets to switch to the highest combat readiness No. 1, not only in connection with a possible surprise attack by the German Wehrmacht, but also in connection with the beginning of the deployment of the strategic aggressive plan "Groza". This is not surprising, because the Second World War was already underway (and carried on September 1, as historians write, and from August 16, 1939).

- June 22 - a Luftwaffe raid on Sevastopol was carried out.

- June 22-23 - in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy, the first air raids by the Black Sea Fleet aviation were carried out on Constanta and Sulina. At the same time, the laying of defensive minefields near Sevastopol, Odessa, Novorossiysk and other areas of the Black Sea continued, the victims of which would soon become Soviet warships and transports of the Naval People's Commissariat.

- June 26 - an unsuccessful raid of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet on Constanta was carried out.

- July 7-13 - the first air raids of the Black Sea Fleet on Ploiesti were carried out. The bombing was unsuccessful.

- August 5-October 16 - the defense of Odessa.

- August 15 - Submarine Shch-211 sank a Romanian schooner, opening a battle account for Black Sea Fleet submariners.

- September 22 - landing at Grigorievka. Most of the paratroopers died.

- September 24-29 - the defeat of most of the forces of the 9th USC by the forces of one division of the 11th Wehrmacht Army on the Perekop Isthmus.

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- September 29 - units of the 51st Army and the 9th USC retreated (fled) from the Ishun positions.
- September 30 - Odessa left. The evacuation was completed on 16 October.
- October 27 - The 22nd Infantry Division of the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops on Ishuni, and 2 days later the command of the Black Sea Fleet declared a state of siege in Sevastopol.
- October 30, 1941 - until July 1, 1942, defensive battles were going on in the fortress. Order of the Supreme Commander of the USSR Armed Forces I.V. Stalin of November 7: "Do not surrender Sevastopol in any case and defend it with all your might!" - was not carried out by the commander of the Black Sea Fleet and the Military Council.
- November 16 - the defeat of three Soviet armies on the Kerch Peninsula was completed; Kerch was occupied by Wehrmacht soldiers. Most of the Soviet soldiers surrendered to captivity.

1942:

- January 5 - unsuccessful landing in Evpatoria.
- January 16-25 - the landing of tactical assault forces by ships of the Black Sea Fleet in Sudak.
- January 28 - the formation of the Crimean Front.
- June 30 - Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, together with the Military Council, the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as members of the bureau of the Seva Stopol City Committee of the Communist Party, left to the mercy of fate more than 120,000 garrison in Seva stopol, as well as the civilian population.

1943:

- February 4-7 - failed landing in the area of South Ozereyka - Stanichka. A rather successful creation of the Malaya Zemlya bridgehead by the forces of the 18th Airborne Army (commander Lieutenant General Leselidze, member of the Military Council Kolonin, head of the political department, brigade commissar L.I. Brezhnev).
- October 31-December 11 - Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. During its implementation, the paratroopers suffered heavy losses.

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1944:

- February 25 - Reconstruction of the headquarters of the Sevastopol Naval Base.

- April 8-May 12 - Crimean offensive operation of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the Separate Primorsky Army and the Black Sea Fleet.

- May 9 - Sevastopol is occupied by Soviet troops.

- May 12 - completion of the operation to defeat the 17th Wehrmacht army in Chersonese.

- August 20-29 - Iasi-Kishinev offensive operation.

- August 20 - Black Sea Fleet air strike on Constanta.

- August 25 - landing and capture of Old and New Kiliya. |

- August 26-27 - landing and capture of Tulcea and Sulina. |

- August 29 - landing and capture of Constanta.

- September 9 - landing of amphibious assault forces in Varna and Burgas. Cessation of hostilities in the Black Sea.

- November 5 - return to Sevastopol of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

August 1947 - a visit to the Black Sea Fleet by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo of the Soviet Union I.V. Stalin and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin in order to restore the Main Naval Base, the city of Sevastopol, and the Black Sea Fleet of the country.

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